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Abstract
This thesis aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the optimal
coordination of monetary and scal policy in complex economic environments.
We analyze the characteristics of optimal dynamics in an economy in which
neither prices nor wages adjust instantaneously and lump-sum taxes are unavailable
as a source of government nance. We then propose that monetary and scal policy
should be coordinated to satisfy a pair of simple specic targeting rules, a rule for
ination and a rule for the growth of real wages. We show that such simple rule-based
conduct of policy can do remarkably well in replicating the dynamics of the economy
under optimal policy following a given shock.
We study optimal policy coordination in the context of an economy where a
constant proportion of agents lacks access to the asset market. We nd that the
optimal economy moves along an analogue of a conventional ination-output variance
frontier in response to a government spending shock, as the population share of non-
Ricardian agents rises. The optimal output response rises, while ination volatility
subsides. There is little evidence that increased government spending would crowd
in private consumption in the optimal economy.
We investigate the optimal properties and wider implications of a macroeco-
nomic policy framework aimed at meeting an unconditional debt target. We show
that the best stationary policy in terms of an unconditional welfare measure is char-
acterized by highly persistent debt dynamics, less history-dependence in the conduct
of policy, less reliance on debt nance and more short-term volatility following a gov-
ernment spending shock compared with the non-stationary timelessly optimal plan.
JEL Classication: C61, E52, E61, E63.
Keywords: Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Timeless Perspective, Nomi-
nal Rigidity, Non-Ricardian Agents, Stationary Policy, Unconditional Debt Targets.
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Introduction
There have been notable advances in the dynamic theory of optimal scal and
monetary policy in the short period of time since the insightful overview by Chari
and Kehoe (1999). This recent research e¤ort, still grounded in the public nance
tradition following Ramsey (1927), has focussed on models with incomplete markets
for government debt and often with price rigidities. In considering jointly optimal
programs for monetary and scal policy, this work has shed new light on a number
of old issues, such as the desirability of ination as an instrument of tax policy, the
optimality of the Friedman Rule, the optimal time-series prole of debt and taxes
and the welfare costs of price dispersion. In particular, the analyses of models in
which non-distortive taxes are unavailable and price-dispersion is costly has led to a
fundamental review of earlier policy implications. In these frameworks, governments
face a trade-o¤ between distortions caused by uctuations in taxes and ination in
response to shocks hitting the economy.
In short, recent contributions to the literature on welfare-maximizing models of
optimal monetary and scal policy have sought to test the robustness of earlier policy
recommendations derived in simpler setups to more complex modelling environments.
1
Introduction 2
The aim of this thesis is to extend this analysis by considering economies subject
to multiple distortions that go beyond those already analyzed in the literature. We
shall study optimal monetary-scal coordination in economies where both prices and
wages are rigid, where a certain proportion of agents has no access to the asset market
and where setting of policy goals is subject to exogenous inuences that prevent the
implementation of the optimal plan. Thereby, we wish to present an analysis that
o¤ers useful guidance for policy, sheds more light on issues of concern in the current
public debate and is innovative with respect to the work already accomplished in the
area.
In this introductory chapter, we rst review the earlier contributions that have
shaped the understanding of optimal policy design in the past three decades. We
identify some issues that have so far been left unanswered and explain the conceptual
framework being employed in this thesis to analyze optimal policy in complex envi-
ronments. Finally, we give a brief account of the key results that will emerge from
our analysis and introduce the structure of the thesis.
I.1 Literature
The literature on optimal monetary and scal policy has developed from two sepa-
rate streams of literature on monetary policy and public nance, as new contributions
tried to assess the validity of some earlier results under more complex, and indeed
more realistic circumstances. In terms of methodology, the literature we concentrate
on in this thesis is grounded in the tradition of Ramsey (1927), though a signicant
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part of the debate has been conducted in the context of models with simple policy
rules. Broadly speaking, the Ramsey-type analysis involves dening a policy problem
whereby the policy maker maximizes social welfare determined by individual utility,
taking into account the optimizing choices of agents, rms and the requirement of
scal sustainability of policy plans. The simple rules stream of analysis emerged
as a consequence of the literature on time-inconsistency, most prominently Kydland
and Prescott (1977).1 This popular alternative to the welfare-maximizing approach
involves supplementing a linear structural model of the economy with policy instru-
ment rules that are argued to be of descriptive value. In this thesis, we shall refer to
this sizeable literature only to the extent that the results bear direct relevance for the
analysis and conclusions arising from the Ramsey-type models of optimal policy.2
Recent contributions to the literature considering the public nance implications
of monetary policy strategies in the context of economies subject to nominal and real
rigidities have signicantly altered the professions view regarding the optimal rate
of ination and its volatility in the face of shocks, and the optimal volatility of the
tax rate. In particular, Friedmans (1969) zero nominal interest rate rule and Barros
1 Kydland and Prescott (1977) questioned the usefulness of optimal control theory in designing stabilization
policies when agents are forward-looking and rational. They show, using a simple numerical example, that
if policy is chosen using optimal control methods assuming that expectations regarding future policy do not
inuence agents behaviour whereas in reality they do, such conduct will in most cases be welfare-dominated
by a simple rule-based conduct of policy and might even in some cases paradoxically destabilize a stable
economy. They argued that optimal control methods are appropriate if current outcomes and the movement
of the systems state depend only upon current and past policy decisions and upon the current state. Holly
and Zarrop (1983) then suggested a straightforward modication to standard optimal control problems
that would take into account the rationality of forward-looking agents expectations. Policies formulated
this waytermed expectations-consistentneed not lead to instability even when the standard approach
would imply more instability. More discussion regarding the problem of time inconsistency and the design
of optimal policies will follow.
2 A full review of this voluminous literature is beyond the scope of the introduction to this thesis. We
highlight Leeper (1991) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) as prominent general contributions.
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(1979) perfect tax smoothing result have been a subject of an intense debate over the
years.
Friedman (1969) argued that the economy should optimally be deated at a
rate that (approximately) corresponds to the rate of return on capital. This policy
would result in zero nominal interest rates in the economy and would thus remove
the wedge of ine¢ciency between the private marginal cost of holding money and the
social marginal cost of producing money created by positive nominal interest rates.
Barro (1979) has shown that given some assumptions about the nature of the
economy and the tax system, taxes as a percentage of aggregate income should opti-
mally be perfectly smoothed over time. He showed this in a simple Ricardian frame-
work in which taxation is associated with convex welfare costs and the policy maker
is constrained to issue one-period (real) securities. Aggregate income and government
spending were assumed to be exogenous and could vary independently of each other.
This framework yielded some notable conclusions. An expected transitory rise in gov-
ernment spending has a small positive e¤ect on taxes which, if aggregate output is
unchanged, stay constant over time. It is the use of debt nance that enables perfect
smoothing of taxes over time. Public debt (decit) responds positively to temporary
rises in government spending and behaves countercyclically in response to accelera-
tions of output growth beyond the trend rate. The ratio of public debt to output is
derived to be constant on average but is shown to rise in periods of abnormally high
government spending or abnormally low output growth.
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The modern analysis of optimal monetary and scal interaction begins with Lu-
cas and Stokey (1983). In a exible-price representative-agent framework without
capital in which government can only raise taxes via distortive means but has ac-
cess to a complete set of state-contingent securities, they set a benchmark for later
analysis.3 Given the neoclassical foundations of the model, there is no rationale for
macroeconomic stabilization policy, yet the analysis is insightful in many di¤erent re-
spects. First, we learn that provided there is a rich enough set of state-contingent
securities in a barter economy, optimal policy can be made time-consistent but, in
general, there is a time inconsistency problem in a monetary economy.4 When there
are nominal claims in circulation in the economy (perhaps alongside claims to real
obligations), it is optimal at any given point in time to inate the economy to erode
the real value of outstanding claims. This policy strategy reduces the need to use
distortive tax to nance current and future surpluses that would have been needed
to maintain scal sustainability. This would, however, result in the inability of the
government to issue nominal liabilities and thereby a need for more tax nance in
the rst place and a reduction in welfare. A commitment technology to deliver a
certain evolution of the price level is needed to ensure time consistency. In the ab-
3 We shall concentrate on models without capital. Chari et al. (1991) introduce physical capital into
the analysis in a exible-price framework and conclude that the optimal tax on capital is zero on average.
Otherwise, the tax on capital works as one of the means of making asset returns state-contingent. Jones et al.
(1993) model both physical and human capital in a model of endogenous growth and nd that if government
expenditures are used for productive purposes, the asymptotic tax rate on capital becomes strictly positive.
In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), when the government is allowed to implement di¤erential tax rates on
wage and capital income, the optimal tax on capital income becomes a volatile subsidy, as it serves as a
means to correct ine¢ciencies and absorb shocks in the model.
4 In short, a policy plan is time-consistent if it is optimal not to deviate from the policy plan announced
in period t in any period t+ j for all j.
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sence of a technology that would force future policy makers to consider the impact of
their decisions on current allocations, a similar time inconsistency problem arises as
in Kydland and Prescott (1977). Second, it emerges from the analysis that debt facil-
itates tax and consumption smoothing and can be an instrument of insurance in the
face of imperfectly foreseen shocks. Third, the Friedman (1969) rule is shown to be
optimal. As explained in Lucas (1986), in the absence of government activity what-
soever, such policy removes the wedge of monetary ine¢ciency that arises because in
a cash-good, credit-good framework, the marginal rate of substitution between cash
and credit goods is not equal to their marginal rate of transformation of 1 unless in-
terest is paid on cash or equivalently no nominal interest is paid on credit goods. In
the presence of government activity, and hence distortive taxation at the same rate on
both cash and credit goods, having positive nominal interest rates would mean tax-
ing one of the goods at a di¤erent rate. In the sense of Ramsey (1927), this would be
justied only if the two goods had di¤erent consumption elasticities. Finally, the tax
rate optimally inherits the time-series properties of the spending shock a¤ecting the
economy. Sargent and Velde (1999) emphasize this implication of Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and highlight the contrast with Barros (1979) result, which they show to be
equivalent to taxes following a Martingale process.
In a similar neoclassical setting, Chari et al. (1991) have found that tax rates
are optimally remarkably stable over time, even though they inherit the time-series
properties of the underlying shock. The stability of the tax rate is enabled by either
the availability of state-contingent debt or via high ination volatility which acts to
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make state-noncontingent nominal debt state-contingent in real terms. The Friedman
rule remains optimal for a large class of utility functions.5
The basic Lucas and Stokey (1983) framework has been extended to include
asset market imperfections by Aiyagari et al. (2002). Whilst recovering the Lucas and
Stokey (1983) result of taxes inheriting the time-series properties of the government
spending shock under complete markets, they nd that the optimal Ramsey outcome
for the tax rate with asset market imperfections is a blend of Lucas and Stokey (1983)
and Barros (1979) Martingale result. The tax rate optimally rises in the period the
transitory shock to government spending occurs and then resembles a Martingale,
as in Barro (1979). In other words, under complete markets, the tax rate follows a
white noise process (if the underlying shock is white noise), while under incomplete
markets, the behaviour of the tax rate is a near unit root process.
While the above literature has signicantly extended the understanding of opti-
mal tax policy, its neoclassical foundations, namely the absence of nominal rigidities,
have limited the extent to which it could contribute to the understanding of optimal
policy over the economic cycle. In Chari et al. (1991), for example, it is the avail-
ability of high ination volatility as a costless means of absorbing shocks that renders
nominal state-noncontingent debt state-contingent in real terms. This in turn makes
5 Aruoba and Chugh (2006) argue that these conclusions would be completely reversed, should one intro-
duce money in a more fundamental way than Chari et al. (1991) who use a simple cash-good, credit-good
model. They show in the context of a search model of money similar to Lagos and Wright (2005) that the
Friedman rule is not optimal and optimal ination volatility is low even if markets are perfectly competitive
and exible. In such a setup, there are rents associated with holding money which are optimally (partially)
taxed away through a positive nominal interest rate. Optimal ination volatility is low, as it distorts the
relative price of goods in the centralized market relative to the decentralized market.
Introduction 8
zero nominal interest rates and highly smoothed tax distortions a feasible and optimal
monetary-scal policy mix.
At the same time, there have been signicant advances in analyzing optimal sta-
bilization in the context of models of monetary policy in economies subject to some
form(s) of nominal rigidity. Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) provide lucid
summaries of the most important advances on this front. The principal conclusion
coming out of this stream of literature is the optimality of zero or near-zero ina-
tion across time and states of nature even if the degree of nominal rigidity involved
is only small. The studies also represent a strong case for ination targeting regimes,
possibly governed by some form of specic targeting rule, as proposed by Svensson
(2002, 2003). Also, one cannot appreciate enough the methodological contribution
of this literature, as it managed to embrace the technical rigour of neoclassical eco-
nomics and combine it with Keynesian ideas of imperfect price and wage adjustment
in a way which yields useful guidance for the conduct of policy. However, the great-
est drawback of this stream of literature is that it does not take into account the
scal consequences of alternative monetary policy strategies. Lump-sum taxes were
assumed to be available to handle the scal consequences of shocks and sometimes
also to eliminate the distortions to the steady state due to the frictions present in the
economy.
In reality, when nominal rigidities are present in the economy and lump-sum
taxes are unavailable as a source of revenue for the policy maker, governments face
a non-trivial choice between distortions caused by volatility in ination and in the
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tax rate following shocks a¤ecting the economy. A recent series of papers has exam-
ined such economies. They all consider frameworks in which non-distortive means
of raising government revenue are unavailable, markets for debt instruments are
incompletedebt is nominal and one-period onlyand there is some form of nomi-
nal rigidity involved. For example, Benigno and Woodford (2003) assume rms set
prices in a staggered way, according to the mechanism put forward by Calvo (1983).
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) introduce imperfect price exibility via convex
costs of price adjustment whilst Siu (2004) uses a cash-credit good model in which
he divides (intermediate) producers into sticky and exible price rms to introduce
nominal inertia.
The results of these latest models carry several notable common features. First,
even a small degree of price stickiness implies a signicant reduction in optimal ina-
tion volatility since ination is no longer a costless shock absorber and the volatility of
the tax rate rises compared with the exible-price situation. Second, the tax rate fol-
lows a near random walk process for any positive degree of price stickiness regardless
of the persistence of the shock but inherit the time-series properties of the shock when
prices are exible. Hence, the dynamics of the tax rate under sticky prices resembles
the one derived with real state-noncontingent debt derived in Aiyagari et al. (2002),
while the Lucas and Stokey (1983) complete-market conclusions are more in line with
exible prices. This is intuitive, since nominal state-noncontingent obligations can
be made state-contingent in real terms via high ination volatility and this option is
available when prices are exible but unappealing under sticky prices. However, these
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results were shown to uphold only subject to certain qualications. Siu (2004) has
also considered optimal responses to large government spending shocks and concluded
that for those, tax-smoothing considerations would dominate and optimal ination
volatility would rise. This is because the costs of resource misallocation due to high
ination are bounded.6 Correia et al. (2003) have argued that given a su¢ciently rich
structure of the tax system, exible-price allocations are attainable even under sticky
prices. Third, it might be optimal to let public debt and the tax rate drift following
even transitory shocks under sticky prices. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) explain
that when price changes are costly, governments nance an innovation in government
spending partly by raising debt and partly via higher taxes. To avoid a large distor-
tion in the period when the shock occurs, the government spreads the required tax
increase over many periods by raising the level of public debt permanently. Servicing
a permanently higher level of debt requires permanently higher tax rates. The opti-
mality of this outcome hinges upon the fact that the discounted welfare losses arising
from a permanently higher tax rate (i.e. output below the pre-shock level) are a price
worth paying for less short-term volatility.7 Fourth, the papers shed new light on
the conditions under which Friedmans (1969) rule is optimal. In Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004a), the Friedman Rule is optimal under perfect competition in the prod-
uct market and exible prices but ceases to be optimal if imperfect competition or
6 In a highly volatile environment, risk-averse producers would always set prices as if they expected a large,
positive (inationary) spending shock. This happens because they try to avoid a situation in which they
would set prices too low and facing high demand, they would run losses. By contrast, if they set prices too
high, the worst outcome is that the face zero demand and make zero prot.
7 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) show this time-series property of debt under price stickiness carries over
to an economy with capital.
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nominal rigidity is introduced.8 A crucial qualication to be made here is that prots
are untaxed in their model. An appropriate tax on the rent associated with imper-
fect competition could eliminate the desirability of ination tax as an indirect tax on
prots under price exibility but not under price rigidity when any deviation from
the zero-ination steady-state is costly.9 The link with taxation of prots has also
been made in Siu (2004) who also nds for the exible-price economy that keeping
nominal interest rate at zero level across time and states of nature is optimal given
some properties of the consumers utility function. Benigno and Woodford (2003)
abstract from transaction frictions, therefore such considerations do not arise and
zero steady-state ination is optimal in their framework. The analysis in Woodford
(2003, Chapter 7), however indicates a deationary optimal outcome might re-emerge
should one include money balances in the analysis. Even then though, the optimal
rate of deation would likely be much lower than the rate suggested by the Friedman
rule. Finally, the optimal policy is predictably time-inconsistent in these frameworks.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and Siu (2004) bypass the issue by assuming the
existence of a technology whereby the policy maker can commit himself to implement
a given nite price level or equivalently a given level of real obligations for the ini-
tial period. Benigno and Woodford (2003) have proposed formulating policies that
are optimal from a timeless perspective. This approach to optimal policy has been
8 The Friedman rule might under some circumstances emerge to be optimal even under price stickiness.
In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), this is the case when non-optimizing price setters fully index to past
ination and all sources of income are taxed at the same rate. Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) reported the
same result in a monetary policy framework.
9 See also Chugh (2006) for a similar result. Interestingly, Chugh (2006) also nds that imperfect compe-
tition in the labour market alone does not justify a departure from the Friedman rule but aggravates the
degree of the departure, if it is generated by imperfect competition in the product market.
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given a sophisticated rationale in Woodford (2003) and most recently in Benigno and
Woodford (2006b). Formulating policies from a timeless perspective entails only a
milder sort of commitment. Rather than promising to deliver a specic policy in the
initial period, one only commits himself to choose policy using the same procedure
regardless of time and the state of nature. This procedure coincides with the one the
policy maker would have used to determine policy in the given period, had he made
the decision in the distant past. One way to express this commitment in simpler se-
tups is in the form of a time-invariant and history-dependent ination targeting rule.
We shall return to this question in more detail in the third section of this introductory
chapter.
To sum up, the profession has come a long way in the understanding of some
key policy questions since the early contributions. Development in the methodology
of analysis enabled researchers to look at old policy issues from new perspectives
and resolve non-trivial decision problems policy makers face in more complex and
also more realistic environments. The lessons to be learned from the literature can
be summarized as follows: 1) Debt nance provides a vehicle to smooth distortions
over time; 2) Regardless of the properties of the underlying shock, taxes optimally
follow a near random walk process when market for debt instruments are incomplete
or when prices are rigid, as 3) optimal ination volatility falls signicantly for only
a small degree of inexibility in prices and ination volatility can then no longer
serve as a means of making nominal state-noncontingent debt state-contingent in real
terms; 4) For a large class of problems, nominal interest rates are optimally kept
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at zero across time and states of nature under exible prices but the Friedman rule
in general does not hold under sticky prices and when there are untaxed rents in
the economy; 5) In the absence of a full set of state-contingent securities, or of an
appropriate commitment technology, the optimal policy in forward-looking rational
expectations frameworks is time-inconsistent.
In this thesis, we wish to examine the properties of optimal policy and the
performance of the economy when one or more of the additional existing assumptions
about the nature of the economy are relaxed.
I.2 Issues
In this section, we highlight the issues we aim to address in this thesis. As the
title of the thesis suggests, we aim to explore the consequences of more complex
environments for the optimal conduct of monetary and scal policy. The questions to
be addressed include: What are the consequences for optimal policy design of nominal
wage rigidity in addition to price rigidity when only distortive taxes are available to
nance government revenue? How would optimal policy and dynamics of the economy
change if we include liquidity-constrained agents into the model, as suggested by the
empirical literature? What is the optimal degree of scal feedback if the policy is
aiming to satisfy an unconditional debt target?
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I.2.1 Consequences of nominal wage rigidity
It has been known for some time, that sticky price but exible-wage models generate
real wage dynamics that are at odds with empirical evidence. In models with sticky
prices but exible wages, the real wage rate is highly volatile across the economic
cycle, whilst Stock and Watson (1999), for instance, observe that real wages in the
United States have displayed essentially no contemporaneous comovement with the
business cycle.10 A similar point has been made by Christiano et al. (1997, 1999)
who concluded in Christiano et al. (2005) that inclusion of staggered nominal wage
contracts might be the powerful tool that would generate real wage dynamics in line
with observed data.
Erceg et al. (2000) have analyzed optimal monetary policy in an economy where
both prices and wages are set according to a staggered mechanism put forward by
Calvo (1983). The policy objective under price and wage stickiness includes a wage-
ination stabilization term in addition to the ination and output gap stabilization
terms of a conventional exible-wage setup. As proved in Damjanovic and Nolan
(2006), price dispersion is costly because it introduces an ine¢cient dispersion of
production across rms: more labour is then needed to produce the same level of
aggregate output and costs are higher too. When wages are set in a staggered way, an
analogous problem arises. Wage ination induces an ine¢cient dispersion in labour
supply across types of labour. Both are then associated with welfare costs. In a
10 Chadha et al. (2002) also nd statistically insignicant correlation between output and real wages,
though the fact that this need not hold for the entire history of UK business cycle uctuations is shown in
Chadha and Nolan (2000).
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linear-quadratic setting, the authors conclude that the Pareto optimum associated
with maximum welfare is attainable if either product or labour market contracts are
exible but not when contracts in both markets are subject to staggered wage setting.
If one of the markets is exible, the corresponding ination term drops out from the
objective function and maximum welfare is attainable via a zero-ination target in
the other market. On the other hand, however, a zero-ination target as a simple
policy rule might be harmful for the economy if both prices and wages are rigid. In
that case, simple rules are preferable and can deliver levels of welfare similar to the
optimal policy.
A principal assumption that underlies the model in Erceg et al. (2000) is the
availability of lump-sum taxation. This allows them not to consider the potential
level e¤ects of stabilization policies and also to ignore the implications of alternative
monetary policies for the scal side. Benigno andWoodford (2004) have dealt with the
case when lump-sum subsidies are not available to o¤set the distortions to the steady
state caused by distortive taxation and excess power in product and labour markets,
generalizing Erceg et al. (2000). It turns out that with an ine¢cient steady state, some
of the principal conclusions of Erceg et al. (2000) fail to hold. In particular, it may
not be possible to attain maximum welfare even if one of the markets is perfectly
exible. This is due to the presence of cost push shocks in the aggregate supply
relationships. Cost push shocks arise in models with a distorted steady state, if the
e¤ect of the shocks is to shift the natural and the welfare-e¢cient rates of output to a
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di¤erent degree.11 Benigno and Woodford (2004) also argue that for the same reason,
the welfare e¤ects of simple rules are likely to be less favourable.
Benigno and Woodford (2004) have, however, retained the assumption that
lump-sum instruments are available to satisfy the requirement of scal solvency. In
Chapter 2 of the thesis, we relax this second assumption and examine the attributes
of optimal monetary-scal coordination in such a framework.
In the meantime, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) have analyzed optimal policy
in the Christiano et al. (2005) model. They nd price stickiness to be the single
most important distortion in the economy justifying price stability as the central goal
of monetary policy. Notably, they nd optimal ination to be fairly volatile when
only nominal wages are rigid and stable only when price stickiness is involved. This
contrasts with the results in Chugh (2006) who extends the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004a) model to include costly wage adjustment and nds that optimal ination
volatility falls signicantly also when only nominal wages are sticky. He concludes
that the fairly high ination volatility in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) under sticky
wages but exible prices must originate in some of the other features of their setup
which is rich in frictions. These frictions might interact with the shocks in a non-
trivial way, generating higher ination volatility. Both papers, however, share the
assertion that highly persistent debt dynamics is optimal under price and/or wage
stickiness.
11 Generally, this will be the case, as it is also shown in this thesis. To clarify the notions, the natural rate
of output is the level of output that would prevail in the perfectly exible economy (see Woodford, 2003).
The welfare-e¢cient rate is dened by the approximation to welfare. See also analysis in Chapter 1.
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Our analysis follows the linear-quadratic approach of Erceg et al. (2000) and
Benigno and Woodford (2004) to analyze optimal policy in an economy with sticky
prices and sticky wages and endogenous taxes, instead of the nonlinear Ramsey ap-
proach of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) and Chugh (2006). This allows us to
characterize optimal policy using a quadratic objective function, which is appealing
from a practical point of view, and to directly compare its properties with the policy
objectives derived in a similar way in the simpler economies of Erceg et al. (2000)
and Benigno and Woodford (2004). Unfortunately, the solution for the optimal dy-
namics of the model with sticky wages is too complex to yield an analytical solution
for policy rules that would implement it. We depart from the conventional approach,
used among others in Erceg et al. (2000) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), of
looking for simple rules for policy instruments to approximate optimal policy. We
propose a simple characterization of policy as an approximation to the optimal policy
at a higher level of generality, as discussed in Svensson (2002, 2003) and Svensson and
Woodford (2005). We specify a pair of simple specic targeting rules for monetary
and scal policy makers to bring about in a coordinated fashion. Such specication
of policy is now commonly used to characterize optimal policy but has not yet been
applied in attempts to approximate optimal policy. We nd that using higher-level
characterization of policy has the advantage of being analytically simple and yet pro-
viding an excellent approximation to the optimal plan, potentially outperforming (ad
hoc) simple instrument rules. At the same time, conduct of policy based on such joint
simple rules is no less veriable and equally transparent. One can still specify reac-
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tion functions that implement the dynamics implied by the simple targeting rules and
that need not be made public. The complexity of these reaction functions highlights
the advantages of approximating optimal policy in terms of targeting rules rather
than instrument rules. Svensson (2002, 2003) has also argued that such higher-level
specication of policy also leaves room for the use of judgement in policy making. On
the other hand, the targeting rules will likely require re-formulation should the struc-
ture of the economy change. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, we nd
specic targeting rules to be an attractive way of characterizing desirable conduct
of policy.12
I.2.2 Presence of non-Ricardian agents
There is now an ample amount of evidence to support the claim that a signicant pro-
portion of agents in the economy does not behave according to the LC-PIH. Mankiw
(2000) makes a strong case for building economic models that reect the divide that
some agents plan ahead for themselves and their descendants, while others live pay-
check to paycheck. The literature following the Ramsey tradition reviewed in the rst
part of this chapter, however, assumes that economies are inhabited by innitely-lived
agents who all smooth consumption over time. There is thus a great potential to ex-
tend the understanding of monetary-scal interactions by analyzing the properties
of optimal policy in economies in which a certain proportion of agents lacks access
to the asset market. We contribute towards this aim in Chapter 3 in which we in-
12 See Chapter 1 for further discussion on alternative options of policy specication.
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troduce agents who do not have access to the asset market into a linear-quadratic
framework similar to Benigno and Woodford (2003). In this, we follow the Ram-
sey tradition taking into account the latest advances in modelling optimal monetary
and scal interactions, as discussed in detail in the rst section of this introductory
chapter.
We derive a model with a continuum of identical households who learn about
their type (non-Ricardian versus Ricardian) at the beginning of each period. This
feature, inspired by Amato and Laubach (2003), enables us to introduce heterogeneity
in agent types and utilize all the appealing methodological aspects of representative-
agent frameworks.
Our framework in Chapter 3 is distinct from all existing contributions in impor-
tant ways. In particular, we assume lump-sum taxes are unavailable as an instrument
to nance government revenue or to render the steady state of the economy e¢cient
by compensating for market imperfections via a subsidy. In such a framework, mon-
etary and scal policy makers must act together to achieve a joint policy objective.
In what follows, we briey review the econometric evidence on consumer be-
haviour and the existing policy-related work regarding economies with liquidity-
constrained agents.
Consumer behaviour
Starting from Hall (1978), the evidence seems to suggest that the life-cycle - per-
manent income hypothesis (LC-PIH) is not a valid description of consumer behaviour.
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The evidence supports the idea that some agents rely only on their wage income to
nance consumption while others smooth consumption over time and indeed across
generations. This may simply be a result of myopia or a simple deviation from the as-
sumption of complete rationality but reference to capital market imperfections could
also o¤er a perhaps more sophisticated rationale for this behaviour.13
Flavin (1981) develops and estimates a simple structural model of consumption
that allows tests of whether innovation in current income has an e¤ect on consumption
in excess of its e¤ect on the lifetime income. Should LC-PIH hold, the change in
consumption would only reect changes in the permanent income. Flavin (1981)
strongly rejects this hypothesis but provides no explanations of why LC-PIH fails
or tests of alternative hypotheses about consumer behaviour. Such a test has been
reported in Zeldes (1989) who tests LC-PIH against the hypothesis that some agents
are liquidity-constrained, i.e. they maximize lifetime utility but face a sequence of
borrowing constraints, even though they can save. Using household-level data, he
provides estimations of the consumption Euler equation. He nds general support for
the claim that borrowing constraints have an important inuence on consumption.
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) provide more evidence to support the hypothesis that a
signicant proportion of the population behaves in a way consistent with the liquidity
constraint hypothesis. Their Euler equation estimations suggest this ratio could be
as high as half of the population in the US and the authors nd similar results for
13 Bilbiie (2005) outlines a simple model in which presence of transaction costs generates limited asset
market participation.
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other rich countries as well (except the UK).14 They also conclude that estimations
of consumption functions best t the data when the model includes non-Ricardian
behaviour. Mankiw (2000) then presents a convincing appeal towards the profession
to reect this divide in modelling work. Citing more evidence on net asset holdings of
the US population, he sketches an outline and intuitive consequences of a model with
heterogeneity in agent types with one group smoothing consumption over time and
across generations and the other consuming the entire after-tax wage income. Overall
then, we now have a strong empirical basis to provide a justication for introducing
heterogeneity in agent types along the lines suggested by the ndings in the literature
on consumer behaviour.
Policy analysis under limited asset market participation
The challenge for the profession is to integrate these ndings into modern frame-
works developed to analyze policy coordination. The analysis in this thesis has ben-
eted from a few contributions analyzing the policy consequences of the presence of
liquidity-constrained agents or the dynamic properties of economies with limited asset
market participation.
Galí et al. (2004) re-visit some earlier conclusions regarding optimal parameter
values in Taylor-type interest rate response functions in a standard New Keynesian
setting for monetary policy. They suggest some important limitations to what has
14 Muscatelli et al. (2004) estimate a DSGE model using 1970-2001 US data and nd the proportion of
liquidity-constrained to be less than 40 percent, accounting for less than 20 percent of aggregate consumption
and about 60 percent of total employment. Coenen and Straub (2005) also estimate a DSGE model using
Euro area data ranging from 1980 to 1999 and conclude that the share of liquidity-constrained consumers in
the Euro area might be lower, perhaps a quarter or a third of the population, depending on the assumptions
about the tax system in the model.
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been referred to as the Taylor principle15, which has become a simple criterion to
assess the determinacy of monetary policy in macroeconomic models of certain types.
The authors observe that the Taylor principle may not be a useful guide for policy
makers if there are liquidity-constrained agents in the economy. For these do not react
to changes in the interest rates but adjust their consumption only in accordance with
changes in net real wage. Therefore, sunspot-e¤ects may arise if their proportion in
the economy is large and the response to ination in the interest rule is su¢ciently
weak. In that case, a rise in the interest rate does not deliver a su¢cient drop in the
consumption of the interest-rate-sensitive Ricardian agents and overall investment,
following an exogenous positive shock to output. To avoid this, for higher shares of
non-Ricardian agents, there should be a signicantly stronger response to ination in
the instrument rule for the interest rate.
In a related paper, Bilbiie (2005) nds that presence of liquidity-constrained
agents beyond a threshold level may induce a change in the sign of the IS relation-
ship slope coe¢cient, introducing thus inverted Keynesian logic into the analysis.
A rise in the real interest rate paradoxically would then lead to a rise in consump-
tion. The optimal monetary policy under the inverted Keynesian logic then involves
a passive rule. An active policy stance, with more-than-proportionate response to
ination, could lead to instability, as a rise in expected ination would be followed
by a rise in the real interest rate and also in consumption and output. Such e¤ects
15 The Taylor principle prescribes more-than-proportionate interest-rate responses to changes in ination
to guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium. The policy prescription slightly changes when there
is positive response to the output gap but the idea of a lower-bound on the ination coe¢cient, possibly
one that is close to unity, remains valid. See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003). Changes in US
inationary patterns have also been related to the fullment of this principle.
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could be mitigated if the policy maker responded to output in addition to ina-
tion. In a part of his analysis that probably comes closest to the one presented in
this thesis, Bilbiie (2005) characterizes optimal discretionary monetary policy in an
economy with non-Ricardian agents using a linear-quadratic setup. He suggests that
the relative weight attached to ination stabilization should decrease as the share of
liquidity-constrained agents in the economy rises. He also derives the implied discre-
tionary reaction function for the interest rate. According to this rule, the interest
rate optimally responds one-for-one to changes in the natural rate of interest and to
expected ination. The strength of the optimal response in the interest rate to ina-
tion is decreasing in the share of non-Ricardian agents and is lower than unity for a
non-Keynesian economy. In Chapter 3, we shall present an analysis in which several
key assumptions that underpin Bilbiies (2005) model are relaxed.
Galí et al. (2007) include scal policy with lump-sum taxes into a simple
rules framework similar to Galí et al. (2004) in an attempt to reconcile dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models with the empirical evidence suggesting a crowd-
in e¤ect of rises in government spending.16 They argue that the presence of non-
Ricardian agents alongside price stickiness is instrumental in delivering the desired
response in aggregate consumption. In these circumstances, aggregate consumption
is less a¤ected by the negative wealth e¤ects of a spending surge and more sensitive
to contemporaneous real wage development. Real wages tend to rise following a
spending shock, boosting the consumption of non-Ricardian agents and ultimately
16 A full review of the evidence here is beyond the scope of this chapter. We refer the reader to the extensive
coverage provided in Galí et al. (2007).
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also aggregate consumption. Coenen and Straub (2005) point out that this result
hinges to a large extent upon the mechanism of wage setting employed in the model.
The exible-wage environment Galí et al. (2007) assume generates a strong real wage
response to shocks, which gives a strong push to the consumption of non-Ricardians.
By contrast, Coenen and Straub (2005), in an estimated rather than calibrated model,
apply a more complicated version of staggered wage adjustment à la Calvo (1983) with
rule-of-thumb wage setting. This mechanism causes a more subdued response in real
wages and hence a smaller positive impact of the consumption of non-Ricardians on
overall consumption. Overall, they suggest that the negative wealth e¤ect dominates.
At the same time, the authors admit that under certain circumstances, depending on
some assumptions regarding the scal side of the economy, the positive consumption
response could materialize. In an open-economy setting, Coenen et al. (2007) nd
that the negative wealth e¤ect of the government spending shock might be dominated
by the positive substitution and wealth e¤ects of the improvement in terms of trade
and a mild positive consumption response might also emerge.
Finally, Muscatelli et al. (2004) supplement a structural framework similar to
Galí et al. (2004) with simple rules for taxes and government expenditures. Having
estimated a New Keynesian structural model, they simulate the impact of various
policy strategies in response to standard shocks. Their simulations nd support for
the conjecture that the presence of non-optimizing agents can explain the positive
correlation between spending shocks and output (and hence consumption). They also
nd, using simple variance frontiers, that a reduction in the share of non-Ricardians
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leads to a more stable output dynamics and a rise in ination variability following an
inationary shock.
In the light of this literature, we conduct our analysis centred on understanding
the impact of the presence of non-Ricardian agents on optimal policy and optimal
dynamics of the economy. We derive a utility-based quadratic policy objective for
an economy with a distorted steady state in which only distortive taxes provide a
source of government tax revenue. We identify optimal policies that maximize this
welfare objective subject to the structural equations of the economy and appropriate
timeless perspective commitments to ensure time-consistency of the solution. We
then analyze the optimal response of the economy to an unexpected rise in government
spending. We also derive a pair of specic targeting rules for the monetary and scal
policy maker in the spirit of Svensson (2002, 2003) as well as simple reaction functions
for each branch of the central authority that would implement the optimal policy. We
provide some new insights regarding the key determinants of optimal policy.
I.2.3 Unconditional debt targets
Monetary and scal policy makers often face situations in which their conduct is con-
strained by rules that form a part of a wider policy agenda of political representatives.
These rules need not reect the views of economists and are even less likely to re-
ect the up-to-date results on optimal policy design. In those situations, the policy
makers are constrained to implement suboptimal policies, even if they understand
the complexity of the economic environment and its implications for the conduct of
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policy. One can view this as a presence of an additional friction inuencing the con-
duct of policy in the economy. In this thesis, we concentrate on one specic family
of such rules, namely those that require policy makers to deliver stationary dynamics
of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We have seen from the review of literature that stationary
dynamics of the debt ratio is inconsistent with the optimal solution under nominal
rigidity in some dening contributions to the literature. Yet, we see such goals as
important pillars of existing policy frameworks around the world. Therefore, it is of
interest either to consider institutional arrangements that could implement the op-
timal non-stationary policy or to examine the possible wider implications of policies
aimed at stationary scal outcomes. We do the latter, as stationary policy targets
might yet prevail for a considerable period of time. We also ask if there is a way
to rationalize what we shall refer to as stationary or unconditional debt targets in
the light of the mentioned literature supporting a non-stationary evolution of scal
indicators.
Policy background
Following the success of ination targeting regimes implemented through inde-
pendent central banks on the monetary side, it is becoming more and more accepted
to constrain discretion on the scal side as well by imposing rules aimed either at
long-term sustainability or short-term stabilization or both (OECD, 2002). Some of
the scal rules we see in practice are implicitly or explicitly consistent with stationary
evolution of public debt-to-GDP ratio. The Sustainable Investment Rule in the UK,
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for example, states that public debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the
economic cycle at a stable and prudent level (HM Treasury, 1998). In New Zealand,
the 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act stipulates that once prudent levels of public debt
have been achieved, debt should be maintained at that level by ensuring that on aver-
age, over a reasonable period of time, the budget runs an operating surplus (Janssen,
2001). The Stability and Growth Pact in the EU, after the recent reform, has also
adopted a more symmetrical approach to scal policy in that it became more fo-
cused on cyclically adjusted indicators with an unchanged aim for a close-to-balance
or small surplus in its surplus-to-GDP ratio (European Council, 2005). The scal
goals within the SGP are dened in terms of reference values and medium-term tar-
gets for the aggregate scal balance and a reference debt-to-GDP value of 60%, which
allows for plenty of exibility. However, at or in the neighborhood of the reference
debt-to-GDP value, countries facing the debt ceiling must not allow a permanent
deterioration in their debt ratios. Overall, we see that in the practical conduct of
monetary and scal policy there exist constraints on policy such that policies need to
be coordinated to achieve stability in scal indicators over the cycle.
Theory
The interpretation of scal sustainability as being equivalent to meeting a sta-
tionary debt target is reminiscent of some of the implications of Barro (1979). Yet,
this view seems to be at odds with the conclusions from more recent literature. A no-
table common feature of Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
Introduction 28
(2004a, 2005) is that the optimal policy under nominal rigidity involves a permanent
drift in the debt ratio in response to even transitory shocks. With public debt per-
manently higher and output permanently below its pre-shock steady-state level, the
ratio of the two variables optimally rises following a temporary spending shock. Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2006) show that this property of the optimal solution is robust to
a situation when spending as well as taxes are treated as a policy instrument.17 In a
policy paper, Kirsanova et al. (2006) then go on to argue in favour of institutional
solutions to scal sustainability as opposed to unconditional debt targets. This is one
way to proceed.
In Chapter 4 in this thesis, we look at the issue from a di¤erent perspective
and examine the wider implications of policies aimed at stationary scal outcomes in
the context of our baseline model which otherwise yields that permanent level-shifts
in the debt ratio represent the optimal response to shocks. We aim to identify the
best among such policies and also provide potential rationalization of unconditional
debt targets in the context of the model. Our main motivation for this analysis is
that unconditional debt targets are important elements of national and international
policy frameworks and are unlikely to be abandoned in the near future. Our principal
motivation is thus related to Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) who tried to assess the
17 The optimality of non-stationary debt dynamics under price stickiness cannot be treated as a general
result. While it emerges in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), Siu (2004)
nds that under price stickiness, both debt and the tax rate are a near unit root process even for transitory
shocks, but importantly, they are still stationary. Sius (2004) result only implies that debt dynamics should
be very strongly persistent. We will, however, be able to compare this result with our optimal degree of
scal feedback derived in a framework which optimally yields non-stationary debt dynamics. Stationary
debt dynamics emerges as the optimal solution under discretionary policy in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006),
however, this perspective is dismissed, and rightly so, as a justication for unconditional debt targets.
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optimal degree of scal feedback in a framework where monetary policy is optimized
given a suboptimal conduct of scal policy. Assuming that the monetary authority
can commit itself to implement the rst-best time-inconsistent plan, they found the
optimal debt dynamics being barely distinguishable from a random walk process. Our
modelling strategy is di¤erent. The scal authority is a strategic player in our set-up
and the stationary debt target is a joint monetary-scal goal.
We rst show that there exists a general class of targeting rules similar to the one
derived to be optimal in our baseline analysis that would yield stationary responses
in all endogenous variables in the model, implying stable debt and primary surplus
ratios relative to the economys total output. We analyze the dynamics of the economy
under these alternative targeting rules in response to a single, serially uncorrelated
shock to government expenditures. We derive a general solution to the dynamics
of the economy, which would also nest the timeless perspective optimal policy of
Benigno and Woodford (2003) and analyze the consequences of such monetary-scal
targeting rules for the implied monetary policy reaction function.
We also seek to identify the best in the class of stationary policy rules. Benigno
and Woodford (2006b) deal with the issues involved in ranking alternative (subopti-
mal) policies. It turns out that if our aim is to evaluate alternative stationary policies
against one another that is if we wish to make no inferences vis-à-vis the timeless
perspective optimal plan, it is su¢cient to rank policies in the family considered ac-
cording to a simple unconditional welfare measure similar to what has been widely
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used in the literature.18 The stationarity property of the policies under consideration
ensures that the target variables have well-dened rst and second moments, which
facilitates the use of unconditional welfare measures. We then present the policy that
maximizes this objective as another special case of our general stationary dynamic
model.19
I.3 Modelling approach
Our baseline framework is akin to the one analyzed in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
In this closed-economy setup, an innitely-lived representative agent maximizes a
discounted stream of utility increasing in consumption of di¤erentiated goods and
decreasing in the quantity of labour supplied across industries. We assume that
rms, which maximize a stream of current and future prots, only use labour as
a factor of production. There is imperfect competition in the product market and
price-setting is staggered as proposed by Calvo (1983). The presence of nominal
rigidity creates a role for stabilization policy in the economy. The government faces a
standard ow budget constraint and has only access to distortive means of taxation
(on wage income) to nance unavoidable government spending which is assumed to
be exogenous in the model. Capital markets are assumed to be incomplete so that
the government can only rely on one-period nominal state-noncontingent securities to
18 For instance, Taylor (1979), Whiteman (1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Erceg et al. (2000),
Jensen and McCallum (2005) and Damjanovic et al. (2006).
19 Clarida et al. (1999) pursue a similar modelling strategy to identify the best policy rule in the class of
policies that includes the optimal discretionary outcome.
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nance any di¤erence between current tax revenue and public spending. Monopolistic
competition in the product market coupled with distortive taxation causes the steady
state of the economy be ine¢cient.
In Chapter 2, we introduce nominal wage rigidity into this setup, as in Erceg et
al. (2000). This necessitates the introduction of another source of ine¢ciency, namely
imperfect competition in the labour market. In Chapter 3, we present an interesting
methodological solution when we show how one can introduce heterogeneity among
agents in terms of their asset holdingswith a stationary distribution of agents ac-
cording to their asset holdingswhilst retaining the representative-agent framework.
Briey, we achieve this by randomizing the individuals belonging to groups of asset
holders and liquidity-constrained agents and by introducing a lump-sum redistribu-
tion of assets when agents change groups. In Chapter 3, we also introduce a minor
change to the setup which facilitates an easier derivation of the microeconomic foun-
dations of the model with non-Ricardian agents but retains the New Keynesian avour
of the benchmark model. In fact the two models become isomorphic at some stage of
modelling. In this setup, consumers no longer consume an aggregate of di¤erentiated
goods but units of a nal good. We introduce two kinds of producers on the supply
side of the economy. Producers of the nal good compete in a perfectly competi-
tive environment but purchase intermediate goods used in the production of the nal
good from a monopolistically competitive market of intermediate goods producers.
Everything else remains as in the benchmark setup.
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These setups lead to a nonlinear Ramsey problem in which the policy maker
maximizes individual utility-based social welfare subject to the optimality conditions
from the consumers and rms decisions, the scal solvency requirement, the evo-
lution of prices under Calvo pricing and the relevant initial and terminal conditions
(see appendix A.3 in Benigno and Woodford, 2003). The standard way to proceed
then is to solve (numerically) the nonlinear problem or to linearize the rst-order con-
ditions from the Ramsey problem as well as the structural equations to obtain the
approximate optimal dynamics of the economy. Benigno and Woodford (2006b) show
that an equivalent approximated problem can be constructed using second-order ap-
proximations to both the welfare function and the structural relationships to dene
an approximate policy objective, which is then maximized subject to a set of rst-
order-accurate structural relationships. The dynamics of the economy implied by the
solution to the approximated problem is isomorphic to the approximated solution of
the nonlinear problem.
There are two important issues in the modelling strategy we pursue in this the-
sis that remain to be discussed in greater detail. First, we abstract from transactions
frictions and model a cashless economy throughout. Second, in our forward-looking
framework, we inevitably encounter the issue of the time consistency of our optimal
policies. In what follows, we aim to review the justication provided in the litera-
ture for the rst assumption and summarize the considerations we have made when
choosing the way to tackle the time-inconsistency problem.
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A world without money
All the way through, we abstract from transactions frictions and model a cash-
less economy in which monetary policy is conducted through varying the nominal
interest rate. This approach to analysis of monetary (and scal) policy, going back
to Wicksell (1907), has been given a sophisticated justication in Woodford (1998).
While the model of cashless economy has since then become accepted as a use-
ful approximation of the conditions in which policy is conducted at present, it does
not immediately follow that the results obtained in such a model do not di¤er from
the results one would obtain in a general model in which transaction frictions play an
important role. In fact, Woodford (2003) shows that assuming large transactions fric-
tions might lead to di¤erent policy objectives and also di¤erent conclusions regarding
the equilibrium rate of ination.
The main concern here is the determination of price level in a world without
money. In the context of a familiar money-in-the-utility type framework, derived
from foundations where money is needed to carry out transactions, with exogenously
determined money supply, Woodford (1998) shows that the current equilibrium price
level is given by the level of current and future money supplies, and current and
expected future supply of goods. Prices vary to ensure a match between real money
supply and demand for real balances. He then goes on to show that there exist well-
dened equilibria if there are no money holdings (the extreme case) but one assumes
that the policy maker sets the nominal interest rate according to a policy rule. Finally,
Woodford (1998) proves that such a well-dened (at least locally unique) equilibrium
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approximates an equilibrium of an economy in which cash balances approach zero,
even if they are allowed to vary substantially (in percentage terms).20 This holds
whether the policy function is dened in terms of the price level or ination. Overall,
one obtains a Wicksellian policy regime where real disturbances not originating with
the monetary policy maker summarized in the concept of the natural rate of interest
have an a¤ect on prices to the extent they are not counteracted by appropriate policy
responses. The appropriate policy response in this case is a close analogue of the
policy prescription of lowering [the nominal rate of interest] when prices are getting
low and raising them when prices are getting high (Wicksell, 1907).
Policies optimal from a timeless perspective
As mentioned, given the forward-looking nature of our setup, we inevitably
encounter the issue of time inconsistency of optimal plans. If one does not assume
the existence of a technology that could implement the optimal Ramsey plan, some
alternative commitment regarding policy in the initial period is inherent in order
for the model to provide useful predictions and guidance for policy.21 One could
assume commitment to a specic value of the price level as in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004a), but we nd it more appealing to assume commitment to a systematic
procedure to pick an initial price level rather than committing oneself to any single
20 Woodford (1998) also notes that one would arrive at the same equilibrium conditions in a money-in-
the-utility function model where additive separability holds for the arguments of the utility function. This
assumption, however, has some unappealing consequences for the elasticity of money with respect to the
interest rates in the money demand function.
21 In most cases, the optimal Ramsey plan is characterized by policy strategies in the initial period that are
of no relevance for practical conduct of policy. Examples of such time-zero policies would include innite-level
tax rates or innite price level.
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such level. Therefore, we use Woodfords (2003) timeless perspective approach to
characterize time-consistent optimal plans.22 Intuitively, the goal is to dene policies
for the present such that one would have committed oneself to in the distant past
had the decision about the present been made back then. Technically, this amounts
to deriving (long-run) optimal plans that take account of the expectations of the
agents and then constraining the policy maker to conduct policy using the same
principles in the initial period. This is conceptually analogous to the way Holly and
Zarrop (1983) proposed to derive expectations-consistent policies by supplementing
a standard control problem with a perfect foresight condition in a deterministic model.
The implementation of such policies requires a commitment technology to deliver the
long-run optimum in the initial period. By denition then, no time inconsistency
problem will arise.
While this approach is intuitive, there has been some debate in the literature
regarding the optimality of such plans. Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002,
2005) and Damjanovic et al. (2006) have suggested in the context of a canonical New
Keynesian framework that there exist time-consistent plans that could under certain
circumstances welfare-dominate the timeless-perspective optimal plans derived from
22 An obvious third alternative is to consider optimal discretionary policy (as for instance in Clarida et
al., 1999 or Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2006) which is by denition time-consistent. It has been argued that
they represent a good approximation of the actual conduct of policy, perhaps with minor modications in
the objective as in Rogo¤ (1985). There are, however, strong arguments why we should not consider this
alternative. Discretionary policy is associated with excess welfare losses not only because it leads to ination
bias (as in Barro and Gordon, 1983) but also results in ine¢cient responses to shocks due to the absence
of history-dependence in the formulation of policy under discretion, as argued in Svensson and Woodford
(2005). On the other hand, policies optimal from a timeless perspective represent the best possible response
to shocks and lead to no ination bias, even though they are clearly inferior to the optimal Ramsey plan.
Since in most cases they can be clearly formulated in the form of a time-invariant general or specic targeting
rule (Svensson, 2003), they are equally relevant from normative as well as a positive perspective.
Introduction 36
a conditional welfare objective and that such plans maximize an analogous uncon-
ditional objective. Woodford (2003) then gives a more detailed explanation of the
objective that policies optimal from a timeless perspective aim to maximize. One
way to interpret the timeless-perspective optimal plans is that they are best in the
family of policies ranked according to how the economy governed by them responds
to shocks and not according to what deterministic paths they would deliver (for non-
zero realizations of the initial states). In other words, if volatility in the economy is
separated into a deterministic and a stochastic component, policies optimal from a
timeless perspective minimize the latter. A complementary explanation follows di-
rectly from the denition of the policy Lagrangian, as we shall see in the analysis in
Chapter 1. According to this interpretation, policies optimal from a timeless perspec-
tive do best if the ranking criterion internalizes the welfare-e¤ects of deviating from
the long-run optimal policy in the initial period. Benigno and Woodford (2006b) have
raised further issues that the alternative approach to optimality would be associated
with in micro-founded economies with a distorted steady state. Hence, in this the-
sis, we adhere to Woodfords (2003) timeless perspective approach to characterize
optimal policy.
We only depart from the above described ranking criterion in Chapters 2 and
4 when ranking policies within families of suboptimal policies that do not include
the timelessly optimal policy. In Chapter 2, we shall be looking for the best policy
among alternative policies that do not imply convergence to the same long-run out-
come. Hence, the evaluation method proposed in Benigno and Woodford (2006b) to
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rank (suboptimal) non-stationary policies that have identical trend components does
not apply in this case. Instead, we dene our own criterion that assesses the match
between the impulse response functions that describe the dynamics of the economy
following the shock under optimal policy and under simple targeting rule-based con-
duct of policy. A similar evaluation criterion for suboptimal policies has been used
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005). In Chapter 4, we shall evaluate a class of poli-
cies that converge to the same long-run outcome, even though it is di¤erent from the
long-run optimum under the timelessly optimal policy. In that case, we shall follow
the analysis in Benigno and Woodford (2006b), though the resulting ranking crite-
rion will be di¤erent from the ranking criterion one would use to rank policies in the
class that includes the timelessly optimal policy.
I.4 Main results
In Chapter 2, we include nominal wage rigidity in addition to price stickiness in the
baseline economy. We derive that the policy makers preferences can be represented
by a quadratic welfare loss function featuring wage ination variability in addition to
price ination and output gap variability. Our contribution here is that we show that
this result from the earlier literature assuming availability of lump-sum taxation as
a source of government revenue carries over to a situation when only distortive taxes
are available. We argue that it is enough for one of the markets to be imperfectly
exible to make the policy of strict price- and/or wage-level targeting (i.e. zero
price and/or wage ination) undesirable. We also show that presence of staggered
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wage adjustment generates endogenous persistence in the optimal economy. The
real wage rate response to a one-o¤ positive innovation in government spending is
more subdued compared with the sticky-price, exible-wage framework and follows
a hump-shaped response that is more in line with empirical observations than the
dynamics implied by the benchmark setup. The timelessly optimal plan cannot be
in this case presented in the form of a tractable analytical solution. We therefore
propose an approximation to the optimal policy plan expressed as a pair of simple
specic targeting rules: a rule for ination and a rule for real-wage growth. Such
characterization of desirable policy conduct is new to the literature and we show
that it is potentially very useful. We dene a ranking criterion that assesses the match
between the dynamics of the economy induced by the timelessly optimal policy and
the policy based on simple targeting rules. Our grid search using this criterion nds
calibrations of the targeting rules that replicate the dynamics of the optimal economy
following the rise in government spending remarkably well. Another interesting result
arising from our analysis is that while our targeting rules do well under di¤erent
calibrations of price and wage contract duration in the model economy, we nd that
the nature of the tax system is an important determinant of the correct specication
of the rule for ination. Furthermore, analyzing an economy in which tax is on sales
revenues rather than wage income, like Benigno and Woodford (2003), we obtain an
interesting case in which the conventional wisdom regarding the optimal dynamic
behaviour of taxes is overturned. We nd that perfect stabilization of the tax rate is
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the optimal response to a number shocks in a sales tax economy in which prices and
wages adjust instantaneously.
In Chapter 3, we contribute to the understanding of optimal monetary and scal
policy by showing that alternative policies in an economy with liquidity-constrained
agents and endogenous tax dynamics can be evaluated using a utility-based quadratic
welfare criterion which depends only on ination and output gap variability, as in
economies in which all agents smooth consumption over time. This policy objective
represents a correct second-order approximation to social welfare around a distorted
steady state of the model economy. An important contribution of our work is that we
derive and analyze how the presence of non-Ricardian agents a¤ects both the target
level of output in the denition of the output gap and the absolute and relative weight
of the output gap stabilization in the policy objective. These parameters are also the
key determinants of the optimal dynamics of the economy. We analyze the optimal
response of the economy to a rise in government spending. Our central nding is
that the optimal economy moves along an analogue of a conventional ination-output
variance frontier, as the population share of non-Ricardian agents rises. Output
should optimally vary more, as this is to the benet of the liquidity-constrained agents
via net real wages, while optimal ination volatility falls as there is less of a need to use
ination to maintain scal solvency. Such considerations are new to the literature on
optimal monetary-scal interactions. We also derive reaction functions for the interest
rate and the primary surplus and analyze the key determinants of optimal instrument-
setting. The optimal tax response varies with the share of non-Ricardian agents and
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this variation is mainly due to the governments attempt to contain pressures on
prices by shifting the natural rate of output towards its preference-driven target level,
which also depends on the share of non-Ricardians in the economy. We identify the
size of the target deviation in output and the interest rate elasticity of demand as the
key determinants of the optimal interest rate policy. In our monetary policy reaction
function, the long-run response to ination rises with the share of non-Ricardian
agents, while the long-run response to the output gap is zero and independent of the
share of non-Ricardian agents. Contrary to some results in the existing literature,
we nd little evidence that increased government spending would crowd in private
consumption in the optimal economy.
In Chapter 4, we analyze the implications of policy frameworks aimed at meet-
ing a stationary debt target. We dene a general joint monetary-scal targeting rule
consistent with stationary scal outcomes and analyze the wider consequences of con-
ducting policy based on that rule. We argue that policies in this family can be ranked
according to a simple unconditional welfare criterion. We show that the best station-
ary policy in terms of our unconditional welfare measure is characterized by highly
persistent debt dynamics, weaker history-dependence and less reliance on debt nance
following shocks compared with the timeless-perspective optimal plan. We also show
that the interest rate policy consistent with stationary scal outcomes features persis-
tent deviations from the steady-state interest rate even if ination is stabilized with
no persistence. A reection of this is that the interest rate reaction function now fea-
tures a long-run response to the output gap, which is absent in the reaction function
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under timelessly optimal policy. Some authors have found it di¢cult to rationalize
unconditional debt targets in the light of the results from the recent New Keynesian
literature. We argue that the ranking criterion we use might o¤er some rationale for
a conduct of policy aimed at stationary scal outcomes. Should policy makers expect
macroeconomic fundamentals to be distributed according to a time-invariant distri-
bution, then maximizing a standard welfare objective on average over all possible
initial values of these fundamentals is consistent with stationary debt targets.
I.5 Structure of the thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we introduce the analytical
framework from which we shall depart in the remaining chapters of the thesis. As
explained above, this is a standard New Keynesian framework with sticky prices in
which optimal policy is characterized using Woodfords (2003) timeless perspective
approach. In Chapter 2, we extend the analysis to include sticky wages and assess the
impact of the duration of price and wage contracts on the optimal dynamics of the
economy. We also propose a pair of simple targeting rules that would provide a good
approximation to the analytically complex timelessly optimal policy and analyze
their robustness. In Chapter 3, we model an economy with a constant proportion of
agents lacking access to the asset market and examine the policy implications of their
presence. In Chapter 4, we look at the case when policy makers are given a mandate
to implement a plan di¤erent in terms of dynamics from the timelessly optimal plan
and characterize the best among the suboptimal plans using an unconditional welfare
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criterion. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and outlines a possible research agenda along
the lines of the analysis presented in the thesis. The details of derivations that are
too lengthy to be included in the main body are relegated to the appendices that
follow each chapter.
Chapter 1
The Baseline Framework
This chapter presents the baseline micro-founded general equilibrium model
of the macroeconomy that will serve as the benchmark setting for the extensions
and thought experiments presented in the rest of the thesis. Rather than merely
replicating the standard model of Benigno and Woodford (2003), we also o¤er some
new features that aim to help the reader connect the analysis with the real-world
conduct of policy. For instance, optimal policy is characterized using a pair of response
functions for the interest rate and the primary budget surplus that would implement
the optimal economy. This chapter also o¤ers a simple diagrammatic exposition to
help understand the intuition behind some of the key policy concepts such as the
e¢cient rate of tax in economies with a distorted steady state.
We consider an economy inhabited by identical, innitely-lived households, who
maximize a discounted stream of utility increasing in consumption of di¤erentiated
goods and decreasing in the quantity of labour supplied across industries. Labour
is the only factor of production in the model. Firms operate in a monopolistically
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competitive product market and choose prices to maximize a discounted stream of
current and future prots. We assume that prices are subject to staggered price
setting in the sense of Calvo (1983). The government faces a standard ow budget
constraint. It raises revenues via distortive taxes on wage income to nance spending.
We assume capital markets are incomplete so that the government is constrained to
issue one-period nominal bonds to bridge the gap between tax revenue and public
spending.
Following Benigno and Woodford (2003), we use their linear-quadratic approach
to characterize optimal policy. This entails constructing a second-order-accurate
welfare-ranking criterion that follows from the consumers objective and maximizing
this welfare objective subject to the linear structural equations of the macroeconomy
implied by the micro-foundations. The problem also involves initial commitments to
deliver the long-run optimal plan. Woodford (2003) provides a detailed rationale for
this approach that has been referred to as policy optimal from a timeless perspec-
tive. Unlike in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), the steady state of the economy is
assumed to be subject to large distortions due to excess market power of rms and
distortive taxation. The assumption of the existence of (lump-sum) tax instruments
to counteract the e¤ects of distortions on the steady state has been a popular assump-
tion, as it simplies the analysis. Relaxing this assumption allows one to analyze the
e¤ects of stabilization policy on the mean of output.
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We analyze the optimal dynamics of the economy in response to a single, positive
and non-persistent innovation to government expenditures.23 We show that the plan
optimal from a timeless perspective contains a unit root under price stickiness. We
observe a permanent increase in public debt and the tax rate under optimal policy,
which in turn holds output below its initial steady-state level. The model is calibrated
to a relatively high degree of price inexibility which causes the optimal ination
volatility to be very small. These results are similar to those reported in Benigno and
Woodford (2003), who analyze the optimal dynamics of a similar economy in response
to a rise in lump-sum government transfers. The properties of the optimal solution
are also in line with the conclusions from the wider literature on optimal policy under
nominal rigidity. As in Benigno and Woodford (2003), we specify a pair of specic
targeting rules in the sense of Svensson (2002, 2003) to serve as a joint policy target
for monetary and scal authorities. We extend their analysis by specifying optimal
reaction functions for each branch of the central government that would implement
the optimal plan. In particular, we derive a reaction function for scal policy with
the primary surplus rather than the tax rate as the policy variable.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an outline of
the microeconomic foundations of the baseline model. Section 2 presents the simple
model of the macroeconomy as well as the quadratic welfare objective implied by the
micro-foundations laid down in Section 1. In Section 3, we then solve this model
23 Our motivation for this type of shock is mainly to preserve continuity with previous literature. Barro
(1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari et al. (1991), Aiyagari et al. (2002). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004a) and Siu (2004) have all used shocks to government spending.
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for the timelessly optimal policies of Benigno and Woodford (2003) and specify
the targeting rules that implement the timelessly optimal economy. We also derive
reaction functions for monetary and scal policy. In this section, we also present the
optimal dynamics of the economy as a result of a simple numerical exercise. Section
4 concludes. Finally, the Appendix to the chapter gives a detailed account of the
derivation of the structural equations, the policy objective function and the steady
state of the economy.
1.1 The microeconomic foundations
In this section, we briey outline the microeconomic foundations of our economy. We
present the key relationships in their non-linear form and relegate the details of the
approximation used to derive the model of the macroeconomy and the approximate
Ramsey problem to the Appendix.
1.1.1 Consumers
Our model economy is inhabited by an innite number of identical households of
measure one. The representative household derives positive utility from total con-
sumption C of di¤erentiated goods and incurs disutility from supplying labour h,
which is captured by the utility function
Ut = Et
1X
T=t
T tuT ; (1.1)
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ut = U

Ct; bGt  Z 1
0
 (ht (j)) dj: (1.2)
0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount rate. The household supplies industry-specic
labour to j industries. As explained in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3), this is equiva-
lent to assuming that each household is employed in one type of industry only and
the existence of perfect capital markets to enable risk-sharing across industries. We
assume the following specic functional forms
U

Ct; bGt = C1 e 1t
1  e 1 ; (1.3)
 (ht (j)) =
ht (j)
1+!w
1 + !w
; (1.4)
where e and !w are constants. Consumption of individual goods is aggregated into
a total consumption index using a standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct (i)
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
; (1.5)
in which " is a constant and represents the elasticity of substitution across goods in
the goods market. Minimization of an expenditure function subject to (1.5) yields an
expression for the optimal consumption of good i. A standard income identity then
implies the demand function
yt (i) = Yt

pt (i)
Pt

 "
: (1.6)
Expenditure minimization also yields the aggregate price index
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt (i)
1 " di
 1
1 "
: (1.7)
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In the utility function, bGt stands for a shock to government expenditures, which is the
only source of disturbance in our model. We assume throughout the derivation that
this shock occurs only once and that it is non-persistent. Furthermore, we assume a
decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology so that
yt (i) = Ht (i)
1= ; (1.8)
with  > 1. Symmetry in equilibrium labour market outcomes allows us to express
the total disutility from supplying labour asZ 1
0
 (ht (i)) di =
1
1 + !w
Y
(1+!w)
t t (1.9)
in which t refers to price dispersion and is given by
t =
Z 1
0

pt (i)
Pt

 "(1+!)
di: (1.10)
We have used ! =  (1 + !w)  1.
Each household maximizes (1.1) subject to an intertemporal constraint equat-
ing after-tax wage and dividend income together with asset returns to consumption
and the change in assets. This problem yields the Euler equation that denes the
stochastic asset pricing kernel in our model
Qt;T = 
T t
Uc

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Pt
PT
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(1.11)
for T > t + 1. it is the period nominal interest rate. We also obtain the expression
for the equilibrium wage rate
wt (j)
Pt
=
h (ht (j))
Uc

Ct; bGt (1   t) ; (1.12)
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where lower-case subscripts denote the respective rst derivatives.  denotes the
proportional tax rate levied on wage income.
1.1.2 Firms
Firms maximize prots with wages being the only cost item on their balance sheets.
The symmetric nature of the labour market equilibrium allows us to write the t-period
prot function of a rm producing good i looks as follows
zt (i) = pt (i) yt (i)  wt (i) yt (i)
 : (1.13)
We assume pricing according to Calvo (1983), with  being the probability of leaving
prices unchanged in a given period. The rm is choosing the optimal price and the
intertemporal rst-order condition is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tQt;TYT

pt
PT

 "
241   Y !T
Uc

CT ; bGT (1  T )

pt
PT

 "! 1
35 = 0 (1.14)
in which  = "= ("  1) stands for the price mark-up over marginal cost and pt is the
(common) optimal price chosen by the optimizing rms in period t. The dynamics of
the price level is given by
Pt =

(1  ) p1 "t + P
1 "
t 1
 1
1 " : (1.15)
1.1.3 Government
Monetary and scal authorities, the two branches of the central government, coor-
dinate their actions to ensure that social welfare given by (1.1) is maximized. The
government raises revenues via distortive taxes on wage income to nance exogenous
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government spendingG. It issues one-period nominal bonds to bridge the gap between
taxation and spending. The government therefore faces a ow budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1   Ptt (1.16)
whereB denotes the volume of one-period nominal bonds issued by the scal authority
and t is the t-period primary budget surplus. This constraint can be rewritten as
bt
(1 + it)
=
bt 1
(1 + t)
 t: (1.17)
The nonlinear Ramsey problem is then to maximize (1.1) subject to the rst-order
conditions from the optimization problems of the consumers and rms, the scal
solvency requirement, the dynamics of the price dispersion and the relevant initial and
terminal conditions, alongside appropriate (initial) commitments that ensure time-
consistency of the solution in the absence of full commitment. This problem would
yield a system of nonlinear rst-order conditions. One can then solve for optimal
dynamics using the nonlinear model or linearize the nonlinear system to obtain an
approximate solution. An equivalent way of solving for the approximate optimal
plan is to formulate a linear-quadratic approximate policy problem (see Benigno and
Woodford, 2003, 2006b for a thorough treatment of a general class of problems which
includes the one considered here). For the case of large distortions, the construction
of a second-order-accurate welfare objective requires a second-order approximation to
the structural equations. In the next section, we present the structural elements of
the approximate problem. Details of the derivation are relegated to the Appendix to
this chapter.
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1.2 The baseline macroeconomic model
The setup outlined in Section 2 implies the following structural relationships for the
economy. The supply side is characterized by the forward-looking relationship
t =  [yt + ' (b t   b t )] + Ett+1: (1.18)
The aggregate supply equation links current ination, t, to the output gap, yt,
deviations in the tax rate b t from its steady-state value, and expected future ination,
Ett+1.
24 The output gap yt is dened as the di¤erence between actual and target
deviation (bY t ) of output from its steady-state value in response to a shock, with
e¢cient deviation being dened as some function of that shock. bY t follows from the
approximation to welfare (see below and in the Appendix). b t , which we shall refer
to as the e¢cient tax rate, is the deviation in the tax rate that would o¤set the cost-
push (or cost-pull) pressure resulting from the increase in government spending. A
cost-push (cost-pull) pressure follows a rise in government spending if the spending
shock shifts the natural rate of output bY nt less (more) relative to what is desirable
from the viewpoint of welfare (the target deviation bY t ).25 A policy of b t then brings
the natural rate in line with the target deviation and eliminates pressure on prices.
Figure 1.1 provides a simple diagrammatic analysis to support the intuition behind
b t . The government spending shock shifts the aggregate supply function to the right.
24 In general, we shall denote the t-period log-deviation of a variable x from its steady-state value x as
bxt = log
xt
x
. Prices are assumed to be stable in the steady state.
25 The natural rate of output is dened as the level of output attained under exible prices. It is also the
level at which no price pressures would arise, if it prevailed in an economy with price rigidities. The deviations
in the natural rate depend on real exogenous disturbancesit gathers the e¤ect of exogenous disturbances
on real marginal costand, in our case, on tax policy. More details are provided in the Appendix to the
chapter and are similar to Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).
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Fig. 1.1. Using tax policy to stabilize the price level
This shift reects at aggregate level a similar shift in the individuals labour supply
schedule following the shock implied by (1.12). With no change in taxes, the level
of output that would stabilize prices is denoted by Y n, which is the natural rate of
output in the absence of changes in taxation. In general, it is, however, welfare-
e¢cient to stabilize output at a di¤erent level denoted Y . If Y  is lower (higher)
than Y n, as in the left (right) panel of Figure 1.1, cost-pull (cost-push) pressures will
arise. It is, however, possible to induce a backward (forward) shift in the aggregate
supply schedule by raising (cutting) the rate of tax levied on wage income. A tax rise
(cut) of b  exactly eliminates the pressures on prices and brings Y n in line with Y .
It remains to be discussed under which circumstances such policy action is feasible.
The derivation of this structural equation from the rms prot-maximizing
decision as well as the denitions of parameter values are given in the Appendix.
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A straightforward log-linearization of (1.11) gives us the intertemporal IS rela-
tionship, which describes the demand side of the economy (see Appendix for details):
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Ett+1   brt : (1.19)
bit = log 1+it1+i ; where i is the steady state interest rate determined by the rate of time
preference. brt represents the deviation in the interest rate that is consistent withbY t . brt depends on exogenous real variables only and hence cannot be a¤ected by
government policy.
The constraint (1.17), together with (1.11) and a transversality condition, im-
plies the following scal sustainability condition expressed in terms of the gap vari-
ables
bbt 1   t    1yt + 't = (1  ) [fyyt + f (b t   b t )]
+Et
hbbt   t+1    1yt+1i ; (1.20)
in which 't is the scal stress term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003) as
a composite measure of the consequences for scal solvency of the spending shock.
More precisely, consider a situation in which the sticky-price economy had been in its
steady state before the shock occurred and the policy response to the shock is given
by the pair fbrT ;b Tg1T=t, delivering a sequence of zero output gaps and no ination
for all t. Then 't is a (rst-order-accurate) measure of the degree to which the
scal sustainability requirement of balancing outstanding liabilities against current
and future surpluses is not satised.
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The Appendix explains the steps involved in deriving (1.20) from (1.17), using
(1.11). Coe¢cients fy and f are also dened in the Appendix.
Finally, the policy maker conducts monetary and scal policy to minimize the
quadratic loss function26
Lt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
q
2
T

: (1.21)
Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2006b) explain the methodological background of de-
riving a quadratic function such as (1.21) that is able provide a second-order accurate
welfare-ranking of alternate policies when the steady state of the economy is inef-
cient, whilst the structural equations, (1.18) and (1.20), together with the initial
commitments (to be discussed below), are accurate only up to rst order. Again,
the Appendix provides a detailed account on how this loss function follows from the
household utility function. Under mild restrictions on the consumption share of na-
tional income, and importantly, for realistic parameter values qy > 0 and q > 0;
which implies that the loss function is convex and hence, the second-order condi-
tions would nd that the solution identied by the rst-order conditions constitutes
a minimum.
26 Svensson (2002, 2003) refers to this objective as a general targeting rule, the variables inside as target
variables.
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1.3 The policy optimal from a timeless perspective
It is well known that optimal policy in forward-looking rational expectation frame-
works is in general time inconsistent and so Woodford (2003) has proposed formulat-
ing optimal policy from a timeless perspective; one should model optimal policy as
the policy that would have been intended for the current period had such a policy
been formulated far in the past, and given the preferences, technology and structure
of the economy that actually exists now, whether or not these did in fact exist in the
distant past. Such a perspective rules out the possibility of policy makers exploiting
certain initial conditions. In order to characterize this timelessly optimal policy, we
need to restrict the policy choices for period t so that the policy maker uses the same
procedure to formulate policy as in later periods. The optimal policy is then cho-
sen so that it satises certain initial (self-consistent) commitments, in addition to the
structural equations of the economy, and is characterized by a time-invariant policy
rule.
The problem facing policy makers in this simple economy is straightforward to
characterize: Policy should aim to minimize (1.21) subject to (1.18), (1.20) and the
relevant initial conditions. The corresponding policy Lagrangian is then written as
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Jt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
q
2
T

+1;T [T   yT   ' (bT   b T )  EtT+1]
+2;T
hbbT 1   T    1yT + 'T   (1  ) fyyT   (1  ) f (bT   b T )
 bbT + EtT+1 + Et 1yT+1io+  2;t 1   1;t 1 t +  12;t 1yt:
(1.22)
The nal two terms represent the additional (self-consistent) constraints on policy
concerning the initial period
t = t; (1.23)
yt = yt: (1.24)
The correct specication of these conditions in a simpler setting is discussed in Wood-
ford (2003). In general, we want t and yt to be predetermined, i.e. to be functions of
lagged endogenous and/or exogenous variables. Benigno and Woodford (2005, 2006b)
explain why linear constraints of this form are su¢cient to justify (1.21) being the
correct second-order-accurate welfare objective and (1.22) the correct formulation of
the policy problem. Briey, this is the case because these constraints determine the
values of those endogenous variables that would have a¤ected equilibrium allocations
in t  1, had expectations regarding period t been formulated in t  1. Such modi-
cation of the standard (approximate) Ramsey problem is in many ways reminiscent
of the way Holly and Zarrop (1983) proposed to modify a standard optimal control
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problem to derive expectations-consistent policies in a deterministic setting. With
such commitments satised, policy in the initial period is predetermined and so is
the part of the approximate welfare measure that would capture the welfare e¤ects
of a surprise policy in the initial period t: On a similar note, Svensson (2003) pointed
out that adding the time-t terms to the policy Lagrangian internalizes the welfare
e¤ects of disappointing private sector expectations regarding policy in the initial pe-
riod. As a consequence, it is su¢cient to evaluate alternative policies that satisfy
these commitments according to their e¤ect on the variability of the economy cap-
tured by (1.21). Given that (1.21) is composed of purely quadratic terms, it is also
su¢cient to specify the initial commitments with rst-order accuracy.
The rst-order condition (with T = t) with respect to public debt implies that
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the scal constraint, also referred to as the
shadow value of government revenue, follows a Martingale process from period t
onwards27
Et2;t+1 = 2;t: (1.25)
The remaining rst-order conditions imply
t = !
 
2;t   2;t 1

; (1.26)
yt = m2;t + n2;t 1; (1.27)
27 Because of this time series property of the solution, restrictions must be placed on the number of the
shocks in order to keep the model in a close enough neighbourhood of the initial steady state (see Benigno
and Woodford, 2003, footnote 26). For a more detailed discussion of shadow value of government revenue
and the macro economy see Dreze and Stern (1990).
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where
! =

q 1 +
(1  ) f
q'

;
m = q
 1
y

(1  ) fy + 
 1  
(1  ) f
'

;
n =  
 1
qy
:
It follows from (1.25), (1.26) and (1.27) that
EtT = 0; (1.28)
EtyT = (m + n)2;t; (1.29)
for all T > t. Solving (1.18) in t+1, using (1.28), and given that we assume that the
shock is non-persistent, the t+ 1-period deviation in the tax rate is
Etb t+1 =   1
'
Etyt+1: (1.30)
Substituting this into a forward-integrated version of (1.20), and using (1.28) and
(1.29), we obtain
bbt = nb2;t; (1.31)
where we have used
nb = (m + n)

fy  
f
'
+  1

:
It is essential to note that the optimal deviation in debt is a linear function of
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the scal solvency constraint. Public debt
therefore inherits the time series properties of the Lagrange multiplier 2.
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Also, (1.18) can be re-arranged to obtain an equation for the dynamics of the
tax rate
b t = b t   1' yt + 1' t: (1.32)
Substituting this into a forward-integrated version of (1.20), and using (1.26) to (1.29)
for ination and output gap dynamics, the dynamics of the Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with the scal sustainability constraint will be
2;t =
mb
mb + nb
2;t 1 +
1
mb + nb
bbt 1 + 't ; (1.33)
in which
mb =

1 + (1  )
f
'

!  

(1  ) fy  
(1  ) f
'
+  1

n:
The scal stress term 't is dened in the Appendix. (1.33) is consistent with (1.25)
and therefore having non-zero 't and bbt 1 6=  't will cause a level shift in 2t and
then also a level shift in bt. Plugging (1.33) back into (1.26) and (1.27) yields the
dynamics of ination and the output gap. (1.32) denes the dynamics of the tax rate.
Form 6=  n, this implies a permanent level change in (the) output (gap) and hence
also in the tax rate. By (1.28), ination is stationary.
1.3.1 Policy rules
From the perspective of policy conduct in practice, it is useful to translate the above
optimal paths into rules for policy variables that the policy makers actually control.
On the monetary side, characterizing monetary policy by interest rate rules of di¤erent
sorts has become widely accepted. We have already derived the optimal path for the
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tax rate, which is the scal variable that policy makers directly control. However, we
believe using the primary budget balance as a policy indicator is more in line with
the real-world conduct of scal policy. For example, Taylor (1997) uses to a great
e¤ect a pair of interest-rate and budget surplus rules to assess policy conduct in the
United States.
Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) discuss alter-
native ways of deriving rules for policy instruments. One approach is to derive a rule
for the policy instrument as a function of current and past disturbances. Such speci-
cation usually emerges as a result of optimal control problems, as shown in Currie and
Levine (1987). This approach is, however, unlikely to o¤er useful guidance to policy
makers and the public in environments with multiple types of shocks of di¤erent na-
ture. But even in simpler settings and given stronger assumptions about the nature of
shocks and the information available to the policy maker and the private sector, these
exogenous nominal interest rate paths may lead to indeterminacy. Many authors then
went on to consider quasi-optimal rules (Currie and Levine, 1987), or simple opti-
mal rules (Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 1999) that are obtained by minimizing an
objective with respect to the parameters of the simplied rule.
Here we pursue the approach proposed by Svensson (2003). We rst specify re-
lations dened in terms of endogenous variables that the monetary and scal policy
makers should optimally aim to bring about in a coordinated fashionthe specic
targeting rules. There are several ways to proceed from here. One way is to derive
implied reaction functions for each authoritya reaction function for the interest
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rate and one for the primary scal surplusconsistent with the targeting rules and
the projected dynamics of the economy. Evans and Honkapohja (2006) refer to such
specication of policy at operational level as fundamentals-based reaction functions.
However, not all issues are resolved with such characterization of policy. Even if the
targeting rules dene a unique rational expectations equilibrium, it is only one of the
equilibriathe others being suboptimalthat the conduct of policy governed by the
implied reaction functions would implement in a realistic setting. It is implicit to
the derivation of the implied reaction functions that the desired equilibrium path for
endogenous variables is being realized, i.e. that the private sector expects the author-
ities to enforce the rational expectations equilibrium in all periods. In other words,
following implied rules would mean that the authorities conduct policy as if the pro-
jected optimal paths of endogenous variables are realized, regardless of whether in
fact they are. This amounts to assigning a key role to transparency in policy making,
which is one way to ensure that the unique rational expectations equilibrium emerges
at least as a natural focal point of the interaction between authorities and the pub-
lic, as argued in Svensson and Woodford (2005). Such specication is, however, not
su¢cient to ensure that the rational expectations equilibrium is implemented in a
more realistic setting that is when expectations of the public need not coincide with
the projected optimal evolution of the economy, as also shown Evans and Honkapohja
(2006). There is thus still a determinacy problem associated with the implied reac-
tion functions, though its seriousness might be somewhat mitigated if one assumes a
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framework with more elements of backward-looking behaviour than what is embodied
in the kind of framework we consider.
In this thesis, we therefore concentrate on expectations-based reaction func-
tions (Evans and Honkapohja, 2006) to characterize optimal policy at operational
level. The specication of these reaction functions does not involve such strong as-
sumptions about the expectations of the private sector. It follows from the way these
rules are derived that they will implement the unique rational expectations equilib-
rium characterized by the joint policy targets and the structural equations of the
economy, if such a solution exists. Thereby we achieve a full characterization of
policy aims at di¤erent levels of generality, as discussed in Svensson and Woodford
(2005), ranging from the general targeting rule, which follows from the Lagrangian
((1.21) plus
 
2;t 1   1;t 1

Ett+
 12;t 1Etyt), through specic targeting rules to
the optimal reaction functions for policy instruments.
Specic targeting rules
The dynamic system consisting of (1.26) and (1.27) can be solved to obtain the
specic targeting rule
t +
n
m
t 1  
!
m
(yt   yt 1) = 0: (1.34)
Monetary and scal authorities should coordinate their actions to ensure this rule,
together with (1.28), is satised in every period.28
28 Here, we assume that the policy makers perfectly observe all contemporanous variables. For an indication
of how information issues could a¤ect the formulation of optimal targeting rules see Clarida et al. (1999).
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Monetary policy
We shall use the pair of targeting rules (1.28) and (1.34), together with the IS
relationship (1.19) to derive the implied optimal path for the interest rate. First, it
is easy to see that (1.19), combined with (1.28) directly yields
bit = brt +  1 (Etyt+1   yt) : (1.35)
Solving (1.34) in period t+ 1 for (Etyt+1   yt), and using (1.35), we receive
bit = brt +  1n!t: (1.36)
(1.35) and (1.36) are both implied reaction functions or fundamentals based reaction
functions. Given the optimal behaviour of ination, well understood both by the
authorities and the private sector, the monetary policy maker should set the interest
rate according to these simple rules. Since ination is stationary, the interest rate
inherits this property.
As discussed above, there are, however, determinacy issues associated with this
kind of characterization of optimal policy at operational level. An alternative way of
specifying optimal monetary policy is using the reaction function
it = brt + Ett+1 +  1Etyt+1    1m! t    1n!t 1    1yt 1: (1.37)
This is the expectations-based reaction function for monetary policy. One can easily
prove the proposition that this rule, coupled with the rule for the tax rate (1.32),
implements the unique rational expectations equilibrium dened by (1.28), (1.34)
and the structural equations (1.18) and (1.20), provided such a solution exists. It is
straightforward to establish that a ve-equation system consisting of (1.18), (1.19),
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(1.20) and the two reaction functions for the policy instruments simply reduces to
the system of structural equations and the pair of targeting rules.29
Fiscal policy
We also derive the scal counterpart of the monetary policy reaction function.
The optimal path for the primary surplus follows from the approximation (1.A.28) in
the Appendix. The optimal dynamics of the primary surplus, consistent with (1.32),
can be written as a simple rule
bt = bt + T

(! +  1)

t +
T


1 
 
! +  1
 1  


yt; (1.38)
in which T ; and  are steady-state levels of aggregate tax revenues, primary surplus
and the tax rate respectively. bt is a shock term given by
bt = T

 
1 + ! +  1
 bY t + T

1
1  
b t    1 T

+
Y

 bGt;
in which Y stands for the steady-state level of output. As explained above, the
output gap follows a non-stationary process under timelessly optimal policies. Hence,
the optimal surplus will also jump to a new steady-state level that is consistent with
the new stock of outstanding government liabilities. The functional form of the scal
rule resembles the one examined, for instance, in Chadha and Nolan (2007).
29 Further work along the lines of Bullard and Mitra (2002) could establish whether or rather under what
conditions such expectations-based reaction functions are also stable under learning in monetary-scal
frameworks.
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Parameter Value
 0:99
 1 0:157
" 10
 1:25
 0:65
! 0:473
 0:3
c 0:8
Table 1.1. Parameter values
1.3.2 Numerical results
To help visualizing the above derived dynamics of the economy, we present the re-
sults of a simple calibration exercise. The parameter values are set as shown in Table
1.1. For  1 and !, we have used the values estimated in Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997). The model has been calibrated so that the production function is of
decreasing returns to scale type. There is a mark-up of approximately 11 percent
in the product markets. The calibration is consistent with a 40-percent steady-state
ratio of debt to aggregate output in annual terms. For these parameter values, the
dynamic system comprising the rst-order conditions from the policy problem and
the structural equations satises the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions and has a
unique, stable solution. The coe¢cients in the loss function are both non-negative
for all calibrations used.30
Our setup is a New Keynesian framework with sticky prices and in such models
output is demand-determined. In a standard monetary policy setup (i.e. assuming
that scal solvency is satised through lump-sum instruments), following a spending
30 We allow  to vary.
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shock, rms need to hire more labour to be able to meet the increased demand. How-
ever, since labour has diminishing marginal productivity, the economy will become
more labour-intensive, average productivity will fall. Also, the disutility from supply-
ing labour rises more-than-proportionately with the level of labour supply, workers
will therefore demand higher wages and marginal cost will rise. Since prices are just
a simple markup over marginal costs, ination will be generated. In models with
endogenous tax dynamics, however, ination also plays a role in maintaining scal
solvency, while tax policy inuences stability of prices through its impact on marginal
cost (the natural rate of output).
In our model, when prices are fully exible ( = 0), all prices adjust immediately
to their optimal level following the shock, price dispersion never occurs and ination
is therefore not costly to the agent (q = 0). The supply curve becomes vertical.
Dividing the supply equation by  and solving the equation with  1 = 0 yields that
the policy of b t represents the optimal response to a spending shock in an economy
with perfectly exible prices, stabilizing output at its target level bY t and maximizing
welfare according to (1.21). Equation (1.35) tells us that the corresponding action on
the monetary side is given by brt . However, in models with endogenous tax dynamics,
the scal constraint needs to be satised too. Under perfect price exibility, it is high
ination, o¤setting scal stress plus any inherited deviation in liabilities, that makes
the b t tax plan feasible. The dynamics of the economy with exible prices is plotted
in Figure 1.2.31
31 The value 1 on the axes denotes 1 percent deviation; the ination rate is quarterly. We have assumed
the economy had been in its steady state before the shock occured.
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Fig. 1.2. Optimal dynamics in a exible-price economy
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Under conditions of imperfect price exibility, the policy that is optimal under
perfect exibility fully stabilizes output at its target level only provided the price level
is fully stabilized. It is, however, easy to see from the scal solvency constraint (1.20)
that with no ination, output at its target level and no tax gap, the requirement
of scal sustainability will not be satised if 't (+bbt 1, if any) is non-zero. Hence,
in an environment with sticky prices, the endogeneity of the tax dynamics and the
associated requirement of scal solvency precludes full stabilization of the economy
via price-level targeting. This contrasts with the results in Erceg et al. (2000) who
concluded that when either prices or wages are exible, Pareto-optimal social welfare
levelscorresponding to maximum welfare according to (1.21)are feasible. Their
result hinges upon the assumption that the scal consequences of alternative mon-
etary policies are dealt with via lump-sum taxes and a simplication due to which
stabilization policy has no signicant rst-order welfare e¤ects. The degree to which
full stabilization is prevented in the setup with endogenous tax dynamics is deter-
mined by the scal stress 't (+bbt 1, if any). An internally consistent mix of tax
and interest rate policy di¤erent from b t and brt will then be needed to satisfy both
structural constraints (1.18) and (1.20) simultaneously, yielding non-zero responses
in ination and the output gap.
The optimal dynamics of our sticky-price economy following a single, serially
uncorrelated rise in government spending is displayed in Figure 1.3.32 The results
are similar to those reported in Benigno and Woodford (2003) who analyze a shock
32 As before, the value 1 on the axes denotes 1 percent deviation, the ination rate is quarterly and we
assume the economy had been in its steady state before the shock occured.
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to government transfers rather than government spending and show how optimal
volatility of ination changes depending on the degree of price stickiness. As pointed
out in the algebraic analysis in the previous section, outstanding liabilities, the output
gap and the tax rate are all non-stationary in the optimal economy. Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2004a) explain that when price changes are costly, governments nance an
innovation in government spending partly by raising debt and partly via higher taxes.
To avoid a large one-o¤ hike in taxes in the period when the shock hits the economy,
the government spreads the tax increase over many periods through permanently
higher public debt, the nancing of which requires a permanently higher tax rate.
The higher tax rate in turn keeps output below its pre-shock steady-state level in the
long run. Therefore, we observe output gaps in the long run, even though our shock
is only short-lived.
The calibration exercise also allows us to learn more about the properties of the
policy rules derived above. Following the discussion in the previous section, we rst
concentrate our discussion on the properties of the specic targeting rule (1.34). In
the present case, monetary and scal policy makers need to coordinate their e¤orts
to make sure current ination is a linear combination of previous periods ination
and the projected change in the output gap according to
t = 1:71t 1 + 0:34 (yt   yt 1) : (1.39)
The optimal policy also needs to satisfy the condition that ination as of period t+1
is zero in accordance with the ination targeting rule (1.28). This pair of targeting
rules, when combined with the aggregate supply relationship and the scal solvency
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constraint yields the unique rational expectations equilibrium solution displayed in
Figure 1.3. At operational level, the long-run response in the interest rate to the
output gap is zero, while coe¢cients at the ination terms in (1.37) add up to 1:33.
The rule thus satises the Taylor principle. The coe¢cients in the scal reaction
function (1.38) are large, conrming the concerns raised in Svensson and Woodford
(2005) about announcing policy commitments at such a low level of generality.
1.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter introduced our benchmark micro-founded New Keynesian framework.
We have replicated the theoretical framework in Benigno and Woodford (2003) with
tax on labour and a government spending shock. In addition, we have added new
perspective on some of the concepts of their analysis. We have analyzed the dynamic
properties of the optimal time-consistent plan (optimal, that is, from a timeless
perspective). We have derived a pair of targeting rules for monetary and scal
policy makers and specied reaction functions that implement the optimal policy.
We have characterized optimal scal policy using a tractable rule for primary budget
surplus which, we think, is more in line with the real-world conduct of policy than the
conventionally used rules for the tax rate. We see a contribution in the clarication
we o¤er with regards to some features of the underlying mechanism of the model such
as the role of the tax rate in stabilizing prices or the role of ination in satisfying
the scal solvency requirement. We have also introduced some key concepts such as
the target level of output, the scal stress and the e¢cient rates of interest and tax.
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Though these notions are not novel to the welfare-maximizing analysis of optimal
monetary and scal policy, the rest of the thesis benets from a thorough treatment
of these concepts, as they play a crucial role in explaining the impact on the optimal
economy of the departures from the baseline framework.
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The aggregate supply relationship
We have explained in the text that rms are choosing the optimal price whenever
they have an option to re-optimize and that the rst-order condition of their problem
is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tQt;TYT

pt
PT

 "
241   Y !T
Uc

CT ; bGT (1  T )

pt
PT

 "! 1
35 = 0 (1.A.1)
or, in a closed-form solution,
pt
PT
=

Kt
Ft
 1
1+"!
(1.A.2)
with
Kt = Et
1X
T=t
()T t
Y 1+!T
(1  T )

PT
Pt
"(1+!)
; (1.A.3)
Ft = Et
1X
T=t
()T t Uc

CT ; bGTYT PT
Pt
" 1
: (1.A.4)
Under a simple Calvo-style price-setting mechanism, the price index evolves according
to
Pt =

(1  ) p1 "t + P
1 "
t 1
 1
1 " ; (1.A.5)
which together with (1.A.2) implies the following implicit denition of price ination
t =
Pt
Pt 1 
1  " 1t
1  
 1+"!
" 1
=
Ft
Kt
=
1
Dt
: (1.A.6)
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The law of motion for price dispersion as dened in (1.10) is
t = 
"(1+!)
t t 1 + (1  )

1  " 1t
1  
  "(1+!)
1 "
: (1.A.7)
As derived in Benigno and Woodford (2004), a second-order approximation to Dt as
given by Kt
Ft
in (1.A.6) can be written as
bDt
1  
+
1
2
Zt bDt = zt + 
1  
Et
h bDt+1 + (1 + "!) t+1i+ 1
2
ztXt
+
1
2
EtZt+1
h bDt+1 + (1 + "!) t+1i
 
1
2

1  
(1  2"  "!)Ett+1
h bDt+1 + (1 + "!) t+1i
+O (3) : (1.A.8)
The expressions Zt; zt andXt will be dened later. The term Ett+1 refers to expected
ination. A second-order expansion of Dt as dened by the expression in brackets in
(1.A.6) can in turn be written as
bDt
1 + "!
=

1  
t  
1
2
 (1  ")
(1  )2
2t +O (3) : (1.A.9)
Substituting for bDt in (1.A.8) leads us to
Vt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

zT +
1
2
zTXT +
1
2
" (1 + !) 2T

+O (3) (1.A.10)
where  = (1 )(1 )
(1+!")
and Vt stands for
Vt = t  
1
2
(1  ")
(1  )
2t +
1
2
(1  ) tZt +
1
2
" (1 + !) 2t : (1.A.11)
In line with Benigno andWoodford (2004), we write (1.A.3) asKt = Et
1P
T=t
()T t kt;T
in which kt;T = kTP
 "(1+!)
t;T . Pt;T stands for the dispersion term in (1.A.3), and
kT then collects the remaining terms from kt;T . We can analogously decompose
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Ft:Zt = Et
1P
T=t
()T t
bkt;T + bft;T  ; and zT and XT in (1.A.10) are then dened as
zT = bkT   bfT ; (1.A.12)
XT = bkT + bfT : (1.A.13)
In what follows, we also make use of the following second-order expansions. Ct =
Yt  Gt can be approximated by
bCt = c 1 bYt   bGt+ 1
2
c 1
 
1  c 1
 bY 2t + c 2bYt bGt + t:i:p:+O (3) : (1.A.14)
Here c is the consumption share of total output in the steady state and t:i:p: refers
to terms independent of policy. We can expand (1   t) as follows
\(1   t) =  b t   1
2

(1  )
b 2t +O (3) (1.A.15)
where  = 
1 
. The second-order expansion of (1.A.7) can be written as
bt = bt 1 + 1
2

(1  )
" (1 + !) (1 + !") 2t +O (3) : (1.A.16)
We see that the expansion does not contain linear terms in ination and hence, when
multiplied with other rst-order terms, the resulting product will be accurate to the
third order. An innite discounted sum of (1.A.16) will be equal to
Et
1X
T=t
T tbt = 1
2

(1  ) (1  )
" (1 + !) (1 + !")Et
1X
T=t
T t2T
+t:i:p:+O (3) : (1.A.17)
Using the above derivations, it is now straightforward to derive the aggregate supply
relationship. We have
zT = !bYT + e 1 bCT   \(1   t); (1.A.18)
1.A Appendix to Chapter 1 76
XT = (2 + !) bYT   e 1 bCT   \(1   t): (1.A.19)
It follows that
Vt = Et
1X
T=t
T t
bYT    1
! +  1
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! +  1
bT
+
1
2

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! +  1
 1bYT bGT + 
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(1 + !)bT bYT
+
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! +  1

1 + 
1  
b 2T + " (1 + !) 2T

+t:i:p:+O (3) : (1.A.20)
where  =  (! +  1) and other parameters are dened as before. To the rst order,
this implies the di¤erence equation
t = 
bYt + 
! +  1
b t    1
! +  1
bGt+ Ett+1 (1.A.21)
which is the aggregate supply relationship. From this we can infer that the immediate
e¤ect of the government spending shockthat is with no change in the tax policyis
to raise the natural rate of output by 
 1
!+ 1
bGt. See Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) for
further details regarding the natural rate of output.
The scal solvency condition
We start with the simple ow government budget constraint shown in the text
Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1   Ptt: (1.A.22)
Bt is the nominal value of public debt in period t and  t is the t-period primary
decit of the government budget (t = Tt Gt). As shown in Benigno and Woodford
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(2003), this ow budget constraint implies the following sustainability condition
bt 1
t
Uc

Ct; bGt = Et 1X
T=t
T tTUc

CT ; bGT (1.A.23)
which requires the current utility value of outstanding real liabilities to be o¤set by
the discounted sum of future primary surpluses priced in marginal utility terms. We
have used (1.11) to substitute for the period interest rates. To the rst order, the
left-hand side, denoted as Wt, can be written as
cWt = bbt 1   t    1 bYt   bGt+O (2) : (1.A.24)
A second-order expansion of the right-hand side can in turn be expressed as
Uc

Ct; bGtt = U c 1   1bYt +  1 bGt + bt   1
2

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   2
 bY 2t
  1bYt bGt  c 1 +  1   1 bYt   bGt bti+O (3) :
(1.A.25)
In our economy with taxes levied on wage income, the total tax revenues are
given by
Tt =
 t
1   t
Y 1+!t C
e 1
t t: (1.A.26)
In the steady state, we obtain
T = Y
1+!
C
e 1
: (1.A.27)
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A second-order approximation to t = Tt  Gt looks as follows
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We have dened d =

T
and d = 
Y
. Using this in (1.A.25) gives us
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Plugging this back into (1.A.23), using (1.A.17) and noting that W = (1  )U c
we have
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)Et 1X
T=t
T t

d 1
 
1 + ! +  1

   1
 bYT + d 1
1  
bT
+
 
 1    1d 1   d
 1
 bGT + 1
2
d 1
1  
(1 + 2)b 2T
+
1
2

d 1 
 1
 
1  c 1

+ d 1
 
(1 + !)2    2

   1
 
1  c 1

+  2
 bY 2T
+
 
d 1 c
 1   c 1    1 + d 1 + d 1 
 1

 1bYT bGT
+
d 1
1  
(1 + !)bT bYT + 1
2
d 1 " (1 + !) (! + 
 1)

2T

+t:i:p:+O (3) : (1.A.30)
With (1.A.24) on the left-hand side, the linear constraint then becomes
bbt 1   t    1 bYt   bGt = (1  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The policy objective function
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that a second-order approximation to the
utility function (1.1) can be written as
Ut = Y U cEt
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where Y = 1  
(1 )

> 0. The approximation contains a linear term in one of the
endogenous variables, which means that policies aiming at stabilization of deviations
of fundamentals from their steady-state values not only a¤ect the variation of the
variables but also have signicant level e¤ects. However, as explained in Sutherland
(2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2006b), for instance, (1.A.32) will not serve as a
correct, second-order-accurate welfare ranking criterion for optimal policies obtained
as a solution to a system of linear structural equations (derived above). To obtain
a welfare function with second-order terms only, one has to use second-order ap-
proximations to structural equations to substitute out the linear term from (1.A.32).
This way, a second-order-accurate welfare ranking criterion is obtained, while the
level-e¤ects are preserved in an implicit form.
The second-order approximations to the scal solvency condition and the ag-
gregate supply relationship can in this case be written as
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The task is to nd a linear combination of these two equations that contains
coe¢cients at linear terms of endogenous variables identical to those in (1.A.32),
which will enable us to substitute out the linear term in (1.A.32). We are therefore
looking for a vector of coe¢cients v0 = (v1; v2) such that satisfy the following system
of equations

d 1 (1 + ! + 
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
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0

:
We obtain v0 = (v1; v2) such that
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;
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with 
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this problem so that
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. We can now sub-
stitute this into (1.A.32) to obtain
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Here bY T = qY Gqy bGT represents the target deviation of output from its steady state. It
follows that bYT   bY T is the di¤erence between the actual and target deviation, which
in the context of our model corresponds to the welfare-relevant output gap.33 The
linear terms in the second line represent the so-called transitory component. This
component, representing the welfare implications of a surprise policy in the initial
period, can be treated as predetermined in the presence of initial commitments of the
form (1.23) and (1.24) (see Benigno and Woodford 2003, 2005).
Finally, we rewrite the linear constraints in terms of the welfare-relevant output
gap. The supply curve becomes
t =  [yt + ' (b t   b t )] + Ett+1; (1.A.39)
where yt = bYT   bY T , ' = !+ 1 ; and
b t = 1'

 1
! +  1
 
qY G
qy
 bGt
is the e¢cient deviation in the tax rate. We see that it is proportional to the di¤erence
between the target deviation in output and the spending-induced shift in the natural
rate of output. It is the deviation in the tax rate that exactly o¤sets any cost-push
(or cost-pull shock) induced by the shock to government expenditures. The scal
solvency constraint takes the following form
33 For detailed discussion of what one should consider as welfare-relevant output gap under various assump-
tions about the size of the distortions see Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
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which is the scal stress term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003) as a
composite measure of the consequences of the shock to government spending for
scal sustainability in period t. Here fy = d
 1
 (1 + ! + 
 1)   1 and f =
d 1
1 
.
The IS relationship
A straightforward log-linearization of a two-period version of (1.11) yields
 e 1Et bCt+1 + e 1 bCt + bit   Etp;t+1 = 0:
Substituting the rst-order terms from (1.A.14) gives us
 1bYt =  1EtbYt+1   bit   Etp;t+1   1 Et bGt+1   bGt :
Finally, assuming no persistence in shocks to government expenditures and using
the general denition for the target deviation of output, we can rewrite the above
equation in terms of welfare-relevant output gaps as follows
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Etp;t+1+ 1  qY G
qy
 bGt: (1.A.42)
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The brt in the text corresponds to  1 1  qY Gqy  bGt.
The steady state
We also derive some key relationships characterizing the steady state of our
economy. In the steady state, prices are stable and hence there is no dispersion.
(1.A.2) becomes
1 =
Y
!
(1  )Uc
 
C; 0
 : (1.A.43)
This relationship denes the steady state level of output. Note that Uc
 
C; 0

=
C
 e 1
. Then
Y =

(1  )

c e
 1
 1
!+e 1
: (1.A.44)
Next, (1.11) implies that in the steady state,
R = I =
1

: (1.A.45)
Here R = (1 + r) and I =
 
1 + i

; r and i are real and nominal interest rates,
respectively. Finally, (1.A.23) can be written as
Wt = tUc

Ct; bGt+ EtWt+1 (1.A.46)
which implies, given the denition of Wt; that
 = (1  ) b: (1.A.47)
Chapter 2
Simple Monetary-Fiscal Targeting
Rules when Prices and Wages are
Sticky
In this chapter, we propose simple specic targeting rules in the spirit of Svens-
son (2002, 2003) to characterize desirable policy in an economy with staggered wage
and price contracts, and endogenous tax dynamics. In such a framework, it is not pos-
sible to characterize optimal policy using simple analytical solutions. Our approach
of looking at joint monetary-scal targeting rules represents an innovative way of
approximating optimal policy that allows us to obtain an excellent match with the
optimal dynamics of the economy following shocks.
We consider an economy in which both prices and wages are sticky for the fol-
lowing reason: while the presence of staggered price adjustment brings the modelling
environment closer to reality, the dynamics of the economy modelled in Chapter 1 re-
tains some characteristics that are at odds with reality. For instance, the real wage
rate in the optimal sticky-price but exible-wage economy in Chapter 1 responds rel-
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atively strongly to shocks and stabilizes with no persistence, just like the rest of the
model. In Figure 2.1, we show that the amplitude of the change in the real wage
rate (in percentage deviation from steady-state level) is similar to the change in real
output in the economy. However, the general assertion from the empirical literature
has been that real wages tend to be acyclical. This point has been raised in the con-
text of a monetary policy model by Christiano et al. (1997) who expressed unease
about the unrealistically sharp response in real wages to shocks in sticky-price but
exible-wage models. Nominal wage rigidity can be a powerful source of greater real
wage stability, as shown in Christiano et al. (2005).34 Therefore, in this chapter, we
amend the baseline framework so that both wage- and price-setting decisions are of
the Calvo (1983) type, as in Erceg et al. (2000).35 Our setting thus becomes a stan-
dard New Keynesian economy where both wages and prices are sticky, tax dynamic
is endogenous and the steady state of the economy is distorted. This is an important
extension of both Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2004).
In our sticky-price, sticky-wage framework, we nd that the central governments
policy objective includes a wage ination volatility term in addition to the objective
of stabilizing price ination and output gap volatility. Hence, this result from Erceg
et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) carries over to a situation when
monetary policy has scal implications too.36 We also nd that the relative weights in
34 They argued that nominal wage stickiness should be a basic building block of a good model designed to
account for the dynamic behaviour of the US economy.
35 We consider Calvo-pricing in its simplest form. According to Christiano et al. (2005), there are no huge
gains from assuming indexation mechanisms being used by rms that cannot re-optimize their prices.
36 Adding further frictions to the model such as various indexation mechanisms or habit persistence would
be likely to a¤ect the nature of the policy objective, as in Amato and Laubach (2003), for instance. Our
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Fig. 2.1. Real wage and output dynamics in the sticky-price, exible-wage model
the policy objective are little changed compared with Benigno and Woodford (2004).
As expected, the optimal nominal wage volatility is low when wage-stickiness is high
and that this causes real wages to be much more stable compared with the sticky-
price but exible-wage case of Chapter 1. This brings the model in line with some
stylized facts about real wage dynamics. The presence of nominal wage stickiness also
introduces endogenous persistence into the dynamics of the model. Our endogenous
variables converge to their (new) steady state levels only gradually, even if the shock
is purely transitory. Non-stationarity in the dynamics of public debt, tax rate and
the output gap survives as the optimal solution when wage stickiness is present in
addition to price stickiness. We also show that it is enough for one of the markets to be
imperfectly exible to make the policy of price- and wage-level targeting undesirable.
As already mentioned, incorporating staggered wage adjustment into the model
analyzed in Chapter 1 makes the setting too complex for us to be able to derive
purpose here is to examine the e¤ect of the absence of lump-sum taxation on the policy objective and optimal
dynamics in isolation.
2 Targeting Rules when Prices and Wages are Sticky 89
closed-form solutions for optimal policy. It becomes impossible to fully characterize
optimal policy in algebraic terms at all levels of generality as proposed in Svensson and
Woodford (2005). This is a common problem and the optimal simple rules literature
o¤ers one way of dealing with such practical issues. In this chapter, we take a slightly
di¤erent approach. Instead of concentrating on rules for policy instruments, we wish
to characterize policies that do approximately as well as the optimal policy at a higher
level of generality. Such specication is now commonly used to characterize optimal
policy but has not yet been applied in attempts to approximate optimal policy.
We concentrate on specic targeting rules (Svensson, 2002, 2003). These rules
o¤er a simple joint policy target for monetary and scal policy makers. We pro-
pose that the branches of central government authority operating in our sticky-price,
sticky-wage economic framework should coordinate their e¤orts to gradually stabi-
lize nominal wage growth and also make sure that a simple relationship linking the
growth in the real wage rate to past price and wage ination and the dynamics of the
output gap is satised. We show that such simple targeting rules can guide policy
very well so that when combined with the structural model, the resulting dynamics of
the economy is a close approximation of the dynamics under optimal policy following
a given shock. Such simple characterization of policy has thus the potential to out-
perform simple (ad hoc) instrument rules. In other words, conduct of policy based
on conventionally considered simple instrument rules would lead to excessive welfare
losses some of which can be eliminated if policy is characterized, as we propose, at a
higher level of generality. This is the main advantage of formulating policy through
2 Targeting Rules when Prices and Wages are Sticky 90
simple targeting rules rather than instrument rules. We demonstrate this point by
deriving expectations-based reaction functions (Evans and Honkapohja, 2006) con-
sistent with the simple targeting rules and showing that they are much more complex
than the conventionally considered instrument rules. At the same time, from a prac-
tical point of view, characterization of policy via the targeting rules proposed here is
no less veriable and equally easy to build into macroeconomic decision frameworks.
As spelled out in detail in Svensson (2002, 2003), characterizing policy using target-
ing rules rather than simple rules for instruments is also more consistent with the
use of judgement in policy making. On the other hand, the quality of approximation
provided by specic targeting rules is prone to be a¤ected by the nature of the econ-
omy modelled. Overall, however, we nd specic targeting rules an attractive and
policy-relevant way of characterizing good policy.
We rank alternative policies in the family of policies given by the proposed
targeting rules. Benigno and Woodford (2006b) discuss in great detail the issues
associated with ranking suboptimal rules in frameworks such as ours. The method for
ranking suboptimal simple rules proposed in Benigno and Woodford (2006b), which
entails separating the trend and the cyclical components of di¤erence-stationary series
(output gap) and ranking of policies implying the same trend component using a
similar decomposition of welfare, cannot be applied in our case, since the policies we
wish to examine do not converge to the same long-run outcome (i.e. have di¤erent
trend components).37 Instead, we identify the best policy in our class using a simple
37 We shall, however, refer to their identication method in Chapter 4, when we examine a class of rules
yielding the same long-run values of all endogenous variables, even though not the same as the timelessly
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grid search over a (constrained) range of parameters to obtain the parameter values
that would calibrate our rules so that the implied impulse response functions for the
variables in the policy objective come closest to those describing the behaviour of
the optimal economy following the same shock. A similar criterion was shown to be
a good alternative to analyses based directly on utility-based measures of welfare in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005).
We also show that the chosen pair of rules can do well under di¤erent calibrations
of price and wage contract duration. Finally, we uncover a link between the design of
appropriate ination targeting rules and the nature of the tax system which follows
from the role distortive taxation plays in price-setting decisions of private agents. We
examine an economy in which tax revenue is raised in the product market by levying
a tax on sales revenue of rms.38 We show that our real-wage growth rule provides
a good t with the optimal policy in the sales-tax economy as well, if the ination
targeting rule is expressed in terms of price rather than wage ination.
Interestingly, just like Benigno and Woodford (2003), we nd perfect smoothing
of the tax rate to be the optimal policy in the perfectly exible sales tax economy
in response to a large class of shocks. Ever since Lucas and Stokey (1983) and the
earlier versions of Aiyagari et al. (2002), the conventional wisdom has been that
optimal rule.
38 It would be no doubt interesting and indeed more realistic to consider economies with multiple tax
instruments. There are several issues with this kind of analysis. The methodology we use would not enable
us to construct a second-order-accurate approximation to welfare with more tax instruments. Moreover, as
pointed out in Benigno and Woodford (2006a), should we not restrict the values of the tax rates, we could
replicate an environment with lump-sum taxes in which the scal solvency constraint ceases to bind and the
scal consequences of monetary policy become irrelevant. If we restricted the values of the tax rates to be
positive, it would likely be optimal to use the least distorting source to nance government revenue.
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perfect stabilization of the tax rate in response to shocks is not optimal. In our
framework, in which debt is nominal and one-period only, the feasibility of a constant
tax rate as the optimal policy following a large class of shocks only depends on the
nature of the price- and wage-setting behaviour. Hence, we nd an interesting case
which goes against the established opinion regarding the optimal dynamic behaviour
of the tax rate.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 presents the microeconomic
foundations of our sticky-price, sticky-wage model. In Section 2, we outline the
corresponding macroeconomic model and the policy makers objective. In Section
3, we derive the timelessly optimal plan. In Section 4, we propose a pair of simple
targeting rules to approximate optimal policy and analyze how the economy performs
relative to the optimal economy under such a characterization of policy. In Section
5, we present some robustness checks, including the economy where the source of
government revenue is tax on sales rather than wage income. Finally, the Appendix
to the chapter gives a detailed account of the derivation of the structural equations
and the policy objective.
2.1 The microeconomic foundations
In this section, we formalize certain aspects of our model mentioned in the intro-
duction. The assumptions about individual preferences and the results regarding the
demand for consumption of di¤erentiated goods as well as the production function
remain the same as in Chapter 1. We only re-write these earlier results using new
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notation to reect that we talk about imperfect product as well as labour markets.39
The consumption aggregator becomes
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct (i)
"p 1
"p di
 "p
"p 1
; (2.1)
in which "p is a constant and represents the elasticity of substitution across goods in
the goods market. The demand function for di¤erentiated goods is now
yt (i) = Yt

pt (i)
Pt

 "p
: (2.2)
The price index is written as
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt (i)
1 "p di
 1
1 "p
: (2.3)
We introduce imperfect competition into the labour market in a similar way.
We assume the existence of a continuum of monopolistically competitive households,
supplying di¤erentiated labour to the production sector. The total quantity of labour
used in the production of good i is an aggregate of di¤erent types of labour indexed
j.
Ht (i) =
Z 1
0
ht (j)
"w 1
"w dj
 "w
"w 1
; (2.4)
in which "w is the elasticity of substitution in the labour market. It is assumed that
there exists an employment agency that bundles together di¤erent types of labour
needed in the production of a good i exactly in the same way as the rm producing
that good would want it. Cost minimization by wage-taking rms subject to (2.4)
39 There is one more short remark on notation. Later on, we modify our economy so that taxes are levied
on sales revenue rather than wage income. We shall denote the variables and parameters relevant for the
income-tax economy with a subscript w and sales-tax economy parameters with a subscript s. As much as
possible, we shall economize on notation and use it only when necessary.
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yields the demand for labour of type j
ht (j) = Ht

wt (j)
Wt

 "w
(2.5)
and the nominal wage index
Wt =
Z 1
0
wt (j)
1 "w dj
 1
1 "w
: (2.6)
Note that aggregate labour supply in the economy can then be expressed as Ht =R 1
0
Ht (i) di. Combining this with the production function and (2.2) yields the expres-
sion for total labour supply in the economy
Ht = Y

t p;t; (2.7)
where p;t refers to price dispersion and is given by
p;t =
Z 1
0

pt (i)
Pt

 "p
di: (2.8)
The total disutility from supplying labour can then be expressed asZ 1
0
 (ht (j)) dj =
1
1 + !w
Y
(1+!w)
t 
1+!w
p;t w;t; (2.9)
where w;t stands for wage dispersion and is given by
w;t =
Z 1
0

wt (j)
Wt

 "w(1+!w)
dj: (2.10)
2.1.1 The wage-setting decision
Each household maximizes the di¤erence between the utility derived from wage in-
come and the disutility from labour supply
Uc

Ct; bGt
Pt
(1  w;t)wt (j)ht (wt (j))   (ht (wt (j))) : (2.11)
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Moreover, it does so in a forward-looking way, evaluating an expected stream of net
utility gains. As in Erceg et al. (2000), we assume a wage setting mechanism of the
type put forward by Calvo (1983) with w 2 (0; 1) denoting the probability of not
being able to adjust wages in any period. The intertemporal rst-order condition can
then be written as
Et
1X
T=t
(
T tw Qt;THt

wT (j)
WT

 "w

24(1  w;T )  wH!wT PTWT 1Uc CT ; bGT

wT (j)
WT

 "w!w 1
359=; = 0
in which w is now the rate of distortive tax on wage income. Qt;T is a standard
stochastic asset pricing kernel that can be derived from a simple household utility
maximization problem subject to a ow budget constraint equating wage and dividend
income together with asset returns to consumption and change in assets (dened in
(1.11)). w is the wage markup and is given by
w =
"w
"w   1
: (2.12)
Suppliers of labour who change their prices in period t set a common wage so that
wt (j) = w

t . We can now solve the rst-order condition from the wage-setting problem
for wage dispersion
wt
Wt
=
2664 Et
1P
T=t
(w)
T t wY
(1+!w)
T 
1+!w
p;T

WT
Wt
"w(1+!w)
Et
1P
T=t
(w)
T t Uc

CT ; bGT WTPT Y T p;T (1  w;t)WTWt "w 1
3775
1
1+"w!w
=

Kw;t
Fw;t
 1
1+"w!w
: (2.13)
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The assumption of Calvo-pricing implies the following law of motion for the wage
index
Wt =

(1  w)w
1 "w
t + wW
1 "w
t 1
 1
1 "w : (2.14)
Combining (2.13) and (2.14) gives us an implicit denition of the nominal wage
growth "
1  w
"w 1
w;t
1  w
# 1+"w!w
"w 1
=
Fw;t
Kw;t
; (2.15)
where w;t =
Wt
Wt 1
. It is now also easy to show that
w;t = w
"w(1+!w)
w;t w;t 1 + (1  w)
"
1  w
"w 1
w;t
1  w
#
 
"w(1+!w)
1 "w
: (2.16)
2.1.2 The price-setting decision
As in Chapter 1, rms maximize a future stream of prots with wages being the only
cost item in their balance sheets. The nominal prot (as in (1.13)) now becomes
zt (i) = pt (i) yt (i) WtHt (i) : (2.17)
Here, we also assume Calvo-pricing with p being the probability of having to leave
prices unchanged in a given period. The representative rm is then choosing the opti-
mal price, taking the wage index as given, and the intertemporal rst-order condition
is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tp Qt;TYT

pT (i)
PT

 "p
"
1  p
WT
PT
Y  1T

pT (i)
PT

 "p( 1) 1
#
= 0 (2.18)
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We can dene !p =   1 and as before, the markup is given by
p =
"p
"p   1
: (2.19)
For pt (i) = p

t ; we obtain a closed-form solution
pt
PT
=

Kp;t
Fp;t
 1
1+"p!p
(2.20)
with
Kp;t = Et
1X
T=t
 
p
T t
Uc

CT ; bGTpWTPT Y T

PT
Pt
"p(1+!p)
; (2.21)
Fp;t = Et
1X
T=t
 
p
T t
Uc

CT ; bGTYT PT
Pt
"p 1
: (2.22)
The price index evolves according to
Pt =
h 
1  p

p
1 "p
t + pP
1 "p
t 1
i 1
1 "p
; (2.23)
which together with (2.20) implies the following implicit denition of price ination
p;t =
Pt
Pt 1 "
1  p
"p 1
p;t
1  p
# 1+"p!p
"p 1
=
Fp;t
Kp;t
: (2.24)
The law of motion for price dispersion as dened in (2.8) is
p;t = p
"p(1+!p)
p;t p;t 1 +
 
1  p
 "1  p"p 1p;t
1  p
#
 
"p(1+!p)
1 "p
: (2.25)
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2.1.3 Central government
The central government faces a ow budget constraint just as in the baseline setup
in Chapter 1. Aggregate tax receipts are now given by
Tt = w;twR;tY

t p;t: (2.26)
As before, the central government chooses optimal policy by solving the Ramsey
problem in which now (2.13) to (2.16) appear as additional constraints.
2.2 The macroeconomic model
We nd that the absence of lump-sum taxation as a source of government nance
does not change the nature of policy makers preferences as expressed by a quadratic
loss function. It follows from our setup that the policy maker conducts monetary and
scal policy to minimize the quadratic loss function
Lt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
qp
2
p;T +
1
2
qw
2
w;T

(2.27)
As in Chapter 1, yt is the welfare-relevant output gap dened as the di¤erence between
the actual and the target deviation in output bY t . The target deviation follows from
the approximation to individual utility, hence it is determined by preferences and is
independent of policy (see Appendix to this chapter). p;t stands for price ination
and w;t stands for nominal wage growth or wage ination. Compared with (1.21), the
welfare objective now contains a wage-ination stabilization term in addition to the
output gap and ination stabilization terms in a exible-wage economy. If appropriate
initial commitments are satised, this objective represents a second-order-accurate
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welfare-ranking criterion, while the rest of the model is specied with only rst-order
accuracy. The functional form is thus the same as in Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004). As one would expect though, the coe¢cients as well as the
target deviation in output will, in general, be di¤erent given the di¤erent structural
setup caused by the unavailability of lump-sum taxation.
The Appendix shows how this objective follows from the denition of individual
welfare and also denes the relevant coe¢cient values. For common parameter values,
these coe¢cients will be positive, implying that the function is convex and the optimal
solution that we obtain represents a minimum from the perspective of welfare losses.
The setup in the previous section also implies the following structural relation-
ships for the economy. The supply side is characterized by
p;t = pyt + p
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etp;t+1; (2.28)
w;t = wyt + w

w
 bw;t   b w;t    bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etw;t+1: (2.29)
Equation (2.28) is the price aggregate supply relationship. bwR;t is the deviation in the
real wage rate from its steady state value that brings about the target deviation in
output without a¤ecting the price level. Equation (2.29) is the wage aggregate supply
relationship. b w;t is the deviation in the tax rate that brings the natural wage rate
in line with the rate consistent with the target level of output and thus eliminates
nominal pressures arising from the innovation to government spending. b w;t is dened
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as
b w;t = (! +  1)w

 1
(! +  1)
bGt   bY t  : (2.30)
Equation (2.30) implies that the previous denition for b w;t can be restated as b w;t
representing the policy that aligns the natural rate of output with its target level,
as in Chapter 1. It is determined based on the di¤erence in the degree to which the
natural and the welfare-e¢cient levels of output are a¤ected by the rise in government
spending.
This point requires a more detailed analysis. Note that the rst-order approxi-
mation to (2.13) and (2.20) can be respectively written as40
p;t = p
h
(  1) bYt + bwR;ti+ Etp;t+1; (2.31)
w;t = w
h 
!w + 
 1
 bYt    1 bGt   bwR;t + wbw;ti+ Etw;t+1: (2.32)
In a exible-price, exible-wage economy ( 1p = 
 1
w = 0), the level of output that
would prevail following the shock would be
bY nt =  1(! +  1) bGt   w(! +  1)bw;t; (2.33)
which is the natural rate of output. It follows that the natural real wage rate will be
given by
bwnR;t =   (  1) bY nt : (2.34)
Equations (2.31) and (2.32) could then also be written as
p;t = p
h
(  1)
bYt   bY nt +   bwR;t   bwnR;ti+ Etp;t+1; (2.35)
40 See the Appendix to this chapter for derivation.
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w;t = w
h 
!w + 
 1
 bYt   bY nt     bwR;t   bwnR;ti+ Etw;t+1: (2.36)
These equations are similar to those derived in Erceg et al. (2000). Based on a system
like this, they concluded that the policy maker is able to achieve rst-best maximum
welfare if prices at least in one of the markets are perfectly exible. We shall refer to
this level of welfare as the Pareto optimum, following Erceg et al. (2000). When both
prices and wages are sticky, this becomes impossible, since a policy of p;t = w;t = 0
is inconsistent with bwR;t = bwnR;t if bY nt 6= 0, which in general holds if bw;t in (2.33) is
treated as exogenous. In our model, there are two additional complications. First, the
tax rate is endogenous. Second, it is welfare-e¢cient to stabilize the economy around
its target level rather than the natural level. Due to the presence of non-negligible
distortions to the steady-state, the target levelwhich is the welfare-relevant level
will in general be a¤ected by the spending shock to a di¤erent degree than the natural
level. As we have seen in Chapter 1, this gives rise to cost-push shock terms that
prevent full stabilization of the economy even if one of the markets is perfectly exible
(see Benigno and Woodford, 2004). Next, we look at how these issues a¤ect our setup
with endogenous tax dynamics.
It follows from (2.31) that the real wage rate that brings output to its target
level without invoking pressure on prices is given by
bwR;t =   (  1) bY t : (2.37)
We can then rewrite (2.36) as follows
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w;t = w
n 
!w + 
 1
 bYt   bY t     bwR;t   bwR;t (2.38)
+
(! +  1)
(  1)
  bwnR;t   bwR;t+ Etw;t+1:
For the case of sticky prices and wages, we obtain a similar contradiction here as
in Erceg et al. (2000). Should bwnR;t = bwR;t, a policy of strict price- and wage-level
targeting (i.e. a policy of zero price and wage ination), coupled with bwR;t = bwR;t
could result in a Pareto optimal outcome according to (2.27). However, there is no
reason why bwR;t should be zero in a stochastic environment, and non-zero realizations
of bwR;t, and therefore non-zero values of bwR;t, are inconsistent with strict price- and
wage-level targeting.
On the other hand, should at least one of the markets be exible, the Pareto
optimum is attainable, unlike in Benigno and Woodford (2004). To see this, note
that under exible prices, for instance, (2.37) holds for bwR;t. Prices are free to adjust
to ensure bwR;t = bwR;t. Then, we only need bwnR;t = bwR;t to have no trade-o¤ between
wage ination and output gap stabilization in (2.38). bwR;t and bwnR;t can be aligned
via tax policy which a¤ects natural but not the e¢cient wage rate. To work out the
corresponding tax response, it is enough to solve
bwnR;t   bwR;t = (  1)bY t   bY nt 
= (  1)
w
(! +  1)
 bw;t   b w;t ;
with bY nt given by (2.33) and b w;t by (2.30). Thus, a policy of b w;t, coupled with stable
wages and fully exible prices brings the natural rate of output in line with the target
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level of output, which is consistent with Pareto optimal maximum welfare. One can
easily work out that a similar story would hold when wages rather than prices are
fully exible. Shortly, however, we shall discuss that the chances of Pareto optimality
being a feasible outcome are only theoretical, given that the optimal economy also
has to satisfy the constraint on government nancing.
Having claried the background to (2.28) and (2.29), the derivation of which
from the representative households wage-setting decision and rms prot-maximizing
decision is given in the Appendix to this chapter, it remains to specify the rest of the
structural model. The real wage dynamic is given by
bwR;t   bwR;t 1 = w;t   p;t: (2.39)
Chugh (2006) highlights the central importance of this identity in determining the
optimal dynamics of the economy and optimal ination volatility when wages are
sticky.41 The ow government budget constraint, together with a standard Euler
equation and a transversality condition, now implies the following scal sustainability
condition
bbt 1   p;t    1yt =  't + (1  ) fyyt + f  bw;t   b w;t+ fw   bwR;t   bwR;t
+Et
hbbt   p;t+1    1yt+1i (2.40)
41 As suggested in the introduction, under staggered wage adjustment, nominal wage growth is costly in
welfare terms, as it generates ine¢cient wage dispersion and hence its desired volatility will be low. Assuming
that real wage dynamics is determined elsewhere in the system and is fairly stable, ination varies only to
deliver the desired path of real wages. This role of ination, according to Chugh (2006), dominates its role of
a shock absorber. Hence, he obtains low volatility of ination to be optimal even when only wage adjustment
is costly.
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't is again the scal stress term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003) as a
measure of the scal consequences of a shock to government spending in period t from
a long-term perspective. The coe¢cients fy; f ; and fw are dened in the Appendix.
Finally, the demand side of the economy is given just like in Chapter 1 by the IS
relationship
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Etp;t+1   brt ; (2.41)
in which brt is the deviation in the interest rate that induces a shift in demand corre-
sponding to the target deviation in output.
2.3 Optimal dynamics with sticky prices and
wages
We are again interested in policies one wished to have committed oneself to imple-
ment in the current period had such a commitment been made in the distant past.
The structure of the policy problem, which is also the correct formulation of the ap-
proximate Ramsey problem subject to appropriate initial constraints (as explained in
Benigno andWoodford, 2006b), is similar to the one in Chapter 1. It includes commit-
ments regarding the t-period values of endogenous variables the knowledge of which
in period t   1 would have inuenced the determination of the equilibrium. These
commitments reect the long-run optimal solution to the dynamics of the relevant
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endogenous variables. The policy Lagrangian is written as
Jt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
qp
2
p;T +
1
2
qw
2
w;T

+1;T

p;T   pyT   p
  bwR;T   bwR;T   Etp;T+1
+2;T

w;T   wyT   ww
 bw;T   b w;T + w   bwR;T   bwR;T   Etw;T+1
+3;T [ bwR;T   bwR;T 1   w;T + p;T ]
+4;T
hbbT 1   p;T    1yT + 'T   (1  ) fyyT   (1  ) f  bw;T   b w;T 
  (1  ) fw
  bwR;T   bwR;T   bbT + Etp;T+1 + Et 1yT+1io
+
 
4;t 1   1;t 1

p;t   2;t 1w;t + 
 14;t 1yt (2.42)
The rst-order conditions (with T = t) form the following dynamic system
qyyt = p1;t +

(1  ) fy + 
 1   w
(1  ) f
ww

4;t   
 14;t 1; (2.43)
qpp;t =
 
4;t   4;t 1

 
 
1;t   1;t 1

  3;t; (2.44)
qww;t = 3;t +
(1  ) f
ww
 
4;t   4;t 1

; (2.45)
3;t = Et3;t+1 + p1;t + (1  )

fw +
f
w

4;t; (2.46)
4;t = Et4;t+1: (2.47)
The optimal dynamics of the key variables can be obtained by solving a system com-
prising (2.43) to (2.47) and the constraints in (2.42). Unfortunately, the complexity
of the system does not allow us to obtain closed-form solutions for the dynamics of
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Parameter Value
 0:99
 1 0:157
"p = "w 10
 1:25
p = w 0:65
! 0:473
w 0:3
c 0:8
Table 2.1. Parameter values
endogenous variables, which is the main disadvantage of this more complex setup.
Nor can we specify optimal policy at a deeper level by deriving tractable policy tar-
gets and implied rules for monetary and scal policy. We are therefore constrained
to present the optimal dynamics in the form of numerical results. We do this below.
In the next section, we shall examine simple specic targeting rules that do well in
generating dynamics that closely matches the optimal dynamics.
2.3.1 Numerical analysis: Calibration and baseline results
We use the King and Watson (1998) algorithm to solve the dynamic system of rst-
order conditions and structural constraints. The parameter values used in the cali-
bration exercise are given in Table 2.1. We set the elasticity of substitution between
di¤erent types of labour "w equal to the elasticity of substitution between di¤eren-
tiated products "p = 10. This implies an approximately 11 percent markup in both
product and labour markets. In the baseline case, the price- and wage-stickiness
parameters p and w have been set to a common value of 0:65.
The steady state output of the economy is about 16.5 percent lower compared to
the economy with exible labour market due to imperfect competition in the labour
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Variable Value

Y
0:0160bw  0:136
qy 2:3496
qp 666:77
qw 424:29
Table 2.2. Steady-state values and coe¢cients
market. We calibrate the economy so that the steady-state scal outcomes are the
same as in the exible-wage economy. The implied steady-state values of some of
the variables as well as some coe¢cient values are displayed in Table 2.2. We see
that the relative weight of output gap stabilization remains very small. The relative
weights in the objective function roughly correspond to the relative weights obtained
in the monetary policy model of Benigno and Woodford (2004).42 The system, as
calibrated, satises the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) stability conditions and has a
unique, stable solution, which we present below.
We start our discussion with the fully exible economy. When both prices and
wages are fully exible, qp = qw = 0, welfare is maximized when the welfare-relevant
output gap is fully stabilized. We can show that such a result is feasible and is also
optimal. Note that the objective becomes
Lt =
1
2
Et
1X
T=t
T tqyy
2
T ;
or equivalently, by solving for the output gap from (2.28) and (2.29),
Lt =
1
2
Et
1X
T=t
T tqy

w
(! +  1)
 bw;T   b w;T 2 :
42 Given our calibration, the corresponding coe¢cient values in the Benigno and Woodford (2004) model
would be qy = 0:9680; qp = 287:9683 and qw = 183:2466.
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This highlights the fact that tax smoothing as a policy objective is implicit in the
general quadratic welfare objective. Constraints (2.39) and (2.40) are now not binding
since we can choose price and wage ination freely. Price ination is chosen to wipe
out the consequences of the spending shock for scal sustainability in the period when
the shock occurs and wage ination adjusts so that bwR is attained in the period of
the shock and the wage rate stabilizes at wR once the shock dies out. Given these
circumstances, welfare is maximized at what Erceg et al. (2000) refer to as Pareto
optimum (Lt = 0) when bw;T = b w;T . These tax and wage dynamics are consistent
with keeping the output gap zero throughout.
When prices and wages are not fully exible, in general, such a result is not
possible. We have examined one intermediate case in Chapter 1 and concluded that
full stabilization and hence maximum welfare is precluded by the presence of the scal
solvency condition, which would not be satised under a policy of zero price ination,
except for a very special and also unlikely case. In the present setting, should prices
be fully exible, as considered in the previous section, a policy of zero wage ination
in all t would be a feasible policy only if
bbt 1 + 't = p;t: (2.48)
Remember that in such a case, p;t is chosen to ensure bwR;t = bwR;t. There is thus
no reason why the relationship (2.48) should hold in general. This contrasts with
the intermediate results in Erceg et al. (2000) who abstract from the scal conse-
quences of alternative monetary policies. In Erceg et al. (2000), the Pareto-optimal
social welfare level is attainable when either prices or wages are exible. But our
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conclusion is the same, though for di¤erent reasons, as in Benigno and Woodford
(2004). We can therefore conclude that the presence of distortive taxes, even though
a¤ecting the structure of the economy and of the argument, it does not alter the
principal conclusions from the existing monetary policy literature in economies with
a distorted steady state. Perfect stabilization of the price and/or wage level remains
an undesirable policy strategy.
It now remains for us to determine the optimal dynamics when both prices and
wages are sticky. Based on the above analysis, it is easy to postulate that the optimal
dynamics will not involve the pair
bwR;T ;b w;T	1T=t and we shall observe price and wage
ination and non-zero output gaps. Stickiness of prices and the costliness of price
dispersion limits the extent to which ination can be used to meet the scal constraint
and similarly wage ination cannot be set freely to ensure immediate adjustment of
real wages. The absence of the possibility of instantaneous real-wage adjustment
introduces endogenous persistence into the model by (2.39). The optimal dynamics
are plotted in Figure 2.2.43 We see that the solution includes non-stationary elements,
as in the exible-wage case. While price and wage ination as well as the interest
rate are stationary, the output gap, real wages, the tax rate and outstanding liabilities
all converge to a new equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized by a higher tax
rate and a lower output level. Hence, the non-stationarity property of the optimal
dynamic solution to public debt, the tax rate and output survives in the sticky-price,
sticky-wage framework as well.
43 The value of 1 on the vertical axes denotes 1 percent deviation from the pre-shock steady state. The
ination and wage rates are quarterly.
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Fig. 2.2. Optimal dynamics under imperfect price and wage exibility
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Fig. 2.3. Optimal real wage and output dynamics under price and wage rigidity
It may not be evident at rst sight that the dynamic of the real wage rate is now
much more subdued relative to output. We plot the dynamics of the real wage rate
and output in Figure 2.3. There is a stark contrast here compared with the exible-
wage case plotted in Figure 2.1. The dynamics under sticky wages are more in line
with what empirical evidence would suggest. The magnitude of the optimal response
in the real wage rate is now very small compared with the response in output. The
response is also mildly hump-shaped, initially slightly overshooting its new long-run
optimal level.
The analysis below will show that a small degree of wage rigidity is su¢cient to
reduce the optimal volatility of both nominal and real wages following the shock and
generate the hump-shaped persistent response in real wages.
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2.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we examine how the above reported results change when one varies
the length of contracts in both product and labour markets. Benigno and Woodford
(2003) have performed similar diagrammatic sensitivity analysis in their sticky-price,
exible-wage framework. They concluded that optimal (price) ination volatility
falls dramatically for even a small degree of price stickiness. The optimal long-run
tax policy is shown to be fairly robust to the degree of price stickiness, except for the
special case of full exibility when taxes are optimally stabilized at their pre-shock
steady state level in the long run. They, however, report substantial variation both
in the size and the sign of the short-term response in the tax rate.
Our results for the sticky-price, sticky-wage economy are shown in Figures 2.4
and 2.5. There are several things to note about these results. First, the optimal
response in the real wage rate is much smaller relative to the response in aggregate
production compared with the exible-wage economy (as indicated in Figure 2.1)
at even small degrees of wage stickiness. For any length of wage contracts, we get
a subdued, hump-shaped response in the real wage rate, which is much more in
line with the empirical literature cited in the introductory chapter. Second, both
price and wage ination vary with the degree of wage stickiness but wage ination
is remarkably insensitive to changes in the contract length in the product market.
Our analysis suggests optimal price ination volatility increases considerably as one
shortens the duration of price contracts while keeping wage contract duration at the
baseline length. These results give some support to the conclusions of Schmitt-Grohé
2.3 Optimal dynamics with sticky prices and wages 113
and Uribe (2005) that price stickiness is the single most important distortion in the
economy justifying price stability as the central goal of monetary policy. Third, the
optimal long-run tax policy is as robust to both price and wage rigidity as it was in
the case of the sticky-price economy of Benigno and Woodford (2003). However, the
short-term response in the tax rate is sensitive to the degree of wage stickiness but
not the length of price contracts. The tax policy here is a¤ected by the changes in the
slope of the wage aggregate supply relationship and the changes in the costliness of
wage ination resulting from changes in the duration of wage contracts. When wages
are highly rigid, the wage aggregate supply schedule is at and the impact of a given
tax rise on wages is only small. At the same time, nominal wage growth is very costly
in welfare terms. Our results indicate that it is optimal to raise taxes sharply in the
short term in response to the shock, implying that the rst e¤ect dominates. As we
approach the other extreme, the aggregate supply schedule is now steep but a given
rate of wage ination is less costly. Our analysis indicates that tax policy principally
remains unchanged compared with the case of highly rigid wages, implying that now
the second e¤ect dominates. The intermediate values of wage stickiness then imply
more tax smoothing over time, characterized by a subdued initial response in taxes
followed by slower adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium level. Finally, we
nd that the degree of wage or price stickiness has remarkably little e¤ect on the
optimal dynamics of the output gap both in the short run and the long run.44 These
44 Several of the observations here are in line with Erceg et al. (2000). Their sensitivity analysis implies
that the variance of price ination in the optimal economy is more sensitive to wage contract duration than
wage ination volatility to price contract duration. They also nd that the optimal variance of the output
gap is pretty stable across di¤erent combinations of price and wage stickiness.
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observations carry important information that we shall utilize when specifying simple
targeting rules in the next section.
2.4 Simple specic targeting rules
The previous section has highlighted one of the considerable weaknesses of optimal
policy analysis in Ramsey-type welfare-maximizing frameworks. Even in a linear-
quadratic setup that would normally yield tractable results which enable us to de-
scribe optimal paths and policy in terms of analytically simple solutions, it ultimately
becomes impossible to characterize optimal policy at all levels of generalityin the
sense of Svensson and Woodford (2005)once the modelling environment becomes
more complicated. One way to analyze issues in policy design is then to search for
simple (linear) policy rules that can to some extent replicate the dynamics of the op-
timal economy and produce limited welfare losses compared with the optimal plan.
In the words of Lucas (1986), such rules,
though certainly less e¢cient than a monetary policy that reacted to real shocks
in just the right way, would have welfare consequences di¤ering trivially from the
optimum policy and, unlike the latter, would be easy to spell out and monitor.
Such rules can either be ad hoc or one can employ a formal optimization pro-
cedure to determine the parameters of a quasi-optimal rule (Currie and Levine,
1987).45 Erceg et al. (2000) have found simple hybrid rules that would do well com-
45 It is common to assume a linear specication for such rules, assuming that the structural model is also
linear. Corrado and Holly (2003) have drawn the attention to the dangers of using linear rules when, in
fact, the underlying economy is nonlinear. They show such conduct of policy would likely cause a bias in
the distribution of endogenous variables. If there are nonlinearities involved in the structure of the economy,
they argue, a piecewise linear rule might produce better results. Assuming a linear structure for the economy
is, however, not a strong assumption in the case of the major economies at present circumstances.
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pared with the fairly complicated optimized simple rule. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2005) also search for suitable rules for the interest rate and the tax rate that would
approximate optimal policy.
In this section, we take a di¤erent approach. We follow the steps we have used
in Chapter 1 to characterize optimal policy. Rather than looking for good instru-
ment rules directly, we look for suitable characterization of policy at a higher level of
generality. We identify a pair of targeting rules which, in conjunction with the struc-
tural equations, generate dynamics similar to the dynamics of the optimal economy.
Subsequently, we specify expectations based reaction functions for monetary and s-
cal policythe equivalents of (1.32) and (1.37) in Chapter 1. The complexity of these
reaction functions highlights the advantage of specifying policy at a higher level of
generality, namely that it allows us to approximate a system with complex dynamic
behaviour much more closely than simple instrument rules would normally do. There
are thus potential gains in terms of welfare associated with the use of targeting rules
as opposed to simple instrument rules. Moreover, our approach o¤ers no less guid-
ance for policy, as our rules are easily veriable and easy to build into macroeconomic
decision frameworks. Last but not least, as pointed out in Svensson (2002, 2003), this
approachas opposed to strict adherence to instrument rulesleaves room for the
use of judgement in policy making. On the other hand, there are robustness issues as-
sociated with specic targeting rules. They are not likely to be robust, even in terms
of functional form, to di¤erent types of models. We believe, however, that there is
nevertheless a very good case for considering such characterization of policy.
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There are obviously numerous ways to calibrate our rules with each of the cal-
ibrations implying di¤erent welfare e¤ects. Some calibrations will do better than
others and the problem is to identify the best policy in the class of policies described
by the pair of simple targeting rules. The issues associated with ranking alterna-
tive simple policy rules are discussed at length in Benigno and Woodford (2006b).
They proposed an unconditional ranking criterion that follows from the policy La-
grangian and internalizes the welfare e¤ects of disappointing private expectations in
the initial period. For the case of an optimal solution that contains non-stationary
elements, they suggested the solution should be disaggregated into a trend and a
cyclical component. A similar decomposition of welfare should allow ranking of al-
ternative policies that have the same trend component or in other words, policies
that converge to the same long-run outcome. However, in this chapter, we wish to
rank alternative policies that do not yield the same long-run outcome. Therefore, we
use an alternative way of ranking policies. We assess the goodness of approximation
provided by our simple rules by evaluating the match between the impulse response
functions generated by the simple rules and the optimal responses in variables in the
objective function. We employ a formal procedure to identify the coe¢cients that
provide the best t. We rst dene a goodness-of-t criterion, which is a measure
of the distance between rule-generated and optimal impulse response functions. It
places di¤erent weights on the t of individual variables with the weights taken from
the objective function (2.27). Then we employ a grid-search procedure that looks for
the combination of parameters that would calibrate the rules so that they provide the
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closest match with the optimal policy in terms of impulse responses generated. This
identication method is inspired by the one used in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005).
They identify policies in the class of policies described by simple rules for the inter-
est rate and the tax rate using a formal procedure that involves assessing the match
between impulse response functions for all endogenous variables under optimal pol-
icy and the responses generated by the rule-based policy conduct. They show that
this methodology is a reliable alternative of an analysis based directly on measures
of welfare.
2.4.1 Targeting rules in an income-tax economy
The family of specic targeting rules we found useful to examine for our income-tax
economy describes the policy makers aim in terms of a rule for real wage growth as
follows
bwR;t   bwR;t 1 =   (ww;t 1 + pp;t 1)  y (yt   yt 1) (2.49)
and a wage ination targeting rule
Etw;t+1 = w;t; (2.50)
with 0 <  < 1. ; w; p;y and  are policy parameters, where w and p
add up to one. We motivate this choice of targeting rules by the following considera-
tions. We have seen in Chapter 1 that optimal policy in a sticky-price monetary-scal
framework can be described by a pair of targeting rules (rather than a single rule, as
in monetary policy models): a future (price) ination target (1.28) and a relation-
ship that links current ination to past ination and the dynamics of the output gap
2.4 Simple specic targeting rules 120
(1.34). Benigno and Woodford (2004) solve for a rather more complex optimal rela-
tionship akin to (1.34) in their sticky-price, sticky-wage setup and conclude that a
good approximation to optimal policy will likely entail a dynamic relationship fea-
turing price and wage ination as well as the output gap. Our targeting rule (2.49)
reects some of the features of their more complex rule.46 We have also seen from the
sensitivity analysis that optimal tax policy is sensitive to wage contract duration but
not to the degree of price stickiness. The same holds for nominal wage growth. It is
therefore natural to think of wage ination as a good candidate for an intermediate
target in our income-tax economy.47 Unlike in Chapter 1, there is some persistence
in the behaviour of our endogenous variablesincluding wage inationin the opti-
mal economy, therefore, one should expect the ination targeting rule to be dened
as a gradual adjustment process converging to a long-run target value. Hence the
choice of (2.50). It follows that the choice of this second rule will likely depend on
the nature of the tax system.48 In the next section, we shall consider a tax system
where tax policy is more closely related to price setting in the product rather than
the labour market and show that the ination targeting rule is best formulated as a
rule for price ination.
46 Adding further dynamic elements into (2.49) did not improve the results much more and comes at a cost
of signicant reductions in the simplicity of policy specication.
47 In setups with endogenous tax dynamics, the policy regarding the tax rate plays a role in stabilizing
ination. This relationship between the tax rate and wage ination is also clear from the wage aggregate
supply relationship (2.29).
48 In our preliminary attempts, we also experimented with a price ination target similar to the wage
ination target used, but it proved to be an inferior policy objective in our economy relying on income tax
as the source of government tax revenue. It is evident from Figure 2.5 that a policy strategy featuring a
simple ination targeting rule similar to (2.50) would make it very di¢cult to mimic the optimal economy
under a shorter duration of price contracts.
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It is straightforward to derive the associated analogues of (1.32) and (1.37). The
expectations based reaction function for monetary policy is as follows
bit = brt + Etp;t+1 +  1Etyt+1    1y p;t + 
 1
y
w;t
+
 1
y
pp;t 1 +
 1
y
ww;t 1   
 1yt 1 (2.51)
The reaction function for the tax rate can be written as
bw;t = b w;t + 1  wp p;t + 1  ww w;t   ! + 
 1
w
yt
 

wp
(Etp;t+1   p;t) ; (2.52)
using (2.50).
2.4.2 The ranking criterion
Since one of the variables in the policy objective, namely the output gap, is non-
stationary, it is not straightforward to assess the goodness of t provided by our
simple targeting rules relative to the optimal policy in terms of welfare, as expressed
by (2.27). An additional complication is that the policies we wish to rank do not
imply convergence to the same long-run outcomes. Hence, the method proposed in
Benigno andWoodford (2006b) cannot be applied in our case. Instead, we look at how
well the dynamics of our economy following the shock matches the dynamics of the
optimal economy following the same shock. In other words, we evaluate alternative
rules of the form (2.49) and (2.50) by comparing the impulse response functions these
rules generate vis-à-vis the impulse responses of the optimal economy.
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We shall concentrate on the impulse responses of the variables in the policy
objective. Let
IRt;T =
24p;t;Tw;t;T
yt;T
35
where xt;T for x = p; w; y is a column vector of realizations of variable x under rule-
based conduct of policy following the baseline government spending shock between
time twhen the shock occursand time T , which is set arbitrarily.49 In our analysis,
we set T = 30, which provides a long enough time for our economy to converge to
its new steady state following the spending shock. Let us also dene the vector of
impulse responses
IR
opt
t;T =
24optp;t;Toptw;t;T
y
opt
t;T
35
that would describe the dynamics of the optimal economy following the same shock.
Let us further dene
	t;T = IRt;T   IR
opt
t;T
and
	
q
t;T =
24 qp
 
p;t;T   
opt
p;t;T

qw
 
w;t;T   
opt
w;t;T

qy
 
yt;T   y
opt
t;T

35 :
Then we dene the best policy in the family of policies characterized by (2.49) and
(2.50) as the policy that minimizes the criterion
  = 	q0t;T	t;T : (2.53)
49 As an extension of the analysis presented here, one could evaluate responses to a variety of shocks by
extending the vector IRt;T and possibly assign weights according to the importance of each of the type of
shocks in explaining business cycle variation. Having multiple types of shocks would not a¤ect the general
discussion, as the additional disturbance terms would only enter the analysis via the star variables in an
additive fashion.
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  is thus a weighted sum of squares of the di¤erences in responses in price ination,
wage ination and output gap in period t following the government spending shock
under the simple policy specication (2.49) and (2.50) and under the timelessly
optimal policy. The weights are given by the importance assigned to stabilization of
each of the target variables in the policy objective (2.27).
2.4.3 Numerical results
In this section, we present the results of our search for the best calibration of (2.49)
and (2.50) in terms of (2.53). Given that we conduct our search in a four dimensional
space, the number of potential combinations of parameter values is large at any level
of discretization. We have therefore constrained our search. We looked for optimal
parameter combinations on certain intervals of parameter values. We have conducted
the searches reported in Table 2.3, which gives the interval size and the size of one
step within the given interval.50 The intervals were chosen after some preliminary
random calibrations and also keeping in mind that the resulting rule should have a
practical appeal. All other structural parameters in the model were calibrated as
before. The parameter combinations we report all satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn (1980)
conditions for uniqueness and stability of the results.
All of the reported three searches have selected the following calibration as the
one that provides the best t with the optimal solution:  = 10:0; p = 1:0; w =
0;y = 3:5 and  = 0:20. Figure 2.6 below provides a sense of the closeness of
50 The precision of our grid-search is limited by the available computer power.
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Search Parameter Interval Step
1 w [0; 10] 1
1 p [0; 10] 1
1 y [0:5; 10:5] 1
1  [0; 0:3] 0:1
2 w [5; 10] 0:5
2 p [0; 5] 0:5
2 y [0:5; 10:5] 1
2  [0:05; 0:2] 0:05
3 w [3; 10] 1
3 p [0; 7] 1
3 y [0:5; 7] 0:5
3  [0:05; 0:3] 0:05
Table 2.3. Intervals for parameter value search
the dynamics generated by our targeting rule-based policy and the optimal policy.51
The reported parameter values imply a long-run response coe¢cient of 1:40 at price
ination and a long-run coe¢cient of 0:05 for wage ination in the reaction function
for monetary policy.
2.5 Robustness of simple rule-based policy
Our sensitivity analysis to the optimal solution has shown that the optimal dynamics
of the economy vary considerably when the duration of price or wage contracts is
changed. While varying the length of price contracts a¤ects mainly the dynamics of
the ination rate, di¤erent degrees of price stickiness are optimally accompanied with
markedly di¤erent responses in the tax rate. In this section, we shall rst examine
if our pair of simple targeting rules can do a good job in replicating the dynamics of
the optimal economy assuming di¤erent values for p and w.
51 Should one consider multiple types of shocks, the desirable calibration of policy targets would likely
be a¤ected and the close match with the optimal dynamics would only hold for the shocks carrying higher
weight. Nevertheless, the general concept would remain una¤ected.
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Fig. 2.6. Dynamics of the economy under optimal and rule-based policy
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We have also argued that there is a close relationship between dynamics of the
tax rate and the price setting behaviour in the market being distorted by taxation.
The optimal income tax rate was shown to be sensitive to wage contract duration but
almost not at all to price contract duration. This property holds for optimal wage
ination as well, which motivated our choice of the ination target. It follows that,
should we have a di¤erent tax system, perhaps the ination target should be di¤erent
as well. In particular, should the tax policy raise revenue in the (and distort) the
product market, a price ination target might be more suitable. In this section, we
shall also investigate this proposition.52
2.5.1 Policy rules under varying price and wage contract
duration
We have repeated the analysis in the previous section for economies with p and w
equal to 0:3 and 0:8, with all other parameters kept constant. The best parameter
values that arose from a search of a grid similar to the one in our baseline analysis
are reported in Table 2.4. Figure 2.7 again illustrates how well our simple rule-based
policy conduct can do relative to the optimal policy.
52 One could argue that since the optimal dynamics of (the) output (gap) are remarkably insensitive to
both price and wage contract duration, perhaps it could serve as an even better intermediate target. There
are, however, serious theoretical as well as practical issues with this policy specication that are unlikely to
be easily overcome. Most importantly, while optimal long-run ination rates are robust to di¤erent types of
shocks as well as tax systems, this will not hold for the output gap.
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Economy  w p y 
Baseline 10:0 0 1:0 3:5 0:20
p = 0:3 7:0 1:0 0 3:5 0:10
p = 0:8 10 0 1:0 4:5 0:30
w = 0:3 14:5 0:31 0:69 9:5 0:15
w = 0:8 12:5 0:20 0:80 3:5 0:05
Table 2.4. Optimized targeting rule parameters
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Fig. 2.7. Optimal policy and optimized rule-based policy under varying price and
wage contract duration
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2.5.2 Optimal and rule-based policy in a sales-tax economy
In this section, we present a model which is identical in all its aspects to the sticky-
price, sticky-wage setup analyzed so far except for the fact that government taxes the
sales of rms at a proportional rate. We set w in the labour supply decision equal
to zero for all t and all states of nature and assume that rms prots are given by
zt (i) = (1   s;t) pt (i) yt (i) WtHt (i) (2.54)
for all i, rather than (2.17).  s is the proportional tax levied on sales revenue. The
representative rm is then choosing the optimal price, taking the wage index as given,
and the intertemporal rst-order condition is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tp Qt;TYT

pt
PT

 "p
"
(1   s;T )  p
WT
PT
Y  1T

pt
PT

 "p( 1) 1
#
= 0:
(2.55)
For pt ; we obtain a closed-form solution
pt
PT
=

Kp;t
Fp;t
 1
1+"p!p
; (2.56)
with
Kp;t = Et
1X
T=t
 
p
T t
Uc

CT ; bGTpWTPT Y T

PT
Pt
"p(1+!p)
; (2.57)
Fp;t = Et
1X
T=t
 
p
T t
Uc

CT ; bGTYT (1   s;T )PT
Pt
"p 1
: (2.58)
The central government faces a ow budget constraint just as in the baseline setup. In
the sales-tax economy, an obvious and also key di¤erence compared with the income-
tax economy is the way tax revenues are collected. Aggregate tax receipts are now
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given by
Tt =  s;tYt: (2.59)
In aggregate, the sales tax based regime is equivalent to taxing all incomes in the
economy at a proportional rate. We shall calibrate our model so that the sales tax
rate is revenue-neutral. The revenue-neutral sales tax rate here is dened as the rate
that maintains the values of key scal indicators relative to the economys aggregate
output in the steady state at levels prevailing in the income-tax economy. We obtain
that the steady-state revenue-neutral sales tax rate will be set at
 s =
w
p
; (2.60)
in which w is the steady-state tax rate on wage income. This relationship ensures
revenue neutrality and since p > 1, this condition implies  s < w.
Sales-tax economy: Macroeconomic setup and the policy problem
The above modications to the microeconomic setup naturally imply changes to
the macroeconomic framework as well. The quadratic loss function retains its func-
tional form, though coe¢cient values will di¤er. The aggregate supply relationships
now become
p;t = pyt + p
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ s  b s;t   b s;t+ Etp;t+1; (2.61)
w;t = wyt   w
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etw;t+1: (2.62)
The main di¤erence here is that deviations in the tax rate now enter the price ag-
gregate supply relationship. The intuition behind bwR;t and b s;t remains the same as
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before. The scal solvency constraint is now written as
bbt 1   p;t    1yt =  't + (1  ) fyyt + f  b s;t   b s;t
+Et
hbbt   p;t+1    1yt+1i : (2.63)
The interpretation of the equations is similar to the one given in the previous section.
Again, we have relegated the details of the derivation and denitions of parameters
to the Appendix to this chapter.
The outlined macroeconomic framework, together with the policy objective,
can be used to dene a linear-quadratic policy problem similar to the one solved for
the income-tax economy. We are again seeking timelessly optimal policies that would
minimize the quadratic loss function such as (2.27) subject to the structural equations
of the economy. The policy problem in the sales-tax economy is written as follows
J = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
qp
2
p;T +
1
2
qw
2
w;T

+1;T

p;T   pyT   p
  bwR;T   bwR;T   ps  b s;T   b s;T   Etp;T+1
+2;T

w;T   wyT + w
  bwR;T   bwR;T   Etw;T+1
+3;T [ bwR;T   bwR;T 1   w;T + p;T ]
+4;T
hbbT 1   p;T    1yT + 'T   (1  ) fyyT   (1  ) f  b s;T   b s;T 
 bbT + Etp;T+1 + Et 1yT+1io
+
 
4;t 1   1;t 1

p;t   2;t 1w;t + 
 14;t 1yt: (2.64)
We can solve the rst-order conditions to obtain the system
yyt = w2;t +

(1  ) fy + 
 1   p
(1  ) f
ps

4;t   
 14;t 1; (2.65)
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pp;t =

1 +
(1  ) f
ps
  
4;t   4;t 1

  3;t; (2.66)
ww;t = 3;t  
 
2;t   2;t 1

; (2.67)
3;t = Et3;t+1  
(1  ) f
s
4;t   w2;t; (2.68)
Et4;t+1 = 4;t: (2.69)
The optimal dynamics of the economy are then determined by the solution to the
system of equations (2.65) to (2.69), together with the structural equations that
serve as a constraint in the policy problem. We now turn to analyzing the properties
of this optimal dynamic solution.
Sales-tax economy: Optimal dynamics
Our baseline calibration here uses the same structural parameter values as be-
fore. However, since the nature of the tax system inuences the e¢ciency of the
economy, this will have widespread consequences for the steady-state of the economy
as well as for some implied parameter values. The implied steady-state values of some
of the variables as well as some coe¢cient values are displayed in Table 2.5. The rel-
ative weights of the targeting variables in the welfare objective barely change across
tax regimes.
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Variable Value
 s 0:216

Y
0:016bs;t 0:000
qy 1:347
qp 389:8
qw 248:1
Table 2.5. Steady-state values and coe¢cients in the sales-tax economy
The discussion regarding the general dynamic properties and welfare in the per-
fectly exible sales-tax economy would be similar to our discussion of the perfectly
exible income-tax economy. There is, however, a key policy result we need to dis-
cuss here before turning to the properties of the sticky-price, sticky-wage economy.
Interestingly, we nd perfect tax smoothing to be optimal in the perfectly exible
sales-tax economy. Perfect smoothing of the tax rate has been originally proposed
by Barro (1979).53 In the light of our discussion above, the optimality of perfect tax
smoothing in the exible economy means that the government spending shock shifts
the natural rate of output exactly to the degree that is e¢cient from the perspective
of welfare and hence no cost-push pressures arise. More formally, in order for a policy
of keeping the tax rate constant to be the optimal plan in the economy with exible
price and wage adjustment, it must hold that
(! +  1)
 1
bY tbGt = 1:
It is straightforward to prove, using the denitions from the Appendix, that this
relationship holds for all parameter values if and only if the tax schedule satises the
general condition T = Y in the steady state. This condition is met by the sales-
53 See Sargent and Velde (1999) for this interpretation of Barros (1979) result.
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tax regime but not by the income-tax regime, which involves nonlinearities in the
tax schedule. In fact, Benigno and Woodford (2003) provide a check that given the
nature of the tax system, the result would also hold for preference and productivity
shocks of the kind considered by them. Clearly, however, the result is not general
in this sense eitherit fails to hold for transfer and markup shocks. Nevertheless,
the analysis here provides an interesting case which goes against the consensus held
among economists since Lucas and Stokey (1983) and the rst appearance of the
analysis by Aiyagari et al. (2002).
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 plot the optimal paths of endogenous variables in response
to the positive spending shock in sales tax economy assuming di¤erent durations of
price and wage contracts. The bold blue line represents the baseline calibration. A
notable di¤erence between the two optimal economies is the response in the real wage
rate. The role of the real wage rate here is to o¤set the e¤ects of increased taxes
on private decisions. A closer inspection of the aggregate supply relationships in the
two economies provides some clues. In the income-tax economy, the real wage rate
rises to counterbalance the distortive e¤ects of the tax hike on the agents preferences
regarding labour and leisure. In the sales-tax economy the real wage rate falls to
ease the cost burden of the rms when their revenues are taxed more heavily on the
margin.
Otherwise, it is easy to see that Figures 2.8 and 2.9 are in some sense mirror
images of 2.4 and 2.5. Optimal tax policy is now much less sensitive to changes
in wage contract duration than to varying degree of price stickiness. It shares this
2.5 Robustness of simple rule-based policy 134
property with price ination. This would suggest that price ination could serve as
a better intermediate target in the sales-tax economy.
Sales-tax economy: Simple rule-based policy
We repeated the analysis carried out for the income-tax economy and found that
the policy providing a good t of the impulse response functions with the optimal
impulse responses in the sales-tax economy could be described by a pair of targeting
rules (2.49) and a price ination targeting rule
Etp;t+1 = p;t: (2.70)
The calibration providing the best t that arose from our search was given by the
following parameter values:  = 7:0; p = 0:36; w = 0:64;y = 0:3 and  = 0:25.
Figure 2.10 indicates the quality of the approximation of the optimal policy that can
be achieved by this simple targeting rule-based conduct of policy.
We searched for the best calibration of the original pair of targeting rules but
the results obtained consistently indicated a much weaker match quantied in terms
our criterion (2.53). Even the best values of (2.53) obtained using (2.49) and (2.50)
were in excess of 100 times larger than the value corresponding to the reported cal-
ibration of (2.49) and (2.70). Using (2.50) rather than (2.70) makes it impossible to
replicate the overshooting nature of the optimal dynamics of wage ination. This
then adversely a¤ects the transitional dynamics of the remaining endogenous vari-
ables, which overall results in substantial deviations from the optimal dynamics of
the economy as quantied by the criterion (2.53).
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Fig. 2.8. Sales-tax economy: wage contract duration and optimal dynamics
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Fig. 2.10. Sales-tax economy: dynamics of the economy under optimal and rule-based
policy
2.6 Concluding remarks 138
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have extended our baseline framework by modelling an economy
in which both prices and wages are rigid. We have shown that preferences of the
policy maker can be characterized by a quadratic welfare objective involving wage
ination variability in addition to variability in price ination and the output gap.
We have shown that perfect stabilization of prices and/or wages is not a desirable way
of conducting policy, if at least one of the markets is subject to nominal rigidity. We
have learned that inclusion of nominal wage rigidity causes the economys dynamics in
response to shocks to become persistent even if shocks themselves are non-persistent.
The optimal dynamics of real wages is much less cyclical compared with the sticky-
price but exible-wage framework. The result that public debt, tax rate and the
output gap are all non-stationary carries over to an economy with imperfect wage
exibility.
We have proposed a pair of simple specic targeting rules, one simple ination
targeting rule and one real-wage-growth rule, that perform well in replicating the dy-
namics of the optimal economy. We have selected desirable policies in the family of
policies dened by these rules using a formal assessment of the match between the
dynamics of the economy induced by these rules and the optimal dynamics of the
economy. We know from earlier literature that among many advantages, a disadvan-
tage of specifying policy in terms of targeting rules is the sensitivity of the appropriate
functional form of the rules to the dynamic nature of the economy. We have found
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that the appropriate formulation of the ination targeting rule will also likely depend
on the type of tax system used to generate government revenue in the economy.
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2.A Appendix to Chapter 2
Income-tax economy: The aggregate supply relationships
Following Benigno and Woodford (2004), we present a unied framework to
derive the price and wage aggregate supply relationships. Let us dene
Dk;t =
"
1  k
"k 1
k;t
1  k
#
 
1+"k!k
"k 1
(2.A.1)
=
Kk;t
Fk;t
; (2.A.2)
for k = w; p: As derived in Benigno and Woodford (2004), a second-order approxima-
tion to Dk;t as given by (2.A.2) can be written asbDk;t
1  k
+
1
2
Zk;t bDk;t = zk;t + k
1  k
Et
h bDk;t+1 + (1 + "k!k) k;t+1i+ 1
2
zk;tXk;t
+
1
2
kEtZk;t+1
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1
2
k
1  k
(1  2"k   "k!k)Etk;t+1
h bDk;t+1 + (1 + "k!k) k;t+1i
+O (3) : (2.A.3)
As before, the variables with a hat denote the t-period percentage deviation of a
variable x from its steady-state value as bxt = log xtx . The expressions Zk;t; zk;t and
Xk;t will be dened later. The term Etk;t+1 refers to expected price or wage ination.
A second-order expansion of (2.A.1) can in turn be written as
bDk;t
1 + "k!k
=
k
1  k
k;t  
1
2
k (1  "k)
(1  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2 
2
k;t +O (3) : (2.A.4)
Substituting for bDk;t in (2.A.3) leads us to
Vk;t = Et
1X
T=t
T t

kzk;T +
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kzk;TXk;T +
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2
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2
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
+O (3) ; (2.A.5)
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where k =
(1 k)(1 k)
k(1+!k"k)
and Vk;t stands for
Vk;t = k;t  
1
2
(1  "k)
(1  k)
2k;t +
1
2
(1  k) k;tZk;t +
1
2
"k (1 + !k) 
2
k;t: (2.A.6)
In line with Beningno and Woodford (2004), we write (2.21) for both the wage-
setting and price-setting decision in a general form as Kk;t = Et
1P
T=t
 
p
T t
kkt;T in
which kkt;T = k
k
TP
 "k(1+!k)
k;t;T . The denitions of k
k
t;T follow from (2.13) and (2.21).
Pk;t;T stands for the dispersion terms in k
k
t;T with Pw;t;T =

Wt
WT

 "w(1+!w)
. kkT then
collects the remaining terms from kkt;T . We can analogously decompose Fk;t: Zt =
Et
1P
T=t
()T t
bkkt;T + bfkt;T , and zk;T and Xk;T in (2.A.6) are then dened as
zk;T = bkkT   bfkT ; (2.A.7)
Xk;T = bkkT + bfkT : (2.A.8)
The second-order approximation to the consumption index and 1    j;t for j = w; s
is taken from the Appendix to Chapter 1. The second-order expansions of (2.16) and
(2.25) can be written as
bk;t = kbk;t 1 + 12 k(1  k)"k (1 + !k) (1 + !k"k) 2k;t +O (3) : (2.A.9)
We see that the expansion does not contain linear terms in ination and hence, when
in product with other rst-order terms, the product will be accurate to the third
order. An innite discounted sum of (2.A.9) will be equal to
Et
1X
T=t
T tbk;t = 1
2
k
(1  k) (1  k)
"k (1 + !k) (1 + !k"k)Et
1X
T=t
T t2k;T
+t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.10)
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Income-tax economy: The price aggregate supply relationship
Using the above derivations, it is now straightforward to derive the price aggre-
gate supply relationship. We have
zp;T = bwR;T   (1  ) bYT ; (2.A.11)
Xp;T =
 
1 +   2 1
 bYT + 2 1 bGT    1  1  c 1 bY 2T
  1c 1bYT bGT + bwR;T ; (2.A.12)
where bwR;T represents real wage deviation, and  1 has replaced e 1c 1: It follows
that
Vp;t = Et
1X
T=t
T tp
n
(  1) bYT + bwR;T
+
1
2

2 1 (1  )  1 + 2
 bY 2T +     1 bwR;T bYT
+
1
2
bw2R;T +  1 bGT bwR;T   (1  )  1bYT bGT
+
1
2
"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.13)
To the rst order, this can be written as a di¤erence equation of the following form
p;t = p
h
(  1) bYt + bwR;ti+ Etp;t+1; (2.A.14)
which is the price aggregate supply relationship.
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Income-tax economy: The wage aggregate supply relationship
Through an analogous sequence of steps, it is easy to obtain the wage aggregate
supply relationship. zw;T and Xw;T can be written as
zw;T = !w bYT + !wbp;T + e 1 bCT   bwR;T   \(1  w;T ); (2.A.15)
Xw;T =  (2 + !w) bYT + (2 + !w)bp;T   e 1 bCT + bwR;T + \(1  w;T ): (2.A.16)
Vw;t then becomes
Vw;t = Et
1X
T=t
T tw
n 
!w + 
 1
 bYT    1 bGT   bwR;T + wbw;T
+
1
2
 
 (2 + !w)  
 1
  
!w + 
 1

+  1
 
1  c 1
 bY 2T
+

 1c 1 +  1
 
 1   
 bYT bGT + 1
2
wb 2w;T
+
 
 1   
 bYT bwR;T +     1wbw;T bYT    1 bGT bwR;T
 
1
2
bw2R;T +  1wbw;T bGT + wbw;T bwR;T
+
1
2
"w (1 + !w)
w
2w;T +
1
2
!w"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.17)
To the rst order, we can write
w;t = w
h 
!w + 
 1
 bYt    1 bGt   bwR;t + wbw;ti+ Etw;t+1; (2.A.18)
which is the wage aggregate supply relationship.
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Income-tax economy: The scal solvency condition
As before, we start with a simple ow government budget constraint and arrive
at the scal solvency condition (1.A.23) and its approximations. In the present case,
however, the derivation of the approximation to surplus is di¤erent. The total tax
revenues in real terms are given by
Tt = w;t
Wt
Pt
Ht
= w;twR;tY

t p;t: (2.A.19)
The derivation of this relationship is now less straightforward compared with the
exible-wage economy. We start o¤ with the individual tax payments by households.
These are given by
PtTt (j) = w;twt (j)ht (j) :
Substituting for ht (j) from (2.5), then integrating over j and raising the both sides
of the equation to the power of 1   "w, we obtain relationship purely in terms of
aggregate variables, which can be easily solved to obtain (2.A.19). In the steady
state, total tax revenues equal
T = wwRY

: (2.A.20)
The primary surplus t = Tt  Gt can then be approximated by
bt = d 1 bw;t + d 1 bYt + d 1 bwR;t + d 1 bp;t   d 1 bGt
+
1
2
d 1 
2bY 2t + 12d 1 b 2w;t + 12d 1 bw2R;t
+d 1 bw;t bwR;t + d 1 bw;tbYt + d 1  bwR;tbYt
+t:i:p:O (3) : (2.A.21)
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We have dened d =

T
and d = 
Y
. Using this in (1.A.25) yields
Uc

Ct; bGtt = U cn1 +  d 1    1 bYt +   1   d 1 bGt
+d 1 bw;T + d 1 bwR;t + d 1 bp;t + 12d 1 b 2w;T + 12d 1 bw2R;t
+
1
2

d 1 
2    1
 
1  c 1

+  2   2 1d 1 
 bY 2t
+d 1 bw;T bwR;t + d 1     1 bw;T bYt + d 1     1 bwR;tbYt
  1

c 1 +  1   d 1   d 1 
 bYt bGt +  1d 1 bw;T bGt
+ 1d 1 bwR;t bGto+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.22)
Plugging this back into (1.A.23), using (2.A.10) and noting that W = (1  )U c
we have
cWt = (1  )Et 1X
T=t
T t
n 
d 1   
 1
 bYT +   1   d 1 bGT
+d 1 bw;T + d 1 bwR;T + 12d 1 b 2w;T + 12d 1 bw2R;T
+
1
2

d 1 
2    1
 
1  c 1

+  2   2 1d 1 
 bY 2T
+d 1 bw;T bwR;T + d 1     1 bw;T bYT + d 1     1 bwR;T bYT
  1

c 1 +  1   d 1   d 1 
 bYT bGT +  1d 1 bw;T bGT
+ 1d 1 bwR;T bGT + 12 d 1 "p (1 + !p)p 2p;T

+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.23)
With (1.A.24) on the left-hand side, this can be written with rst-order accuracy as
bbt 1   p;t    1 bYt   bGt = (1  ) h d 1    1 bYt +   1   d 1 bGt
+d 1 bw;t + d 1 bwR;t
+Et
hbbt   p;t+1    1 bYt+1   bGt+1i(2.A.24)
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Income-tax economy: The policy objective function
Benigno and Woodford (2004) show that a second-order approximation to the
utility function (1.1) can be written as
Ut = Y U cEt
1X
T=t
T t

Y;w bYT   1
2

! +  1  Y;w (1 + !)
 bY 2T
+ 1bYT bGT   1
2
(1 Y;w)
w
"w
2
w;T  
1
2
(1 Y;w)
p
"p
2
p;T

+t:i:p:+O (3) ; (2.A.25)
where Y;w = 1  
(1 w)
pw
. The approximation contains a linear term in one of the
endogenous variables. We therefore encounter the same problem as mentioned in
the Appendix to Chapter 1. As before, the task is to derive a second-order-accurate
welfare-ranking criterion. To obtain a welfare function with second-order terms only,
we have to use second-order approximations to structural equations to substitute
out the linear term from (2.A.25). This way, a correct welfare-ranking criterion is
obtained, while the level-e¤ects are preserved in an implicit form.
The second-order approximations to the scal solvency condition and the ag-
gregate supply relationships can in this case be written as
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cWt
(1  )
= Et
1X
T=t
T t
n 
d 1   
 1
 bYT +   1   d 1 bGT
+d 1 bw;T + d 1 bwR;T + 12d 1 b 2w;T + 12d 1 bw2R;T
+
1
2

d 1 
2    1
 
1  c 1

+  2   2 1d 1 
 bY 2T
+d 1 bw;T bwR;T + d 1     1 bw;T bYT + d 1     1 bwR;T bYT
  1

c 1 +  1   d 1   d 1 
 bYT bGT +  1d 1 bw;T bGT
+ 1d 1 bwR;T bGT + 12 d 1 "p (1 + !p)p 2p;T

+ t:i:p:+O (3) ; (2.A.26)
Vp;t
p
= Et
1X
T=t
T t
n
(  1) bYT + bwR;T
+
1
2

2 1 (1  )  1 + 2
 bY 2T +     1 bwR;T bYT
+
1
2
bw2R;T +  1 bGT bwR;T   (1  )  1bYT bGT
+
1
2
"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+ t:i:p:+O (3) ; (2.A.27)
2.A Appendix to Chapter 2 148
Vw;t
w
= Et
1X
T=t
T t
n 
!w + 
 1
 bYT    1 bGT   bwR;T + wbw;T
+
1
2
 
 (2 + !w)  
 1
  
!w + 
 1

+  1
 
1  c 1
 bY 2T
+

 1c 1 +  1
 
 1   
 bYT bGT + 1
2
wb 2w;T
+
 
 1   
 bYT bwR;T +     1wbw;T bYT    1 bGT bwR;T
 
1
2
bw2R;T +  1wbw;T bGT + wbw;T bwR;T
+
1
2
"w (1 + !w)
w
2w;T +
1
2
!w"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.28)
We need to nd a linear combination of these three equations such that contains
coe¢cients at linear terms of endogenous variables identical to those in (2.A.25),
which will enable us to substitute out the linear term in (2.A.25). We are therefore
looking for a vector of coe¢cients v0 = (v1; v2; v3) such that satisfy the following
system of equations
24 d 1    1   1 !w +  1d 1 0 w
d 1 1  1
35v =
24 Y;w0
0
35 :
We nd that
v =
24  Y;w
 wY;w


d 1 (1 + w)
Y;w


d 1
35 ; (2.A.29)
where

 = d 1
 
!w + 
 1

+ d 1 (1 + w) (  1)  d
 1
 w + 
 1w:
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It therefore holds that
Et
1X
T=t
T tY;w bYT = Et 1X
T=t
T t
n
v0Y
bYT + v0bw;T + v0w bwR;To
=  Et
1X
T=t
T t
8<:
1
2
fv1 [d
 1
 
2    1 (1  c 1) +  2   2 1d 1 ]
+v2 [2
 1 (1  )  1 + 2]
+v3 [( (2 + !w)  
 1) (!w + 
 1) +  1 (1  c 1)]g bY 2T
 

v1

c 1 +  1   d 1   d 1 

+ v2 (1  )  v3

c 1 +  1   
	
 1bYT bGT
+
1
2

v1
d 1 "p (1 + !p)
p
+ v2
"p (1 + !p)
p
+ v3
!w"p (1 + !p)
p

2p;T
+
1
2
v3
"w (1 + !w)
w
2w;T

+ v1
cWt
(1  )
+ v2
Vp;t
p
+ v3
Vw;t
w
+ t:i:p:+O (3) ;
in which 0Y = (d
 1
   
 1;   1; !w + 
 1), 0 = (d
 1
 ; 0; w) and 
0
w = (d
 1
 ; 1; 1).
We can now substitute this into (1.A.32) to obtain
Ut =  Y U cEt
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qy bY 2T   qY GbYT bGT + 12qw2w;T + 12qp2p;T

+Y U c
"
v1
cWt
(1  )
+ v2
Vp;t
p
+ v3
Vw;t
w
#
+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.30)
The coe¢cients are dened as follows
qy = ! + 
 1  Y;w (1 + !) 
Y;w


wd
 1

 
1  2 1

 
Y;w


w

 2    1
 
1  c 1

+
Y;w


d 1
h
(1 + !)2  
 
1   1
2
+  1
 
1  c 1
i
; (2.A.31)
qY G = 
 1

1 +
Y;w


w
 
d 1    1   c 1

+
Y;w


d 1
 
1 + w   c
 1    1

;
(2.A.32)
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qw =
(1 Y;w)
w
"w +
Y;w


d 1
"w (1 + !w)
w
; (2.A.33)
qp =
(1 Y;w)
p
"p +
Y;w


d 1
"p (1 + !)
p
: (2.A.34)
Note again that  (1 + !w) = (1 + !p) (1 + !w). (2.A.30) can also be expressed as
Ut =  Y U cEt
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qy
bYT   bY T 2 + 12qw2w;T + 12qp2p;T

+Y U c
"
v1
cWt
(1  )
+ v2
Vp;t
p
+ v3
Vw;t
w
#
+ t:i:p:+O (3) ; (2.A.35)
where we have dened
bY T = qY Gqy bGT : (2.A.36)bY T again stands for the target deviation of output from its steady state. bYT   bY T is
then the welfare-relevant output gap. The linear terms in the second line represent
the transitory component mentioned in the Appendix to Chapter 1.
We can now re-write all our structural equations in terms of the welfare-relevant
output gap. The price aggregate supply relationship (2.A.14) becomes
p;t = pyt + p
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etp;t+1; (2.A.37)
in which yt = bYT   bY T , p = p (  1) and bwR;t =   (  1) qY Gqy bGt, which is the
deviation in real wages consistent with bY t .
The wage aggregate supply relationship modies as follows
w;t = wyt + w

w
 bw;t   b w;t    bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etw;t+1; (2.A.38)
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with w = w (!w + 
 1) and we have also dened
b w;t = (! +  1)w

 1
(! +  1)
 
qY G
qy
 bGt: (2.A.39)
Finally, the scal solvency condition becomes
bbt 1   p;t    1yt + ft = (1  ) fyyt + f  bw;t   b w;t+ fw   bwR;t   bwR;t
+Et
hbbt   p;t+1    1yt+1 + ft+1i ; (2.A.40)
where
ft = 
 1

1 
qY G
qy
 bGt + (1  )Et 1X
T=t
T t

d 1 (  1)
qY G
qy
 
 
d 1   
 1
 qY G
qy
   1 + d 1
 
d 1
w

 1  
 
!w + 
 1
 qY G
qy
  (  1)
qY G
qy
 bGT : (2.A.41)
is the scal stress term. fy = (d
 1
   
 1) and f = fw = d
 1
 .
Sales-tax economy: Approximation to the aggregate supply relationships
The relevant approximations yielding the structural equations follow the same
sequence of steps as above. Here, we only spell out the results for the sales-tax
economy. The second-order approximation to the price aggregate supply relationship
can be shown to be
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Vp;t = Et
1X
T=t
T tp
n
(  1) bYT + bwR;T + sb s;T
+
1
2

2 1 (1  )  1 + 2
 bY 2T +     1 bwR;T bYT
+
1
2
bw2R;T +  1 bGT bwR;T   (1  )  1bYT bGT
+s
 
1   1
 b s;T bYT +  1sb s;T bGT + 12sb 2s;T
+
1
2
"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.42)
To the rst order, this is written as
p;t = p
h
(  1) bYt + bwR;t + sb s;ti+ Etp;t+1: (2.A.43)
Similarly, the approximated wage-aggregate supply relationship looks as follows
Vw;t = Et
1X
T=t
T tw
n 
!w + 
 1
 bYT    1 bGT   bwR;T
+
1
2
 
 (2 + !w)  
 1
  
!w + 
 1

+  1
 
1  c 1
 bY 2T
+

 1c 1 +  1
 
 1   
 bYT bGT
+
 
 1   
 bYT bwR;T    1 bGT bwR;T   1
2
bw2R;T
+
1
2
"w (1 + !w)
w
2w;T +
1
2
!w"p (1 + !p)
p
2p;T

+t:i:p:+O (3) (2.A.44)
and its rst-order-accurate form is
w;t = w
h 
!w + 
 1
 bYt    1 bGt   bwR;ti+ Etw;t+1: (2.A.45)
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Sales-tax economy: The scal solvency constraint
The main di¤erence is that in the sales-tax-based scal system, total tax rev-
enues are simply given by
Tt =  s;tYt: (2.A.46)
It follows that the steady state revenues are given by
T =  sY s: (2.A.47)
Again, we can approximate t as follows
bt = d 1 b s;t + d 1 bYt   d 1 bGt + 12d 1 b 2s;t + 12d 1 bY 2t
+d 1 b s;tbYt + t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.48)
Using a similar sequence of steps, we obtain
cWt = (1  )Et 1X
T=t
T t
n 
d 1   
 1
 bYT + d 1 b s;T +   1   d 1 bGT
+
1
2
d 1 b 2s;T + 12 d 1    1  1  c 1+  2   2 1d 1  bY 2T
+d 1 b s;T bYT    1bYT bGT  c 1 +  1   d 1   d 1 
+ 1d 1 b s;T bGTo+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.49)
Then, to the rst order, we have
bbt 1   p;t    1 bYt   bGt = (1  ) h d 1    1 bYt + d 1 b s;t +   1   d 1 bGti
+Et
hbbt   p;t+1    1 bYt+1   bGt+1i : (2.A.50)
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Sales-tax economy: The policy objective
The derivation of the policy objective follows standard steps as well. Given
the simpler nature of the tax schedule, we only need two equations to substitute out
the linear term from (1.A.32). Hence, our problem resembles the one solved in the
Appendix to Chapter 1. To this end, we add up the two aggregate supply relationships
as follows
Vp;t
(! +  1) p
+
Vw;t
(! +  1) w
= Vt
= Et
1X
T=t
T t
bYT    1
! +  1
bGT + s
! +  1
b s;T
1
2

 1 (1  c 1)
! +  1
+ 2 + !    1
 bY 2T
 
1   1   c 1
! +  1
 1bYT bGT + s
! +  1
 
1   1
 b s;T bYT
+
s
! +  1
 1b s;T bGT + 1
2
s
! +  1
b 2s;T
+
1
2
"p (1 + !)
p (! + 
 1)
2p;T +
1
2
"w (1 + !w)
w (! + 
 1)
2w;T

+t:i:p:+O (3) ; (2.A.51)
in which we have used the denition  (1 + !w) = (1 + !p) (1 + !w) = (1 + !) :
We use this equation, together with (2.A.49) to substitute out the linear term from
(1.A.32). We solve 
d 1   
 1 1
d 1
s
!+ 1

v =

Y;s
0

and obtain
v =

v1
v2

=

 
Y;s


s
Y;s


d 1 (! + 
 1)

;
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where Y;s = 1 
(1 s)
pw
and 
 = d 1 (! + 
 1)  s (d
 1
   
 1) in which s =
s
1 s
.
Following a similar sequence of steps as before, we obtain the following approximation
to utility
Ut =  Y U cEt
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qy
bYT   bY T 2 + 12qw2w;T + 12qp2p;T

+Y U c
"
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(1  )
+ v2Vt
#
+ t:i:p:+O (3) : (2.A.52)
bY T is dened as before and now
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 
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;
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qw =
(1 Y;s) "w
w
+
Y;s


d 1
"w (1 + !w)
w
; (2.A.55)
qp =
(1 Y;s) "p
p
+
Y;s


d 1
"p (1 + !)
p
: (2.A.56)
Again, we re-dene the linear constraints in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap.
The wage aggregate supply relationship becomes
w;t = wyt   w
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ Etw;t+1; (2.A.57)
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with w = w (!w + 
 1) and bwR;t = h(!w +  1) qY Gqy    1i bGt. The price supply
relationship is then written as
p;t = pyt + p
  bwR;t   bwR;t+ s  b s;t   b s;t+ Etp;t+1; (2.A.58)
where p = p (  1) and b s;t =  (!+ 1)s h qY Gqy    1!+ 1 i bGt. The scal solvency
condition and the scal stress term are nally written as
bbt 1   p;t    1yt + 't = (1  ) fyyt + f  b s;t   b s;t
+Et
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The steady state
In the steady state, wages and prices are stable and hence there is no dispersion.
(2.13) and (2.20) become
1 =
wY
(1+!w) 
Uc
 
C; 0

wR (1   j)
; (2.A.61)
1 = pwRY
 1
; (2.A.62)
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for j = w; s. A product of these two terms denes the steady state level of output.
Note that Uc
 
C; 0

= C
 e 1
. Then
Y j =

(1   j)
wp
c e
 1
 1
!+e 1
: (2.A.63)
The steady-state interest rate and the relationship between public debt and primary
surplus is dened as before.
Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary and Fiscal
Policy in an Economy with
Non-Ricardian Agents
As discussed in the introduction to the thesis, there is now substantial empiri-
cal evidence to support the notion that a large proportion of consumers in advanced
economies behave in a way which is inconsistent with the life-cycle/permanent income
hypothesis (LC-PIH). The existing welfare-maximizing models of optimal monetary-
scal policy design analyze optimal policy from the perspective of an innitely-lived
representative agent who is able to smooth consumption over time (Lucas and Stokey,
1983, Chari et al., 1991, Aiyagari at al., 2002, Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2004a, and Siu, 2004). The challenge for macroeconomists, wish-
ing to analyze the question of optimal, welfare-maximizing policy when agents are
heterogenous in terms of their participation in the asset market, is to design linear-
quadratic problems where one has a stationary distribution of types of agents and
yet where one need not track the distribution of wealth across agents as a separate
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state variable. In addition, one wants to be able to formulate a policy criterion that
is analytically tractable in the region of the distorted steady state. In this chapter,
we show how one can achieve this.
In our analysis, we allow for heterogeneity among agents and yet retain some
of the valuable tractability of the representative agent set-up. We derive a model
with a continuum of identical agents who learn about their type (non-Ricardian ver-
sus Ricardian) at the beginning of each period, as in Amato and Laubach (2003).
This approach generates an economy in which agents of a certain type represent a
constant population share over time, while the model can be analyzed as a stan-
dard representative-agent setup. As a result we may utilize some appealing aspects
of recent advances in the analysis of optimal monetary and scal policy, while bring-
ing the modeling environment in line with the empirical evidence on non-Ricardian
behaviour.54
Our contribution is distinct in several ways. First, our setup di¤ers from Am-
ato and Laubach (2003) in the denition of non-Ricardian behaviour. We model
non-Ricardian behaviour via agents whose consumption is constrained by their con-
temporaneous after-tax wage income, and their choice as regards consumption and
leisure is a result of an optimizing decision rather than simple adherence to a rule of
54 Alternatively, it would be possible to assume two stable populations of agents of each type with the
government maximizing the discounted sum of their weighted period utilities. Such a specication of the
policy objective facilitates the derivation of the second-order-accurate quadratic objective. Mathematically,
the two approaches are equivalent. The advantage of our setup is that a policy objective that discounts the
weighted period utilities of agents of each type follows directly from the individuals utility function, given
some assumptions (see below). In the alternative framework, one needs to justify such a policy objective,
as itstrictly speakingwould not correspond to maximizing social welfare. Arguably, maximizing the
discounted value of weighted period utilities is a valid objective if lack of access to the asset market comes
from constraints rather than individual preferences.
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thumb. Second, we assume that the government has only access to distortive means
of raising revenue. This endogenizes the dynamics of the tax rate and thereby we have
an environment in which jointly optimal monetary and scal policy strategies are de-
termined to be pursued by the respective branches of government in a coordinated
fashion. In such a setup, ination plays a role in meeting the long-run scal solvency
requirement and at the same time the dynamic of the tax rate a¤ects price stabil-
ity through its impact on marginal cost and the natural rate of output. Third, we
do not assume that a subsidy is available to eliminate the distortive e¤ects of excess
market power or government policies, commonly used in analyses of monetary pol-
icy following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and allow for large departures from
the hypothetical steady state attained in rst-best economies. Relaxing this assump-
tion incorporates the level e¤ects of stabilization policy in the analysis. The last two
features of the model distinguish our analysis from Bilbiie (2005) who models an econ-
omy with liquidity constrained agents but his analysis concentrates on the monetary
side only and assumes that the steady state of the economy can be made e¢cient.
In our model, in which labour is the sole factor of production in the economy,
the government uses proportional taxes on wage income to raise tax revenue. There
is a minor modication relative to our baseline microeconomic setup. Here we assume
there are two kinds of producers: intermediate and nal goods producers. The market
for intermediate goods is imperfectly competitive and the prices of (intermediate)
goods are imperfectly exible. Intermediate goods serve as an input in the production
of a nal good that is sold in a perfectly competitive environment. This modication,
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whilst yielding results that are isomorphic to those in the baseline framework, makes
some parts of the derivation more convenient.
We derive a quadratic policy objective and seek time-consistent policies that
maximize the welfare objective subject to the linear structural equations of the macro-
economy, assuming initial commitment of the timeless perspective sort. Perhaps
surprisingly, we are able to demonstrate that our utility-based policy objective is
a function of ination and output gap variability only. This means we are able to
present the model in which all agents smooth consumption over time as a special
case of a more general setup. The share of non-Ricardian agents will obviously a¤ect
the relative costliness of the variability in the target variables as well as the value of
the target deviation in output. We can demonstrate, for instance, that, under our
baseline calibration, ination stabilization becomes more important, as the popula-
tion share of liquidity-constrained agents rises. To o¤er practical guidance for policy
makers, we also derive simple specic targeting rules in the spirit of Svensson (2002,
2003) and Taylor-like reaction functions for the instruments of monetary and scal
policy consistent with the optimal policy. Whilst the rules we obtain retain the func-
tional form of the baseline framework, the share of liquidity-constrained agents will
a¤ect the response coe¢cients in the rules.
The implications of our model are then illustrated numerically. Again, a sin-
gle, serially uncorrelated positive shock to government expenditures is the source of
disturbance in the model. The main nding of the calibration exercise is that the op-
timal economy moves along an analogue of a conventional ination-output variance
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frontier, as the population share of non-Ricardian agents rises. The optimal response
in aggregate output increases because this is to the benet of the liquidity-constrained
households via net real wages. The net real wage rate is shown to be increasing and
convex in aggregate output. It follows that those for whom the net real wage is the
sole determinant of welfare prefer more volatility in output. As the population share
of non-Ricardian agents rises, this preference exerts greater inuence on policy. The
consequences of the scal shock for long-term scal sustainability, as expressed by
a composite measure of scal stress, then become less severe. There is then less
of a need to use ination to meet the scal solvency constraint. Optimal ination
volatility consequently falls.
In general, perfect stabilization of the tax rate is not optimal and the sign as
well as the size of the response in the tax rate mainly depends on the size of the
preference-driven target response in output relative to the spending-induced initial
shift in the natural rate of output. The resulting tax hike or tax cut then counteracts
the arising cost-pull or cost-push pressure through its impact on the natural rate.
This role of tax policy has been exposited in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we show
that when the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents is low, the welfare-e¢cient
target level of output initially undershoots the natural rate and a tax rise is needed
to o¤set the arising cost-pull pressures. As the proportion of non-Ricardian agents
rises, the target response in output rises too, ultimately surpassing the response in
the natural rate, necessitating a tax cut to contain the cost-push pressure on prices.
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The optimal interest rate response to a rise in government spending is negative.
The relatively low interest rate elasticity of demand implied by our baseline calibra-
tion causes that the rate of interest associated with the target level of output is lower
relative to the steady-state rate of interest determined by the rate of time preference.
Hence, a cut in the interest rate is needed to stabilize the output gap. Furthermore,
as the population share of the non-Ricardians rises, not only is it optimal to stabilize
the economy around an increasing target level of output, but output also becomes
less responsive to the interest rate. The interest rate associated with the target level
of output correspondingly falls more below the steady-state rate. Thus, somewhat
surprisingly, smaller responses in ination are associated with larger cuts in the inter-
est rate. Finally, our results do not imply that the inclusion of liquidity-constrained
agents would bring about a rise in private consumption in response to an increase
in government expenditures in the optimal economy. Our sensitivity analysis shows
that these conclusions hold over a wide range of structural parameter values.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the mi-
croeconomic foundations of the model. Section 2 presents the model of the linear
economy and the quadratic objective function of the policy maker that follow from
the micro-foundations. Section 3 derives the optimal dynamics of endogenous vari-
ables following a shock to government expenditures, including the reaction functions
for the optimal conduct of monetary and scal policy. The impact of the presence of
non-Ricardian agents on optimal dynamics of the model and the implications for op-
timal policy are discussed in Section 4. In Section 4, we also check the sensitivity of
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the results with respect to some key structural parameter values. Section 5 concludes.
Finally, the Appendix gives a detailed account of the derivations that underlie the
macroeconomic model presented in Section 2.
3.1 The micro-foundations of the model
In this section, we present a general equilibrium framework that generates a constant
population share of liquidity constrained agents in the economy. We allow for het-
erogeneity among agents in terms of access to the asset market but our setup enables
us to maintain much of the tractability of the representative agent framework. This
feature of the analysis then facilitates the use of modern methods of optimal policy
determination.
3.1.1 Consumers
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of identical, innitely-lived agents
indexed by k 2 [0; 1]. The agents utility is increasing in consumption C and leisure
(1 H). As in Galí et al. (2004), we assume the following functional form for the
utility of agents
u =
[C (1 H)!]
1 e 1
1  e 1 (3.1)
with ! > 0 and e 1 > 0. We further assume, like Amato and Laubach (2003), that
the representative consumer receives information about whether she is able to smooth
consumption over time or whether she has to rely only on current wage income to
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nance consumption at the beginning of each period. It is before this information
regarding the current period is revealed that the agent makes her optimizing choice.
Let  2 [0; 1) denote the probability that the agent is unable to smooth con-
sumption over time.  is independent of the consumers history. The law of large
numbers then implies that  will also stand for the proportion of hand-to-mouth
agents in the economy.
We also assume that the newcomers to the asset market will be given an en-
dowment, while the leavers will be charged a lump-sum tax by the government when
leaving the asset market. Let the lump-sum transfer be on aggregate equal to the to-
tal asset holdings of the agents who are leaving the asset market, including the earned
interest.55 Let us also assume that access to the asset market is a requirement for
receiving dividends.
At the beginning of each period, before the information about the type that each
agent belongs to is revealed, there are two groups of consumers in the economy: those
who were non-Ricardian and those who were Ricardian in the previous period. Their
respective shares on the population are  and 1 . Members of either group face two
scenarios. Once the information about the type is revealed, they can become either
non-Ricardian or Ricardian with probability  and 1    respectively. Therefore,
after the information about access to the asset market is revealed, we shall have four
types of agents in the economy: types A (D) had (no) access to the asset market
55 This assumption is needed to ensure that the transversality condition for consumer asset holdings is
satised. At the same time, it eliminates the need to track the distribution of wealth in the economy, as we
shall see below.
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in period t   1 and have (no) access to it in period t; types B and C represent the
intermediate casesthe leavers and the newcomers to the asset market. We assume
that the agents know  and observe total asset holdings in the economy (and all other
aggregate variables).
Given these assumptions, we can write the expected budget constraint of those
who were Ricardian in the previous period as follows
PtC
AB
t +(1  )B
A
t = (1   t)WtH
AB
t +(1  )PtD
A
t +(1  ) (1 + it 1)B
A
t 1 (3.2)
in which CABt = (1  )C
A
t +C
B
t and an analogous relationship holds for the labour
supply. The superscripts denote agent type. (1 + it 1)B
A
t 1 represents the asset
holdings expected to be carried over from the previous period. it denotes the nominal
interest rate and Pt is the general price level. D
A
t stands for dividends received by the
agents in period t who continue to have access to the asset market. W is the nominal
wage rate and  is the at tax rate on wage income.
Analogously, the expected budget constraint of those who were non-Ricardian
in the previous period is given by
PtC
CD
t +(1  )B
C
t = (1   t)WtH
CD
t +(1  )PtD
C
t +(1  ) (1 + it 1)B
C
t 1 (3.3)
Consumption CCDt is dened as a weighted average analogous to C
AB
t above and
the same holds for HCDt . In this case, (1 + it 1)B
C
t 1 stands for the asset holdings
expected to be acquired via the lump-sum transfer by the newcomers to the asset
market from those previously Ricardian agents who will have left the asset market.
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Similarly, after gaining access to the asset market, the agents will also be entitled to
receiving their share of dividends DCt .
From period t + 1 onwards, regardless of whether they were Ricardian or non-
Ricardian in t 1, the agents can belong to any of the above groups with probabilities
(NR=non-Ricardian, R=Ricardian)
type A: P [R (T ) j R (T   1)] = (1  )2 = A
type B: P [NR (T ) j R (T   1)] =  (1  ) = B
type C: P [R (T ) j NR (T   1)] =  (1  ) = C
type D: P [NR (T ) j NR (T   1)] = 2 = D
for T > t. These probabilities also represent the respective population shares of
agents of each type in each period of time.
It follows that the expected budget constraint of consumers will be written as
PtCt +Bt = (1   t)WtHt + PtDt + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 (3.4)
where the aggregate consumption is Ct =
P
s
sC
s with s = A;B;C;D and s are the
respective probabilities given above. An analogous relationship holds for the labour
supply Ht. Once redistribution via the lump-sum tax has occurred, only types A and
C hold assets, therefore Bt =
P
s
sB
s
t with s = A;C and the same holds for dividends.
This relationship holds for all t. It is important to note that since we have assumed
a population of measure one, the aggregate variables are also per capita levels as well
as economy-wide averages.
(1 + it 1)Bt 1 represents the total asset holdings (of agents who were Ricardian
in the previous period) in the economy at the beginning of period t. Once the in-
formation about access to the asset market in period t is revealed and redistribution
occurs, these holdings will be split between those who stay Ricardian and the new-
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comers to the market who will receive the share of those who exit from the market.
Since all agents are identical (in all aspects but access to the asset market) in our
model, assets will be uniformly distributed across individuals who have access to the
asset market. Hence, share  of total assets carried over from the previous period will
be held by newcomers to the asset market, while those who stay Ricardian will hold
the rest. Now, since share  of total assets will be held by a fraction  (1  ) of the
population, this implies that the newcomers must hold 
(1 )
= 1
1 
of the average
economy-wide holdings. Similarly, share (1  ) of total initial assets will be held by
a fraction (1  )2 of the total population. Therefore, those who stay Ricardian will
also hold (1 )
(1 )2
= 1
1 
of average holdings. It therefore follows that
(1 + it 1)B
A
t 1 = (1 + it 1)B
C
t 1 =
1 + it 1
1  
Bt 1: (3.5)
Agents will be aware of this, since aggregate holdings as well as  are observed by
everyone. Each agents (expected rather than actual) initial asset holdings will thus
be identical at the time of making the optimizing choice.56 A similar reasoning would
apply to dividends.
Also, it can be shown that given a simple budget constraint that makes con-
sumption equal to the after-tax wage, the period utility function of the form (3.1) is
56 One way to interpret (3.5) for  2 (0; 1) is that asset holders in our economy receive higher private
returns on their asset holdings as a compensation for the possibility that they might be expelled from the
asset market. Overall, however, the aggregate (expected) return is the same as in an economy without
liquidity constraints, as seen from (3.4). Notice the analogy with Blanchard (1985) where agents receive
higher private returns on their asset holdings, whilst facing a constant risk of conscation of their assets due
to death.
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maximized if the liquidity-constrained agents supply labour
HNR =
1
1 + !
(3.6)
in which case the optimal consumption of these agents is given by
CNRt = (1   t)
Wt
Pt
HNR (3.7)
for all t.57 We have used the superscript NR to denote the variables optimally chosen
by agents who become non-Ricardian regardless of which group they belonged to
in the previous period. The utility of the non-Ricardian agents, given this optimal
choice, can be written using an indirect utility function V NR

 t;
Wt
Pt

. Agents will
take this optimal choice into account as a kind of an outside option, since the tax rate
 is set by the government, and we also assume perfectly competitive labour markets
(and therefore that every single agent is a wage-taker).
Given the fact that the (expected) initial holdings of assets by both previous
periods Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents are the same (see above), they both will
face the same decision problem and choose a common optimal level of consumption,
labour supply (labeled with the superscript R) and asset holdings for the case that
they will have access to the asset market. The problem to be solved can thus be
reduced to the problem of a representative agent choosing a sequence

CRt ; H
R
t ; bt
	
57 Constant labour supply by non-Ricardian agents over time and across states of nature facilitates aggre-
gation in the model just like the constant hazard rate in Blanchard (1985). Importantly, it is a result of
an optimization exercise and not simply an assumption. On the other hand, this result rests on the spe-
cic functional form used to dene individual utility. A feasible, though at the same time a more restrictive
alternative would be to have a utility function log-linear in consumption, as in Bilbiie (2005).
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to maximize
max
CR
T
;HR
T
;bT
Ut = Et
1X
T=t
T t
8<:(1  )

CRT
 
1 HRT
!1 e 1
1  e 1 + V NR

 t;
Wt
Pt
9=;
(3.8)
subject to
Ct +
bt
1 + it
= (1   t)
Wt
Pt
Ht +Dt + bt 1
Pt 1
Pt
(3.9)
for all T > t in which now Ct = C
NR
t + (1  )C
R
t and Ht = H
NR + (1  )HRt ,
with bt = (1 + it)
Bt
Pt
.
Combining the rst-order conditions with respect to CRt and H
R
t yields
CRt =
(1   t)
!
Wt
Pt
 
1 HRt

(3.10)
and we also obtain the Euler equation

Et
 
CRt+1

 e 1  
1 HRt+1
!(1 e 1)
(CRt )
 e 1
(1 HRt )
!(1 e 1)
(1 + it)
(1 + Ett+1)
= 1; (3.11)
in which (1 + Ett+1) =
Pt+1
Pt
.
In aggregate then, labour supply and consumption respectively are given by
Ht =

1 + !
+ (1  )HRt ; (3.12)
Ct = C
NR
t + (1  )C
R
t
=
(1   t)
!
Wt
Pt
(1 Ht) : (3.13)
Combining (3.6), (3.7), (3.10) and (3.13), yields
CNRt =
!
1 + !
Ct
(1 Ht)
; (3.14)
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CRt =
Ct
(1  )

1 
!
(1 Ht) (1 + !)

: (3.15)
The expected t period utility of the representative agent can then be written in terms
of the aggregate variables as
ut =
C1 e
 1
t
1  e 1
(
 (1 Ht)
e 1 1

!
1 + !
(1+!)(1 e 1)
+ (1  )e
 1

1 
!
(1 Ht) (1 + !)
1 e 1 
1 
Ht
1  
+

(1  ) (1 + !)
!(1 e 1))
:
(3.16)
3.1.2 Firms
Let us assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers of di¤erentiated
intermediate goods (indexed j). These goods then serve as an input in the production
of a single nal good. The production technology of the nal good - produced by a
representative rm operating in a perfectly competitive environment - is described by
a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
Yt =
Z 1
0
yt (j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
; (3.17)
where yt (j) is the quantity of an intermediate good used in the production of Y . A
simple cost minimization exercise by nal goods producers yields the expression for
the demand for intermediate good j
yt (j) = Yt

pt (j)
Pt

 "
(3.18)
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and the aggregate price index
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt (j)
1 " dj
 1
1 "
: (3.19)
Let us also assume that the production of the intermediate goods is described by the
production function
yt (j) = Ht (j)
1= (3.20)
with  > 1. In equilibrium it holds that
Ht =
Z 1
0
Ht (j) dj
= Y t t (3.21)
with
t =
Z 1
0

pt (j)
Pt

 "
dj (3.22)
denoting price dispersion.
The producers of intermediate goods maximize prots given by
t (j) = pt (j) yt (j) WtHt (j) : (3.23)
They do so in a forward-looking way, evaluating an expected stream of prots. We
assume a price setting mechanism of the type put forward by Calvo (1983) with
 2 (0; 1) denoting the probability for a rm of charging unchanged prices in any
period. The rst order condition from this problem is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tQt;TYT

pt
PT

 "
"
(1  T )  
WT
PT
Y  1T

pt
PT

 "( 1) 1
#
= 0 (3.24)
and the dynamics of the price level is then given by
Pt =

(1  ) p1 "t + P
1 "
t 1
 1
1 " : (3.25)
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3.1.3 Government
Monetary and scal authorities, the two branches of the central government, coor-
dinate their actions to ensure that social welfare given by (3.8) is maximized. The
government raises revenues via distortive taxes on wage income to nance exogenous
government spendingG. It issues one-period nominal bonds to bridge the gap between
taxation and spending. The government therefore faces a ow budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1   Ptt (3.26)
whereB denotes the volume of one-period nominal bonds issued by the scal authority
and t is the t period primary budget surplus. This constraint can be rewritten as
bt
(1 + it)
=
bt 1
(1 + t)
 t (3.27)
3.2 The macroeconomic model
The micro-foundations discussed in detail in Section 1 imply a simple New Keynesian
model of the macroeconomy. The model we present here appears to be very similar
to our baseline framework in Chapter 1. We left the notation largely unchanged to
indicate that we can present the economy with non-Ricardian agents as a generaliza-
tion of the framework in which the LC-PIH holds for consumer behaviour. The main
di¤erence here is that some key parameters of the model, such as the slope of the IS
relationship, the costliness of volatility in the target variables or the target level of
output, will be a function of the share of liquidity-constrained agents in the economy.
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Log-linearization of the Euler equation (3.11) gives us the intertemporal IS
relationship, which describes the demand side of the economy
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Ett+1   brt : (3.28)
yt is the welfare-relevant output gap. Again, bit = log 1+it1+i ; where i is the steady state
interest rate determined by the rate of time preference. brt represents the deviation
in the interest rate that is consistent with the preference-driven target deviation in
output bY t . As before, brt depends on exogenous real variables only and hence, cannot
be a¤ected by government policy. The details of the derivation are given in the
Appendix.
The supply side of the economy is characterized by the following forward-looking
New Keynesian Phillips curve
t = yt +  (b t   b t ) + Ett+1: (3.29)
The supply equation links current ination to the output gap, deviation in taxes and
expected future ination. As before, b t is the deviation in the tax rate that would
o¤set the cost-push (or cost-pull) pressure resulting from the increase in government
spending. The derivation of this structural equation from the rms prot-maximizing
decision as well as the denitions of parameter values are given in the Appendix to
this chapter.
The governments ow budget constraint can be shown to yield the following
scal sustainability condition expressed in terms of the gap-variables in (3.29)
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bbt 1   t + yyt + 't = (1  ) [fyyt + f (b t   b t )]
+Et
hbbt   t+1 + yyt+1 + 't+1i : (3.30)
't is again the scal stress term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003) as a
composite measure of the consequences for scal solvency of the spending shock in
period t. The Appendix explains the steps involved in deriving (3.30) from (3.27).
Coe¢cients fy, f and y are also dened in the Appendix.
Finally, the central government conducts monetary and scal policy in a coor-
dinated fashion to minimize the quadratic loss function
Lt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
q
2
T

: (3.31)
The Appendix provides a detailed account on how this loss function follows from
the agents expected utility function. In the analysis below, including the sensitivity
analysis, our calibration is consistent with both coe¢cients in the loss function being
positive. The objective function is then convex and the optimal solution derived in
the next section constitutes a minimum.
3.3 Optimal dynamics of the economy
As in Chapter 1, in the absence of full commitment, the policy that maximizes (3.31)
subject to (3.29) and (3.30) is time inconsistent. We therefore followWoodford (2003)
and derive the policy optimal from a timeless perspective. We need to restrict
the policy choices for period t so that the policy maker uses the same procedure to
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formulate policy as in later periods. The problem facing the policy maker is, therefore,
given by the following Lagrangian:
Jt = Et
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
q
2
T

+1;T [T   yT    (bT   b T )  EtT+1]
+2;T
hbbT 1   T + yyT + 'T   (1  ) fyyT   (1  ) f (bT   b T )
 bbT + EtT+1   EtyyT+1io+  2;t 1   1;t 1 t   y2;t 1yt
(3.32)
The nal two terms represent the additional constraints concerning the initial period
t = t;
yt = yt:
These are commitments regarding values of endogenous variables the expectations
of which are relevant for the determination of equilibrium in period t   1. The
specication of these commitments follows from the long-run solution to the model.
Policies that satisfy these commitments are necessarily time-consistent.
The rst-order condition from the above policy problem (with T = t) with
respect to the deviation in outstanding liabilities implies that the Lagrange multi-
plier associated with the scal constraint follows a Martingale process from period t
onwards58
Et2;t+1 = 2t: (3.33)
58 Assumptions regarding the number and/or the size of the shocks in order to keep the model in a close
enough neighborhood of the initial steady state must apply here just as in Chapter 1.
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The remainder of the solution is a close analogue of the solution presented in Chapter
1. We obtain
t = !
 
2;t   2;t 1

; (3.34)
yt = m2;t + n2;t 1; (3.35)
with
! = q
 1


1 +
(1  ) f


;
m = q
 1
y

(1  ) fy   y  
(1  ) f


;
n =
y
qy
:
It follows from (3.33), (3.34) and (3.35) that
EtT = 0 (3.36)
EtyT = (m + n)2;t; (3.37)
for all T > t. With the shock being non-persistent, (3.29) written for period t+1 can
be solved for the expected deviation in the tax rate
Etb t+1 =   

Etyt+1: (3.38)
Substituting this into a forward-integrated version of (3.30), solving that equation
forwards, and using (3.36) and (3.37), we obtain
bbt = nb2;t; (3.39)
where we have used nb for (m + n)

fy  
f

  y

. Outstanding liabilities there-
fore inherit the time series properties of the Lagrange multiplier 2. Also, (3.29) can
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be re-arranged to obtain an equation for the dynamics of the tax rate
b t = b t    yt + 1 t: (3.40)
Substituting this into a forward-integrated version of (3.30), and using (3.34) to (3.37),
the dynamics of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the scal sustainability con-
straint will be
2;t =
mb
mb + nb
2;t 1 +
bbt 1 + 't
mb + nb
; (3.41)
in which
mb =

1 + (1  )
f


!  

(1  ) fy  
(1  ) f

  y

n:
It is easy to understand that having non-zero 't and bbt 1 6=  't will cause a level
shift in 2t and then also a level shift in bt. Plugging (3.41) back into (3.34) and
(3.35) yields the dynamics of ination and the output gap. Equation (3.40) denes
the dynamics of the tax rate. For m 6=  n, this implies a unit root in output gap
and hence also in the tax rate. This conclusion is therefore robust to the presence of
non-Ricardian agents.
3.3.1 Optimal policy rules
To o¤er some guidance for optimal policy conduct in practice, we translate the above
optimal paths into policy rules. As before, we rst derive the specic targeting rule
that the authorities should jointly aim to satisfy in every period. Then we follow
Taylor (1997), who uses a pair of interest-rate and budget surplus rules to assess
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policy conduct in the United States, and derive the reaction functions for individual
branches of public authority that implement the optimal policy.
The rst-order conditions (3.34) and (3.35) imply the targeting rule
t +
n
m
t 1  
!
m
(yt   yt 1) = 0: (3.42)
Monetary and scal authorities should coordinate their action to ensure this rule is
satised in every period, together with (3.36). The functional form of the rule, as
presented here, is the same as in Chapter 1. The coe¢cients determining the extent
to which current ination should depend on past ination and output gap dynamics
will, however, be a function of .
Monetary policy
We can combine the pair of targeting rules (3.36), (3.42) and the IS relationship
(3.28) to derive the implied reaction function for monetary policy. As before, it is
easy to see that (3.28), combined with (3.36) directly yields
bit = brt +  1 (Etyt+1   yt) : (3.43)
Together with (3.42), solved in period t+1, this leads us to the implied optimal path
for the interest rate
bit = brt +  1n!t: (3.44)
As before, these rules are both the fundamentals based reaction functions in the sense
of Evans and Honkapohja (2006). The more relevant expectations based reaction
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function is written as
it = brt + Ett+1 +  1Etyt+1    1m! t
  1
n
!
t 1   
 1yt 1 (3.45)
We see they all retain the simple functional form from Chapter 1. Importantly
though, both brt and the response coe¢cients now vary with  in a non-trivial way,
which we discuss below.
Fiscal policy
The scal control variable in our model is the tax rate. Its optimal dynamic is
given by (3.40). It is, however, more in line with real-world policy conduct to think
of the primary budget surplus as the principal indicator of scal policy stance in the
short term. As in Chapter 1, we obtain that the reaction function
bt = bt + T



1 H
+
Y
C
 
1
1  



yt +
T

1

t
in which the variables with bars denote steady state levels of the relevant variable.
bt is a shock term dened as
bt = T

1
1  
b t + T



1 H
+
Y
C
 bY t   T

Y
C
+
Y

 bGt:
Here, bt depends on .
3.4 Numerical results 181
3.4 Numerical results
In this section, we present the numerical results for the dynamics of the economy in
response to a single, serially uncorrelated positive shock to government spending of
1 percent of steady-state output. We rst evaluate the optimal impulse responses
in the absence of non-Ricardian consumers. Then, we investigate how the optimal
dynamics of the economy vary with the share of the non-Ricardians in the economy.
3.4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model using conventional structural parameter values. Some of the
parameter values di¤er from the calibration in Chapter 1. The parameters were chosen
so that the steady-state scal outcomes take on reasonable values. , the discount
rate, remains at 0:99, implying an annualized steady-state rate of interest just over
4 percent. The consumption share of national income is 0:8. The value of e 1 is
set so that  uccY =uc equals 0:157, which is the value estimated in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). Similarly, the value of ! is calibrated so that the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply (given by
 
1 H

=H from (3.13)) takes on a value of 1, as in Galí et.
al (2004). We assume an approximate 9 percent price markup in the product market,
arising due to imperfect competition among intermediate goods producers. We set
 = 1:25 so that the production function governing the production of intermediate
goods is of decreasing-returns-to-scale type. The price stickiness parameter in the
Calvo-pricing model  has been set to 0:65. The steady state labour income tax rate
remains 30 percent. These parameter values imply a steady-state surplus-to-GDP
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ratio of 0:02 and hence b=Y = 2 (or 50 percent of aggregate output on an annual
basis). The steady-state aggregate output, as shown in the Appendix, is independent
of .
The sensitivity of the results to changes in some of these parameter values
are reported in a separate section. The dynamic system comprising the rst-order
conditions from the policy problem and the structural equations has a unique stable
solution for the parameter values used in the calibration exercise.
3.4.2 The economy with Ricardian agents only
Let us rst consider the limit of our model when all the agents are Ricardian. Fol-
lowing the general discussion in Chapter 1, we postulate that in an environment with
sticky prices, the endogeneity of the tax dynamics precludes full stabilization of the
economy via strict price-level targeting. The degree to which full stabilization is pre-
vented is given by the scal stress 't (+bbt 1, if any). We therefore observe non-zero
responses in ination and the output gap.
Figure 3.1 plots the optimal paths under price stickiness for  = 0.59 We see
that the optimal volatility of both endogenous variables that appear in the objective
functionination and the output gapis very small. The results are again similar
to those reported in Benigno and Woodford (2003) who analyze a shock to govern-
ment transfers rather than government spending and show how optimal volatility of
59 The value 1 on the vertical axes stands for 1 percent deviation. The ination and interest rates are
quarterly. We have assumed the economy was in its steady state before the shock occured.
3.4 Numerical results 183
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x 10
-3 inflation
t
0 5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 output gap
t
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
tax rate
t
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
outstanding liabilities
t
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
interest rate
t
0 5 10 15 20
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
primary surplus
t
Fig. 3.1. Optimal dynamics in the sticky-price economy without liquidity constraints
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ination changes depending on the degree of price stickiness. We also see that as
before, outstanding liabilities, output gap and the tax rate are all non-stationary.
As for the policy variables, the primary surplus initially falls, since the spending
shock is not fully covered by extra tax revenues. The surplus is also non-stationary.
It jumps to a new level that is consistent with the higher long-run level of public debt.
The response of the interest rate might appear somewhat counter-intuitive.
There is, however, an intuitive explanation. Given the minute deviation of ina-
tion and the output gap in the optimal economy, the optimal deviation in the interest
rate is primarily determined by the size and the sign of brtthe deviation in the in-
terest rate consistent with the target deviation in output. brt is a composite measure
and, as shown in the Appendix, is a net e¤ect of two components. One is the e¤ect on
the interest rate of a pure demand shock induced by the rise in government expendi-
tures. This acts to push the interest rate upwards. The second component represents
the drag on the interest rate arising from the need to bring the output of the econ-
omy to its target level. The size and the sign of brt then crucially depend on the size
of bY t and the elasticity in the IS relationship . In our calibration, the second com-
ponent dominates mainly because of the relatively small value of  compared with
the slope coe¢cients derived in frameworks such as Benigno and Woodford (2003).60
Hence, the interest rate deviation consistent with the target deviation of output is be-
low the zero-ination steady state level of interest. This causes the unexpected sign
of the deviation in the policy rate needed to be implemented to stabilize the output
60 The di¤erence has roots in the functional form of the utility function (3.1) and the denition of marginal
utility of consumption that follows from it.
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Fig. 3.2. Determinants of the e¢cient rate of interest
gap. Figure 3.2 displays a simplied diagrammatic analysis of the determinants of brt .
The left panel displays the case described above alongside a hypothetical situation
in which the target deviation in output would be smaller. The right panel shows an-
other hypothetical case with demand being more responsive to changes in the interest
rate (higher ). In both alternative cases, brt would be positive.
3.4.3 The role of non-Ricardian agents
The general part of the discussion in the previous section on exible-price versus
sticky-price economies also holds in the presence of non-Ricardian agents. Here we
investigate the impact of the presence of non-Ricardian agents in the economy on the
optimal deviations in our endogenous variables in the period when the shock occurs.
Our main result can be visualized using an analogue of a conventional ination-
output variance frontier. Figure 3.3 shows how the optimal deviation in ination and
output in the period when the shock occurs varies with the share of non-Ricardian
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Fig. 3.3. Optimal ination and output volatility and the presence of non-Ricardian
agents
agents in the economy.61 We see that the optimal economy moves along the frontier
from a state of (relatively) higher ination coupled with low output volatility towards
an optimum with lower ination and higher output volatility, as the share of the
non-Ricardian agents in the population rises.
The above developments can be traced back to individual preferences. Figure
3.4 gives further insights. One needs to note that a spending-induced increase in out-
put has a positive social welfare e¤ect via the consumption of the non-Ricardians,
the sole determinant of which is the economy-wide net real wage rate. An approx-
imation to the net real wage rate given by (3.13) would reveal that itand hence,
non-Ricardians consumption and welfareis convex in aggregate output. The non-
Ricardians will therefore prefer more output volatility to less. Also, a reduction in
61 We have used a range for  that we perceive as realistic and useful for our analysis. Extending the plots
beyond  = 0:5 does not alter the conclusions.
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Fig. 3.4. The costliness of output variability and scal stress in non-Ricardian
economies
the volatility of output has favourable level e¤ects (as seen from (3.A.41) in the
Appendix). The corresponding welfare e¤ects are higher when the share of the non-
Ricardians is low and thus, more stability in the level of output is desirable when 
is small.62 Overall then, as the presence of the non-Ricardians in the population in-
creases, qythe measure of public dislike for output volatilityfalls. A given output
deviation is then less costly in welfare terms, and the optimal deviation rises.
Figure 3.4 also reveals that the scal stress associated with a given spending
shock becomes smaller when  rises. A given rise in government spending has less
severe consequences for scal sustainability when the associated response in output
is larger. The need to use ination to ensure the requirement of scal solvency is met
then diminishes.
The optimal initial responses in the policy instruments and policy-related vari-
ables reect the optimal outcomes described above. brt is a¤ected both by the optimal-
62 Such rst-order e¤ects are generally ignored if one assumes the steady state of the economy is e¢cient
or only mildly ine¢cient (see Woodford, 2003).
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ity of stabilizing output around an increasing target level and the declining elasticity
in the IS relationship when the share of liquidity-constrained agents rises ( falls with
rising ). Both inuences act to make brt more negative. A stronger anti-inationary
policy stance is therefore paradoxically associated with a larger cut in the policy rate.
The size and the sign of the response in the tax rate varies depending on the size
of the target deviation in output relative to the impact of the rise in government spend-
ing on the natural rate of output. For low population shares of the non-Ricardians,
the target deviation in output is smaller compared with the spending-induced shift in
the natural rate and a tax hike is required to o¤set the resulting cost-pull pressure.
For larger values of , with a rising target response, ultimately the opposite will hold.
The tax rate will need to be cut to contain the cost-push pressure. Here, we repro-
duce the simplied diagram from Chapter 1. Figure 3.6 shows how varying the tax
rate can be used to contain pressures on prices.63 The left panel represents the case
when the population share of non-Ricardian agents is low, while the right panel holds
when their share approaches half of the population and the target response is larger
than the spending-induced shift in the natural rate. The responses in outstanding
liabilities and the primary scal surplus, whose dependence on  is plotted in 3.5,
follow from the above.
To characterize policy at a deeper level, we can analyze the properties of the
optimal specic targeting rule (3.42) that the policy makers optimally aim to meet
63 In the diagram, we use a simplied, static plot of a rather special case when prices can be fully stabilized as
bbt 1 exactly o¤sets the scal stress 't. This case represents a simple way of explaining how b

t is determined
in our model.
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in every period. In an economy with Ricardian agents only, we obtain the following
targeting rule
t = 3:38t 1 + 0:49 (yt   yt 1) :
The coe¢cient values of course depend on the share of non-Ricardians in the general
model. The sensitivity of the coe¢cient values to  is plotted in Figure 3.7. The long-
run response coe¢cient at the output gap in the monetary policy reaction function
(3.45) remains zero, as in Chapter 1 for all . In the economy with Ricardian agents
only, the long-run response coe¢cient at ination is 5:2. The sensitivity of this
parameter to  is shown in Figure 3.8. Note again, that the IS schedule in this
analysis is about ve times steeper compared with the analysis in 1, which inuences
the size of this coe¢cient as well.
Another variable that deserves close attention is aggregate private consumption.
Several papers (see for instance Muscatelli et al., 2004, Coenen and Straub, 2005 or
Galí et al., 2007) have sought to see whether the inclusion of non-Ricardian agents
in models sheds new light on the debate regarding the potential positive e¤ects of a
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Fig. 3.8. Long-run response coe¢cient at ination in the reaction function
rise in government spending on aggregate consumption. The conclusion that seems
to emerge from the mentioned literature is that the presence of liquidity-constrained
agents in the economy, perhaps alongside other factors, might help reconcile the
results obtained from micro-founded New Keynesian models of the macroeconomy
with empirical evidence of a crowding-in e¤ect. In our optimal economy, we do not
nd a positive consumption response for a spending shock of a commonly-used size
(1 percent of steady-state output), not even for higher values of . This result is
robust to the choice of parameter values, as shown in the next section. We suspect
the di¤erence in the results is due to a fundamental conceptual di¤erence between
our model and the mentioned analyses. Our economy behaves optimally, whilst the
existing papers assume a simple rule-based conduct of policy in their economies.
On the real side, the policy goal in our economy is to stabilize the welfare-relevant
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output gap. The preference-driven target deviation in output thus plays a crucial role
in dening the optimal dynamics of output and hence also consumption. The target
deviation is not large enough to be consistent with a positive private consumption
response under our baseline calibration. In what follows, we check the robustness of
this claim.
3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We check the sensitivity of our results to changes in the values of structural parame-
ters. In particular, we focus on the parameters determining the shape of the utility
function. First, Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the change in results resulting from di¤er-
ent values of  uccY =uc and  ulll=ul.
64 It is easy to see that the patterns identied
in the previous section hold for a wide range of parameter values. However, when
preferences approach the state of being log-linear in consumption or for low values
of Frisch labour supply elasticity, some of the conclusions from the previous sections
get reversed.65
Second, we see that the response in aggregate consumption takes on consistently
negative values. This result is particularly robust with respect to the degree of price
stickiness. The upper-right panel of Figure 3.11 plots the initial response in aggregate
consumption for di¤erent  (as before, on the horizontal axis) and varying values of
, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. Parameters in the utility function vary as before. The
64 We have used l = 1   H. Varying  ulll=ul from 0.1 to 0.9 is equivalent to changing the Frisch labor
supply elasticity from around 1.6 to 0.2.
65 This would make our analysis consistent with Bilbiie (2005) who uses a utility function log-linear in
consumption and nds that the relative weight of on the output gap in the objective function is increasing
in .
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Fig. 3.9. Sensitivity analysis: initial aggregate output response and the welfare costs
of output deviation
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Fig. 3.10. Sensitivity analysis: initial ination response and the degree of scal stress
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Fig. 3.11. The response in aggregate consumption to increased government spending
and its robustness to parameter values
di¤erence in the response is barely visible. Hence, unlike Galí et al. (2007), we
do not nd that the degree of price stickiness could signicantly a¤ect the sign of
the response in aggregate consumption to an increase in government spending in
the optimal economy. The reason is that  only determines the size of the optimal
output gap which has a very small inuence on the optimal output response relative
to the inuence of the preference-drive target deviation, which is independent of price
stickiness. Overall then, the optimal response in private consumption is consistently
negative across a wide range of ; e 1 and !.66
66 Serial correlation in the spending shock could be another potential source of a larger response in output.
In the context of an economy similar to ours but without liquidity constraints, Benigno and Woodford
(2006a) analyze the consequences for the dynamics of ination and the tax rate of di¤erent degrees of
persistence in their scal shock. Ination volatility increases, which reects the fact that autocorrelation in
the shock causes scal stress to rise and hence the economy needs more ination in order for scal solvency
to be maintained. The increase in ination is, however, only small. The tax response is also somewhat
higher. As one would expect, there is some persistence in the tax response but ination stabilizes with no
persistence. From these, one can infer the magnitude of the impact on the dynamics of the output gap and
hence also output. It appears that in models of this type, the consequences of the persistence in the shock
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Fig. 3.12. Sensitivity of the slope of the IS relationship to parameter values
Finally, much of the analysis in Bilbiie (2005) rests upon the possibility of
an upward-sloping IS relationship when demand rises in response to a rise in real
interest rates. We investigate the possibility of such scenario in our setup. We focus
our attention on the  parameter in (3.28) and analyze its sensitivity to changes in
the parameters of the utility function. The results are reported in Figure 3.12. We
see that the slope coe¢cient, however sensitive to calibration, does not change sign.
Hence, we do not nd evidence of the inverted Keynesian logic in our model.
The conclusions of the sensitivity analysis do not change if we extend the plots
beyond  = 0:5:
3.5 Concluding remarks
We have used a New Keynesian linear-quadratic setting to highlight some optimal
policy implications of the presence of non-Ricardian agents in the economy. Extend-
are mainly dealt with via debt. Overall, it does not appear as though persistence in the shock could induce
a large enough response in output so that private consumption would rise following the spending shock in
the optimal economy.
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ing the existing literature, we include liquidity-constrained consumers into a model
with endogenous tax dynamics and derive a second-order-accurate quadratic welfare-
ranking criterion for the case of large distortions to the economys steady state.
We nd that the optimal deviation in output in response to a rise in govern-
ment spending increases as the population share of non-Ricardian agents rises, while
optimal ination volatility decreases. We have demonstrated that these results can
be traced back to individual preferences. Our model does not signal any poten-
tial positive private consumption response to an increase in government spending in
the optimal economy and this result is robust to a wide range of parameter values
governing individual preferences or nominal rigidity in the model. We obtain that
potentially controversial policy responses, such as a cut in the tax rate or accommoda-
tive monetary policy stance, might in some cases be the optimal policy response to a
rise in government spending. The associated analysis o¤ers interesting observations
regarding the determinants of optimal policy in a broader sense.
In this analysis, as in Galí et al. (2004), we compromise slightly on generality
by assuming a utility function of a specic form. This facilitates aggregation in the
model and enables us to obtain a tractable solution. Further checks are needed to
establish the extent to which our results are a¤ected by this assumption.
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3
The aggregate supply relationship
The aggregate supply relationship can be derived from the rms optimization
problem as follows. The prot function of a rm producing intermediate goods is
given by (3.23). We assume Calvo pricing with  being the probability of leaving
prices unchanged in a given period. The rm is choosing the optimal price and the
intertemporal rst-order condition is written as
Et
1X
T=t
T tQt;TYT

pt (i)
PT

 "
"
(1  T )  
WT
PT
Y  1T

pt (i)
PT

 "( 1) 1
#
= 0
(3.A.1)
Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor which can be derived from (3.11). We can
dene !p =   1 and  will replace "= ("  1) as the price markup due to imperfect
competition in the intermediate goods market. After substituting from (3.10) for the
real wage rate and using pt (i) = p

t ; we obtain a closed-form solution
pt
PT
=

Kt
Ft
 1
1+"!p
(3.A.2)
with
Kt = Et
1X
T=t
()T t
 
CRT
(1 e 1)  
1 HRT
!(1 e 1) 1 !Y T
(1  T )

PT
Pt
"(1+!p)
;
(3.A.3)
Ft = Et
1X
T=t
()T t
 
CRT

 e 1  
1 HRT
!(1 e 1)
YT

PT
Pt
" 1
: (3.A.4)
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The price index evolves as derived in the Appendix to Chapter 1, and ination and
the law of motion for price dispersion are also dened in a similar way. Here we also
make use of the general derivation in the Appendix to Chapter 1, and jump directly
to deriving zT and XT : Using (3.12) and (3.15), we obtain
kT =

CT
(1  )

1 
!
(1 HT ) (1 + !)
(1 e 1)


1 
HT
1  
+

(1  ) (1 + !)
!(1 e 1) 1 !Y T
(1  T )
; (3.A.5)
fT =

CT
(1  )

1 
!
(1 HT ) (1 + !)

 e 1


1 
HT
1  
+

(1  ) (1 + !)
!(1 e 1)
YT : (3.A.6)
In what follows, we also make use of the second-order expansions Ct and (1   t)
from the Appendix to Chapter 1. The expansion for leisure (1 Ht) is written as
\(1 Ht) =  !H bHt   1
2
!H 
1 H
 bH2t +O (3) (3.A.7)
with !H = H=
 
1 H

. From (3.21), it follows that
bHt = bYt + bt (3.A.8)
The second-order expansion of price dispersion around the zero-ination steady state
does not contain linear terms in ination and hence, when multiplied with other
rst-order terms, the product will be accurate to the third order. Therefore, we can
write
bH2t = 2bY 2t (3.A.9)
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We can also establish that
\
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!
(1 Ht) (1 + !)

=  
H bHt 1
2
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
1 H
2
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We have dened

H =
!H!
(1 + !)
 
1 H

  !

and
H =
(1 + !)H
(1 + !)
 
1   H

+ 
:
Using the above derivations, it is now straightforward to derive the aggregate
supply relationship. For zT and XT , we have
zT = bCT + \1  !
(1 HT ) (1 + !)

+ (  1) bYt
 
\
1 
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1  
+

(1  ) (1 + !)

  \(1   t); (3.A.10)
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
+
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 
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+
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(1  ) (1 + !)

+( + 1) bYt   \(1   t): (3.A.11)
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It follows that
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where we have used
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H +   1; (3.A.13)
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To the rst order, this can be written as a di¤erence equation of the following form
t = 
h
zy bYt   c 1 bGt + !b ti+ Ett+1: (3.A.16)
From this we can infer that the immediate e¤ect of the government spending shock
is to raise the natural rate of output by c
 1
zy
bGt.
3.A Appendix to Chapter 3 202
The scal solvency condition
Again, we start with a simple ow government budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1   Ptt (3.A.17)
Bt is the nominal value of public debt in period t and t is the t-period primary
surplus of the government budget (t = Tt  Gt). Following Benigno and Woodford
(2003), this ow budget constraint implies the following sustainability condition
bt 1
t
 
CRt

 e 1  
1 HRt
!(1 e 1)
= Et
1X
T=t
T tT T
 
CRT

 e 1  
1 HRT
!(1 e 1)
(3.A.18)
which requires current outstanding real liabilities to be o¤set by the discounted sum of
future primary surpluses. We have used (3.11) to substitute for the discount factors.
We can denote the left-hand side as Wt
Wt =
bt 1
t

Ct
(1  )

1 
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(1 Ht) (1 + !)

 e 1


1 
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!(1 e 1)
: (3.A.19)
Equation (3.A.18) can be written as a di¤erence equation
Wt = t
 
CRt

 e 1  
1 HRt
!(1 e 1)
+ EtWt+1: (3.A.20)
In the steady state, it holds that
(1  )W = 

C
R

 e 1 
1 H
R
!(1 e 1)
: (3.A.21)
To the rst order, Wt can be approximated as
cWt = bbt 1   t + y bYt + e 1c 1 bGt +O (2) : (3.A.22)
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with y = e 1
H   !  1  e 1H   e 1c 1. A second-order expansion of the
right-hand sides of (3.A.18) can in turn be expressed as
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We have dened
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)WfH =
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(1  )WfHH =
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2 :
In an economy with tax on wage income, the total tax revenues are going to be
given by
Tt =  t
Wt
Pt
Ht
= !
 t
1   t
Ht
1 Ht
Ct: (3.A.24)
In the steady state, total tax revenues equal
T = !!!HC: (3.A.25)
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The primary surplus t = Tt  Gt can then be approximated by
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 =
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Plugging (3.A.27) back into (3.A.18), and using (1.A.17)
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With (1.A.24) on the left-hand side, this can be written with rst-order accuracy as
bbt 1   t + y bYt + e 1c 1 bGt = (1  ) hfy bYt + fb t
 
 
d 1 c
 1 + d 1   e 1c 1 bGti
+Et
hbbt   t+1 + y bYt+1 + e 1c 1 bGt+1i :
(3.A.31)
The denitions of fy and f follow from (3.A.30).
Approximation to utility
We have derived in the text that the agents utility function can be written in
terms of aggregate variables as follows
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The second order approximation to the discounted sum of expected utilities given by
this expression can be written as
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(3.A.34)
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The policy objective function
We have derived above that a second-order approximation to the utility function
can be written as
Ut = C
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where Y =
 
Kc 1 + LH

. We again encounter the problem that (3.A.37) will
not serve as a correct, second-order-accurate welfare-ranking criterion for optimal
policies obtained as a solution to a system of linear structural equations (derived
above). Y is a non-trivial function of the structural parameters and is generally
non-zero. This model then represents the case in which even the assumption about
the existence of instruments to o¤set distortions to the economys steady state would
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not be helpful. To obtain a welfare function with second-order terms, one has to use
second-order approximations to structural equations to substitute out the linear term
from (3.A.37). This way, a correct welfare-ranking criterion is obtained, while the
level-e¤ects are preserved in an implicit form.
The second-order approximations to the scal solvency condition and the ag-
gregate supply relationship can be written as
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As before, the task is to nd a linear combination of these two equations such
that contains coe¢cients at linear terms of endogenous variables equal to those in
(3.A.37), which will enable us to substitute out the linear term in (3.A.37). We are
therefore looking for a vector of coe¢cients v0 = (v1; v2) such that satisfy the following
system of equations

fy zy
d 1
1 
!

v =

Y
0

:
We nd that
v =

 Y


! (1  )
Y


d 1

; (3.A.40)
where 
 = zyd
 1
   !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) fy. It therefore holds that
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where 0Y = (fy; zy) and 
0
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
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
. The denition of xY G follows from equation
(3.A.39). We can now substitute this into (3.A.37) to obtain
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The coe¢cients are dened as follows
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Equation (3.A.42) can also be expressed as
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where we have dened
bY T = qY Gqy bGT : (3.A.47)
The discussion regarding bY T and the welfare-relevant output gap from Chapter 1
applies here as well. We can now re-write all our structural equations in terms of
the welfare-relevant output gap. The price aggregate supply relationship (3.A.16)
becomes
t = yt +  (b t   b t ) + Ett+1; (3.A.48)
where yt = bYT   bY T ;  = zy, and  = ! . b t = zy!  c 1zy   qY Gqy  bGt is interpreted
as before.
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The scal solvency condition becomes
bbt 1   t + yyt + 't = (1  ) [fyyt + f (b t   b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is the composite measure of scal stress introduced in Benigno andWoodford (2003).
The IS relationship
The relationship dening the stochastic discount factor (3.11) can be written in
terms of the aggregate variables as follows
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(3.A.51)
A straightforward log-linearization of this relationship yields
 1bYt =  1EtbYt+1   bit   Etp;t+1  e 1c 1 Et bGt+1   bGt : (3.A.52)
In this we have assumed that b 1 = 0 or equivalently, that t is large enough so that
tb 1 is insignicantly di¤erent from 0.  1 will now be dened as
 1 = e 1c 1   e 1
H + !  1  e 1H : (3.A.53)
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Rewriting (3.A.52) in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap, we obtain
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Etp;t+1+ qY G
qy
  e 1c 1Et bGt+1   bGt : (3.A.54)
Assuming no persistence in the shock, we obtain the equation in the text with
brt = e 1c 1    1 qY Gqy
 bGt:
The steady state
In the steady state, prices are stable and hence there is no dispersion. Equation
(3.A.2) becomes
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!C
R
Y
 1
(1  )

1 H
R
 ; (3.A.55)
which can also be written in terms of aggregate variables as follows
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where we have used c = C=Y and H = Y

. This relationship denes the steady-
state level of output. It is easy to show that this relationship yields two solutions
for the steady-state output, one of which represents a special case with the Ricardian
agents consuming no leisure (H
R
= 1) so that H = 1+! !
1+!
. By (3.10), this implies
a corner solution case, a case of zero consumption for Ricardians in the steady state.
A positive deviation from this steady state then implies an innite increase in utility
for Ricardian agents and for the whole economy too. We therefore concentrate on the
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interior solution which can be written as
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Equation (3.A.57) can be shown to be equal to
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Next, (3.11) implies that in the steady state
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Chapter 4
Monetary-Fiscal Interactions
under Stationary Debt Targets
The principal motivation for studying policy questions in linear-quadratic frame-
works is policy-relevance. Yet the recommendation arising from such analyses might
not be acceptable politically. One needs to accept that macroeconomic policy is
normally only a part of a wider policy agenda of political representatives. Whilst
economists usually play a part in designing the macroeconomic policy framework, it
is not unlikely that the approved policy will not fully reect their advice or, even
more likely, the latest advances in optimal policy design. One way to proceed then is
to think about institutions that could implement the optimal policy in a credible way,
as in Kirsanova et al. (2006), and present this as a policy recommendation to politi-
cal representatives. An alternative approach is to nd policies that do best given the
existing political constraints. The latter is our aim in this chapter. We shall focus
on the case where existing policy frameworks require aggregate scal indicators to be
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stationary, whereas it would be desirable to let them drift permanently in response
to shocks.
We rst look at the existing policy arrangements. Ination targeting regimes
maintained by independent central banks have become a common institutional arrange-
ment on the monetary side. This institutional solution reects a large volume of
literature on time inconsistency and optimal monetary policy initiated by Kydland
and Prescott (1977). Most recently, the literature summarized in Woodford (2003)
presents a convincing case for monetary policy regimes governed by some form of a
targeting rule for ination, as proposed by Svensson (2002, 2003) and Svensson and
Woodford (2005). It has been shownamong others in the previous chapters of this
thesisthat this main policy message is robust to a diverse set of assumptions about
the nature of the frictions in the economy as well as various assumptions about the
scal side of the economy (see also Benigno and Woodford, 2004, 2005, 2006a).
Applying rules on the scal side is also becoming an accepted element of the
macroeconomic policy framework in many countries (OECD, 2002). There are promi-
nent examples of rules that require the authorities to satisfy an unconditional debt
target over the economic cycle. The Sustainable Investment Rule in the UK or the
current scal arrangements in New Zealand (see HM Treasury, 1998 and Janssen,
2001) are good examples. The Stability and Growth Pact in the EU might be in-
terpreted in a similar way if countries are at or in the neighborhood of the reference
debt-to-GDP value. Then, facing the debt ceiling, the governments must not allow a
permanent deterioration in the debt ratio following shocks.
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This view of scal sustainability, though reconcilable with earlier contributions
such as Barro (1979), seems to be at odds with some of the conclusions from recent lit-
erature. In particular, Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004) suggest that the optimal policy under nominal rigidity involves a permanent
level-shift in the debt ratio in response to even transitory shocks. In Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2005), this conclusion holds in an economy with capital as well. Our
analysis in this thesis has revealed that this time-series property of the optimal so-
lution carries over to the case with nominal wage rigidity as well as to economies
with liquidity-constrained agents. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a) show that the non-
stationarity property of the optimal timeless perspective solution is robust to a
situation when spending as well as taxes are treated as policy instruments.
The main purpose of this chapter is to show, in the context of our baseline
framework, what the implications for policy coordination might be of the conduct of
scal policy aimed at stationary outcomes, however suboptimal this understanding of
scal policy might be within our baseline framework. We also aim to identify the best
policy in the class of stationary policies and seek a possible rationalization for such
policies. In our setup, meeting a stationary debt target is a joint monetary-scal goal.
The scal authority is a strategic player. The strategic interaction between monetary
and scal policy makers here is thus principally di¤erent from the one considered in
Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006). Assigning the role of a leader to the monetary
authority, they characterize rst-best monetary action, assuming scal policy is given
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by a simple feedback rule with government spending responding to public debt.67 In
such a framework, they nd the optimal degree of scal feedback to be very small,
with a debt dynamic barely distinguishable from random walk.
In our analysis, we rst show that there exists a general class of targeting rules
similar to the one derived to be optimal in our baseline analysis that is consistent
with an unconditional debt targetthe steady state debt-to-output ratio. We then
generalize the solution to the model using this class of targeting rules. We show
that the implied interest rate path consistent with a stationary debt target features
persistent deviations from the steady-state interest rate even if ination is stabilized
with no persistence. This interest rate process can be implemented via a reaction
function in which the interest rate responds to the output gap in the long run, which
is absent in the timelessly optimal plan. We shall argue that the impacts on ination
and output (gap) volatility of faster stabilization of the economy can be mitigated by
changing the parameters of the general formulation of the specic targeting rule in a
way which is equivalent to changing the long-run response to ination in the interest
rate reaction function or by varying the degree to which new debt issuance is used to
relax the scal stress resulting from increased government spending.
Finally, we seek to identify the best in the class of stationary policy strategies
and o¤er a justication for stationary debt targets. Our strategy in this chapter is
thus reminiscent of the procedure used in Clarida et al. (1999) to identify the best rule
within the class that includes the optimal discretionary policy. Benigno andWoodford
67 Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) assume there exists a commitment technology that enables the mon-
etary policy maker to implement the time-inconsistent optimal plan.
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(2006b) explain in detail the issues involved in ranking alternative (suboptimal) policy
rules. They argue in favour of using unconditional measures to rank suboptimal
policies in order to avoid arbitrariness in ranking for di¤erent realizations of initial
conditions which might arise should one use conditional measures. In the present case,
we wish to evaluate a family of policies that in a narrower sense does not involve the
timeless perspective optimal policy. Unlike the timelessly optimal policy, the policies
we consider do not have a trend component and also do not imply the same long-run
outcomes as the timeless perspective optimal policy in the absence of disturbances
for all possible realizations of the initial conditions. If we wish to rank them against
one another, but make no comparisons with the timelessly optimal plan in Chapter 1,
it is su¢cient to use a simple unconditional welfare measure. Unconditional welfare
measures akin to the one we use have been used in the literature, for instance, in Taylor
(1979), Whiteman (1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Erceg et al. (2000),
Jensen andMcCallum (2005) or Damjanovic et al. (2006).68 Since we consider policies
that lead to mean-reversion in the target variables in the objective function, these
endogenous variables have well-dened rst and second moments, which facilitates
the use of our unconditional measure.
We then present the policy that maximizes this objective as another special case
of our general stationary dynamic model. Our analysis implies that highly persistent
scal outcomes are optimal if one denes scal goals in terms of stationary outcomes
68 We are also aware of the arguments put forward against unconditional measures, for instance, in Kim et
al. (2005). Our goal here is, however, not to derive the optimal plan but to nd the policy that is consistently
best among suboptimal plans.
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with the speed of convergence determined by the rate of time preference. This is
broadly in line with earlier results on stationary plans. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis
(2006) nd the optimal persistence to be even higher, while in Siu (2004), the optimal
policy under price stickiness implies a similarly high degree of inertia. It emerges then
that if policies are to be stationary, the desired speed of convergence is going to be
very slow. Kirsanova et al. (2006) argued that governments might lack the credibility
to implement such highly-inertial strategies. Institutional arrangements such as the
Fiscal Monitoring Committee suggested, among others, in their paper are therefore
of considerable interest. We also show that this policy entails a marginally weaker
response to ination in the interest rate reaction function, a small long-run response
to the output gap, and a weaker feedthrough from the scal shock to debt.
Interestingly, the proposed ranking of stationary policies also provides a way
to rationalize the use of stationary debt targets in the context of models considered
here. It follows from our analysis that should policy makers expect endogenous vari-
ables to be drawn from a time-invariant distribution, stationary debt targets can be
rationalized as an outcome of a systematic policy framework aiming to minimize the
social welfare loss over the entire distribution of initial conditions generated by all
possible histories of shocks rather than a specic one.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We replace the timelessly op-
timal targeting rule from our baseline framework with an alternative general spec-
ication of the rule in Section 1 and show that policies in this class would imply
stationary responses. We also explain the implications for the coordination of mon-
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etary and scal policies. In section 2 we discuss the issues associated with ranking
stationary policies against one another and identify the policy that maximizes our
chosen unconditional criterion. Section 3 makes some concluding remarks. The mi-
crofoundations of the model and the model of the macroeconomy remain as in Chapter
1.
4.1 Policy issues when the scal side is stationary
We have argued in the introduction that, in reality, there are important cases when
scal policy is constrained to deliver outcomes that di¤er from the timelessly optimal
results in terms of the time-series properties of the scal variables. In this section, we
analyze how an economy might behave under such conduct of scal policy. In other
words, we look at the implications for the conduct of monetary policy of a scal policy
aimed at a stationary debt ratio. To this end, we look at a generalized version of the
specic targeting rule (1.34) in Chapter 1 to enable straightforward comparison of
results across models. This formulation of the joint policy target can accommodate
a wide range of policies.
Consider, therefore, replacing (1.34) with
t + 1t 1   2 (yt   3yt 1) = 0; (4.1)
so that 1, 2 are non-zero and 0 6 3 < 1.
69 Let this rule characterize the joint
policy aim of the respective branches of the central government alongside a targeting
69 Further restrictions on i for i = 1; 2; 3 will apply to ensure the existence of a unique and bounded
solution to a dynamic system that involves (4.1). See below.
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rule for ination given by
EtT = 0 (4.2)
for all T > t. It clearly follows that for T > t+ 1,
EtyT+1 = 3EtyT : (4.3)
Under such policy, the output gap would be expected to converge back to its steady-
state value of zero, since
lim
T!1
EtyT = 0:
Ination is stationary by (4.2), and thus the convergence would also apply to the tax
rate by
b t = b t   1' yt + 1' t
which follows from the aggregate supply relationship. It follows that the primary
surplus and its ratio to aggregate output will converge to its steady-state value as well.
The scal solvency requirement implies that the dynamics of outstanding liabilities
would also be characterized by convergence towards the initial steady state. We have
thus identied a class of targeting rules that are consistent with stationary scal
outcomes.
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4.1.1 Dynamics of the economy under a stationary rule
We shall use the structural equations
t =  [yt + ' (b t   b t )] + Ett+1; (4.4)
bbt 1   t    1yt + 't = (1  ) [fyyt + f (b t   b t )]
+Et
hbbt   t+1    1yt+1i ; (4.5)
together with the future ination target (4.2) and the targeting rule (4.1) to charac-
terize the dynamics of the economy.70 Solving (4.5) at t + 1, and using (4.3) yields
a relationship between the deviation in outstanding liabilities and the (t+ 1)-period
output gap71
Etyt+1 = abbt; (4.6)
in which
a =
(1  3)h
(1  ) fy  
(1 )f
'
+ (1  3) 
 1
i : (4.7)
The intuition here is simple. It is straightforward from (1.17) that there are two
ways to satisfy scal solvency following a rise in public debt. First, the conventional
way, is through higher future primary surpluses. In this scenario, taxes need to be
raised. Tax-smoothing implies that it will be optimal to spread the tax increase over
time. Higher taxes, ceteris paribus, keep output below its steady-state level. Hence,
70 The interpretation of the variables in the structural equations remain as in Chapter 1.
71 Note that we analyze the impact of a single, serially uncorrelated shock. A more general formulation
of the relationship would include an expression for the discounted series of current and future scal stress
variables.
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even in the absence of shocks in the future, we observe a sequence of output gaps.
In this case, we would expect a < 0. The second way is through interest rate cuts,
which discount the value of total outstanding liabilities.72 This policy option boosts
demand and thus a signicant tax cut or, eventually, a subsidy (negative tax rate)
is implemented to ensure the corresponding level of supply. In this case a > 0. It
follows from (4.7) that there exists a speed of convergence 3 such that
lim
3!
 
3
a =1 and lim
3!
+
3
a =  1;
with
3 =
h
(1  ) fy  
(1 )f
'
+  1
i
 1
: (4.8)
For 3, no bounded solution exists. For fast convergence (3 2 [0; 

3)), the interest-
rate channel applies while higher persistence (3 2 (

3; 1)) in scal variables is con-
sistent with adjustment via future surpluses. For 3 2 [0; 

3), a is convex in 3 and
conversely, for 3 2 (

3; 1); a is concave in 3.
Next, let us postulate that the dynamics of outstanding liabilities can be ex-
pressed as a transformation of an underlying autoregressive process
bbt = b0t; (4.9)
t = b1t 1 + b2
bbt 1 + 't ; (4.10)
where b0; b1 and b2 are constants. By (4.6),
EtbbT+1 = 3bbT (4.11)
72 This is our analogue of the passive monetary policy regime in Leeper (1991) and Kirsanova and Wren-
Lewis (2006).
4.1 Policy issues when the scal side is stationary 224
and
EtT+1 = 3T (4.12)
for all T > t.
Though the shock to government expenditures and hence 't are exogenous, the
parameters of the process (4.10) need not be. In fact, we can think of this as a
dynamic relationship that captures various aspects of scal policy conduct and its
parameters as policy variables. For instance, the product of parameters
b0b2 > 0 (4.13)
represents the degree of feedthrough of overall scal stress 't (+bbt 1, if any) into
debt. This allows us to choose the degree to which the government relies on debt
nance to deal with the consequences of the spending shock for scal sustainability.
Note, that by combining the above equations, we obtain that the coe¢cients need to
satisfy
b1 + b0b2 = 3: (4.14)
Since the degree of persistence 3 is also a policy parameter, b1 will follow from the
choice of b0b2 to which it is inversely related.
Returning to the t-period structural equations, and using (4.2) and (4.6) to-
gether with the relation
t =
2
1
(Etyt+1   3yt) ; (4.15)
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Parameter Value
1
n
m
2
!
m
3 1
b0 nb
b1
mb
mb+nb
b2
1
mb+nb
Table 4.1. Parameter values to recover the timelessly optimal solution
which follows from the (t+ 1)-period version of (4.1), we can solve for the dynamics
of the output gap.
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Equation (4.15) will then imply the following dynamics of the ination rate
t =
8<:a+
h
1 + (1 )f
'

2
1
a+  (1   1a)
i
3h
(1  ) fy +  1  
(1 )f
'
  2
1
3

1 + (1 )f
'
i
9=; b0b121t 1
+
8<:b0b2a  3
n
1  b0b2
h
1 + (1 )f
'

2
1
a+  (1   1a)
io
h
(1  ) fy +  1  
(1 )f
'
  2
1
3

1 + (1 )f
'
i
9=; 21
bbt 1 + 't
= t 1 + b
bbt 1 + 't : (4.17)
The dynamics of the tax rate can then be derived from (1.32). The dynamic equations
above have a bounded solution only if
2
1
3 6=
(1  ) fy + 
 1   (1 )f
'
1 + (1 )f
'
: (4.18)
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For parameter values shown in Table 4.1, we could recover the solution optimal from
a timeless perspective derived in Chapter 1.
4.1.2 Policy implications
The analytical discussion in the previous part of this section o¤ers some insights into
how policy will di¤er from the timeless perspective optimal policy if we restrain our
attention to the class of policies for which 3 2 [0; 1) f

3g and bj for j = 0; 1; 2 and
i for i = 1; 2; 3 satisfy (4.13), (4.14) and (4.18). It is perhaps most straightforward
to exposit the di¤erence on the monetary side by looking rst at the fundamentals
based reaction function. Combining the aggregate demand function
yt = Etyt+1   
bit   Ett+1   brt ; (4.19)
the ination target (4.2) and (4.15) yields the following expression for the implied
path of the interest rate
bit = brt +  112t    1 (1  3) yt: (4.20)
The implied response function for the monetary authority under a general stationary
policy, unlike the timelessly optimal response function in Chapter 1, thus features
a small pro-cyclical response to the projected output gap. The pro-cyclical element
in the reaction function plays an instrumental role in bringing about a consumption
path consistent with the dynamics of output that is itself driven by the underlying
scal policy. In particular, once the shock dies out and ination stabilizes, it is
this pro-cyclical response to (the) output (gap) that prevents the interest rate from
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returning to its steady-state level, and thereby induces an intertemporal allocation of
consumption that is consistent with the output level that converges to its pre-shock
steady-state. In terms of the expectations based reaction function
it = brt + Ett+1 +  1Etyt+1    12 t    112t 1    13yt 1: (4.21)
the long-run response coe¢cient at the output gap term is non-zero and the long-run
response to ination might also be a¤ected. The rules for the scal side interestingly
remain una¤ected.
Second, though the coe¢cients determining the dynamics of ination and the
output gap are not trivial functions of 3, we can still speculate about possible ways
of counteracting the e¤ects of a gradual reduction in 3 on the responses in ination
and output gap to shocks, or more broadly, ination and output gap volatility. It
is easy to see from (4.16) and (4.17) that the two channels of inuence available are
via the ratio 2
1
or through manipulating b0b2. We see from (4.20) that changing the
2
1
ratio is equivalent to an inverse change in the response coe¢cient at the ination
rate in the implied interest rate rule (4.20), or equivalently, a change in the long-run
response to ination and history-dependence of policy in (4.21). The second channel
involves changing the degree to which debt nance is used to deal with the scal
consequences of the rise in government spending.
We have thus demonstrated that real-world policies that induce stationarity
have implications for the dynamics of the economy. So the key question is how should
theorists and policy makers rank policies given by (4.1). In other words, since we have
a number of policy options available with ambiguous overall impact on welfare, the
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challenge is to choose the optimal mix of parameters that would deliver the highest
welfare within the class of rules given by (4.1).
4.2 Ranking stationary policies
Ranking of policies characterized by (4.1) is not a straightforward task and the choice
of an appropriate ranking criterion requires some discussion. An obvious candidate
for a good welfare measure to evaluate alternative policies suboptimal relative to
the timelessly optimal policy follows from the Lagrangian (1.22). This criterion is
a modication of (1.21) so that policies that deviate from the timelessly optimal
policy in time t get penalized
	t = Et
(
1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
T +
1
2
q
2
T

+
e2;t 1   e1;t 1 t +  1e2;t 1yto : (4.22)
ei;t 1 for i = 1; 2 refers to the solution for the (t  1)-period Lagrange multiplier
one would obtain from the dynamic system in Chapter 1. However, such a criterion
might result in arbitrariness in the ranking of suboptimal rulesespecially those lying
outside the class that includes the timelessly optimal policydepending on initial
conditions, which is an issue also raised in Benigno and Woodford (2006b). To see
this, it is enough if we solve for the expected evolution of the output gap and ination
under a stationary rule as follows
EtxT = Azt 1 +B't;
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in which x =(; y)0, z =

;bb0 and
A =

( + bb0) b1
T t 1
3 ( + bb0) b2
T t 1
3
(y + ybb0) b1
T t 1
3 (y + ybb0) b2
T t 1
3

;
B =

( + bb0) b2
T t 1
3
(y + ybb0) b2
T t 1
3

:
Etx
2
T would then also depend on initial conditions and given the complexity of the
coe¢cients in A,
@Etx2T
@i
for i = 1; 2; 3, for instance, would also depend on zt 1. This
dependence on initial conditions, also identied in Soderlind (1999), may therefore
cause a substantial degree of ambiguity in welfare ranking that is not likely to yield
any useful recommendation for policy makers. As noted in Benigno and Woodford
(2006b), policy makers might nd themselves in a situation that adherence to a policy
rule based on (4.22) given specic initial conditions at some point in time need not
deliver maximum welfare according to (4.22) within the same class of (suboptimal)
policies at some later date.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b, 2005), for example, resolve the issue by rank-
ing rules assuming that the system is initially in its non-stochastic steady state. Be-
nigno and Woodford (2006b) have in turn proposed taking into account all possible
initial states (i.e. their probability distribution) rather any single one. This amounts
to ranking policies according to an unconditional welfare measure. The distribution
of initial states is, in general, determined by the nature of the shocks as well as pol-
icy. Benigno and Woodford (2006b) suggest one should evaluate alternative policies
over a distribution of initial states determined by the timelessly optimal policy. In
the present case, the timelessly optimal policy involves a permanent level shift in
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the output gap. For this case, they have proposed separating the trend and the cycli-
cal component of the series. This would imply a similar decomposition for welfare
in which the welfare e¤ects arising from cyclical variation would be independent of
the trend component. Hence, for a given value of the trend component, alterna-
tive policies consistent with the same trend component could be evaluated over the
distribution of all possible realizations of the cyclical components.
In our case, the class of policies we investigate does not include the policy
optimal from a timeless perspective. The processes driving our endogenous variables
have no trend component. The stationary policies do not imply convergence to the
timelessly optimal long-run outcome in the absence of disturbances for all values
of the vector of initial states zt 1. Therefore, all variation in endogenous variables
corresponds to variation in their cyclical component.
It follows that in order to rank stationary policies in the class given by (4.1)
against one another on average for all possible initial conditionsthat is, without
making welfare comparisons against the timeless perspective optimal planit is
feasible and su¢cient to evaluate which policy maximizes the unconditional expected
value of (4.22). Note that since policies in the class under consideration yield sta-
tionary responses in both ination and the output gap, the target variables in the
policy objective have well-dened rst and second moments. The rst moments in
the present case are zero. Hence, our objective in principle amounts to identifying
the policy that yields the lowest value of (1.21) on average for all possible realization
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of shocks in the past under stationary policy. The criterion can be written as
e	 = eE 1
2
qyy
2
t +
1
2
q
2
t

; (4.23)
where eE is the unconditional expectations operator. This ranking criterion for sta-
tionary policies also implies a way one could rationalize the use of stationary debt
targets in actual conduct of policy. If policy makers expect that the values of key
variables such as ination or the output gap are drawn from a stationary distribution,
then minimizing the unconditional expectation of the general utility-based quadratic
welfare objective is consistent with a stationary debt target. Next, we examine the
properties of the best policy aimed at stationary scal outcomes.
A convenient way to identify the best policy according to (4.23) is to dene the
Lagrangian
eEJt = eE(Et 1X
T=t
T t

1
2
qyy
2
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1
2
q
2
T

+1;T [T   yT   ' (bT   b T )  EtT+1]
+2;T
hbbT 1   T    1yT + 'T   (1  ) fyyT   (1  ) f (bT   b T )
 bbT + EtT+1 + Et 1yT+1ioo : (4.24)
Given that the distribution of variables is time-invariant, the unconditional expecta-
tion operator will satisfy the following properties: eEEtxT = xt which implies that
eEEt1;TT+1 = eE1;t 1t and eEEt2;T bT 1 = eEEt2;t+1bt. The unconditional La-
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Table 4.2. Parameter values for the optimal stationary policy
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Following Damjanovic et al. (2006), we note that the unconditional expectations
operator can be written in a Lebesgue integral form and to maximize this integral,
one needs to maximize the expression under the integral. In our case, this is the
expression in the curly brackets. The policy that maximizes the criterion (4.23),
henceforth referred to as optimal stationary policy, is then characterized by coe¢cient
values given in Table 4.2, where
nb = (m + n)

fy
1 + 
 
f
' (1 + )
+  1

:
There are several things we need to note about the optimal stationary policy
given by
t + 
n
m
t 1  
!
m
(yt   yt 1) = 0: (4.26)
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First, the low optimal speed of convergence implies that the optimal scal strategy
within the class of stationary strategies will be characterized by highly persistent
deviations from the steady state. The optimal degree of persistence is determined
by the rate of time preference. This is broadly in line with the result in Kirsanova
and Wren-Lewis (2006). Second, the optimal stationary policy implies a somewhat
weaker long-run response to ination in the monetary policy reaction function and
the long-run response coe¢cient at the output gap term is small
it = brt + Ett+1 +  1Etyt+1    1m! t    1n!t 1    1yt 1: (4.27)
Third, we see both from (4.26) and (4.27) that the history-dependence of policy weak-
ens. Finally, for plausible numerical values, it can also be shown that the feedthrough
b0b2 from the scal shock to debt is weaker under stationary optimal policy (see Figure
4.1 below).
4.2.1 Numerical results
We illustrate the di¤erence between the timelessly optimal plan and our best station-
ary plan using numerical simulation. We take the parameter values from Chapter 1.
Figure 4.1 displays the results. Under the optimal stationary policy, as indicated by
the dashed red line, public debt, the tax rate as well as the output gap converge to
their initial levels. The speed of convergence is slow. Public debt has only converged
approximately half the way after 12 years. We see, however, that the dynamics of
the economy involves more short-term volatility under the optimal stationary plan.
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This follows from the fact that the requirement of a stationary scal response limits
the degree to which tax smoothing can be implemented. This is intuitive and follows
from the way formulation of stationary policies implied by the ranking criterion (4.23)
di¤ers from the formulation of policies optimal from a timeless perspective. When
formulating timelessly optimal policies, one discounts future welfare losses arising
from deviations in public debt, the tax rate and hence output from their steady-state
levels. The benets of short-term stability outweigh the (discounted) costs of per-
manent future deviations. Hence, optimal tax smoothing involves a permanent tax
increase, which makes it possible to achieve more stability in the short term. In the
case of the class of policies we examine, the terms of trade are di¤erent. The uncon-
ditional welfare measure implies that future welfare losses are undiscounted and thus
receive an equal weight. This makes the policy of a permanent shift in public debt
and the tax rate an unattractive strategy. Due to less tax smoothing, stationary out-
comes are then associated with somewhat higher short-term volatility. In our model,
higher short-term volatility in response to a rise in government spending brings in
more tax revenue relative to the timelessly optimal case and therefore, as shown in
Figure 4.1, the policy maker relies less on debt nance under the best stationary plan.
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Fig. 4.1. Responses under the timelessly optimal policy and the optimal stationary
plan
4.3 Concluding remarks 236
4.3 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the consequences for monetary policy, and for policy coordination
in a broader sense, of policies that yield stationary paths for key scal indicators and
identied the policy in this class that produces the highest welfare according to an
unconditional welfare criterion. We motivate this search for optimal stationary poli-
cies by noting that they seem to have an appeal in the real world. We have shown
that such policies can be nested in a general framework that also includes the time-
lessly optimal policy and can be implemented through adherence to a pair of specic
targeting rules, one of which is characterized by less history dependence compared
with the corresponding timelessly optimal rule. Our analysis has shown that the
consequences of faster speed of convergence in scal variables can be mitigated by
changing the parameters of one of the specic targeting rules in a way which is equiv-
alent to varying the strength of the response in the interest rate to ination and/or by
varying the degree to which scal policy relies on new debt issuance to deal with the
scal consequences of the shocks. The stationary policy that maximizes our uncondi-
tional welfare ranking criterion is characterized by high persistence, an interest-rate
response function in which the interest rate responds less to ination in the long run
compared with the timeless perspective optimal policy and a scal policy that uses
less debt nance to deal with the scal consequences of shocks. Short run volatility,
however, increases, as there is less smoothing of tax distortions over time. We have
also found that the monetary policy reaction function under stationary debt regimes
coupled with a zero-ination future target features a non-zero long-run response to
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the output gap. This contrasts with the timelessly optimal interest-rate reaction
function, which involves a long-run response to ination only. As a result of this dif-
ference, the interest rate converges to its steady state level only gradually following
the shock, even if ination is stabilized with no persistence. This is to ensure an in-
tertemporal allocation of consumption that is in line with the converging behaviour
of output in the economy.
Chapter 5
Summary and Future Research
Recent contributions have signicantly extended the understanding of the trade-
o¤s policy makers face when conducting policy in distorted environments. In the
introduction to this thesis, which provides a detailed overview of earlier results, we
set out that the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the ongoing research e¤ort aimed
at testing the robustness of conclusions from simpler setups to modelling environments
in which economies are subject to multiple distortions. The aim has been to write a
thesis that is innovative, and which provides a useful framework for thinking about
real-world policy issues.
The thesis presented here uses a method of analysis that has been proved to be
reliable in delivering results that are useful from the perspective of policy design in
practice. It is also innovative, as it introduces new features not considered thus far in
the context of optimal monetary-scal coordination. The thesis also o¤ers guidance
for situations when implementing optimal plans would require overly complex decision
rules and situations when optimal plans are not a part of the political agenda at all.
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We have shown how the presence of nominal wage rigidity a¤ects optimal con-
duct of monetary and scal policy. We demonstrated that in an environment with
staggered wage adjustment and endogenous scal dynamics, the individual utility-
based preferences of the policy maker can be represented using a quadratic objective
function that includes price ination, wage ination and output gap stabilization
terms. Our analysis implies that this conclusion from the earlier literature on opti-
mal policy under sticky prices and wages survives in an environment when lump-sum
taxes are unavailable as a source of government nance. In such a framework, the
optimal dynamics of the real wage rate is much more acyclical compared with the
exible-wage baseline setup. While the economy hit by a one-o¤ shock stabilizes with
no persistence under sticky prices and exible wages, endogenous persistence is gener-
ated when wages are sticky. We have argued that it is enough for one of the markets
to be imperfectly exible to make the policy of strict price- and/or wage-level tar-
geting undesirable. We have shown that changing the degree of nominal rigidity has
only little e¤ect on long-term tax policy. However, there can be signicant variation
in short-term tax policy, if the change in average contract length occurs in the mar-
ket in which decisions are distorted by the tax system. We have proposed a pair of
simple specic targeting rules for monetary and scal policy makersa rule for ina-
tion and a relationship that links real wage growth to past price and wage ination,
and output gap dynamicsto approximate optimal policy. This is necessary, as it is
no longer possible to characterize optimal policy using an analytical solution when
both wages and prices are sticky, and monetary policy has scal consequences. We
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have found such specication of policy, which is otherwise consistent with complex
rules at operational level, providing an excellent match with optimal outcomes fol-
lowing a given shock, and hence potentially leading to lower welfare losses relative
to the timelessly optimal plan compared with the conventional method of approx-
imating optimal policy by simple rules for policy instruments. We have also found
that the nature of the tax system inuences the correct specication of the ination
targeting rule.
We have also studied the optimal policy implications of the presence of agents
who have no access to the asset market in the economy. We have presented a setup
in which agents are heterogenous in terms of their asset holdings and yet there is no
need to track the distribution of wealth across individuals over time, which enabled
us to retain and benet from the tractability of analysis in a representative-agent
framework. We have shown that the preferences of the policy maker can be expressed
by a conventional quadratic welfare objective in which, however, the share of non-
Ricardian agents in the economy a¤ects the weight placed on ination and output gap
variability, as well as the target level of output in the output gap. We have analyzed
the dynamics of the economy in response to a positive innovation in government
spending and found that the optimal deviation in output in response to the shock
increases as the population share of non-Ricardian agents rises, while optimal ination
volatility decreases. Though earlier studies have linked crowd-in e¤ects of government
spending with the presence of liquidity-constrained agents, our model does not signal
such e¤ects to be a feature of the optimal economy. We have derived policy reaction
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functions for authorities that ensure policy instruments are set to implement the
optimal dynamics of the economy and analyzed the determinants of the optimal
paths for the interest rate and the tax rate. It has been shown that under certain
circumstances, potentially controversial policy responses such as an interest rate cut
or a reduction in the tax rate is the optimal response to a rise in government spending.
While earlier contributions have suggested that an important feature of opti-
mal policy under nominal rigidity is that public debt should be allowed to drift in
response to shocks, unconditional debt targets remain an important feature of some
of the policy frameworks around the world. This motivates our search in this the-
sis for the best policy in the family of those consistent with an unconditional debt
target. We have ranked alternative rules from the family of rules consistent with
stationary outcomes using an unconditional welfare measure, which also provides a
way to rationalize unconditional debt targets as policy objectives. We found that
the best stationary policy was characterized by high persistence in debt, an interest
rate path that does not stabilize with ination but converges gradually, responding
to the output gap in the long run, unlike the baseline optimal interest rate policy.
Under such regime, scal policy then relies less on debt nance to deal with the scal
consequences of shocks which comes at a cost of more short-term volatility.
To conclude this chapter and the thesis, we wish to provide an outline of the
issues that have not been addressed in this thesis but would represent interesting
extensions of the research work conducted here.
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5.1 Further work on heterogeneity
It is of considerable interest in analyzing optimal monetary and scal policy in the
context of models capable of capturing wealth and income heterogeneity without a
loss in their reliability to predict aggregate variables. Krusell and Smith (1998) laid
down the foundations of such analysis. We believe frameworks with income and/or
wealth heterogeneity would greatly widen the scope of stabilization policy questions
one could analyze. In particular, there is little known about optimal automatic sta-
bilization. We know that heterogeneous agent models provide a fertile setting for
solving optimal tax problems. Putting them into a dynamic context in a model able
to accommodate multiple scal instruments would be a way to shed more light on the
optimal structure of taxation and spending over the cycle. We therefore see a great
potential in conducting research aimed at analyzing the distributive consequences of
stabilization policy. A related issue would be to analyze the optimal use of instru-
ments over the cycle and identify the winners and losers under alternative policy
strategies. We know little about which taxes or types of spending should be varied
over the cycle to deal with specic shocks. Robust answers to these issues would be
hugely benecial, should one consider delegating parts of scal policy to a body that
goes well beyond being merely an advisory or oversight committee, as suggested in
Kirsanova et al. (2006) and elsewhere.
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5.2 Methodological issues
It is a great challenge to blend existing frameworks developed to analyze questions
of policy design with the type of analysis presented in Krusell and Smith (1998) and
outlined in the previous section. The analysis in Chapter 3, where we have introduced
heterogeneity in terms of access to the asset market and shown that presence of
liquidity constraints might have signicant consequences for optimal policy, is a good
illustration of the di¢culties one might face when applying standard methods of
policy analysis to environments with heterogeneous agents. Even though one can only
celebrate its usefulness from the perspective of guidance for policy, the methodology
summarized in Benigno and Woodford (2006b) is prone to serious limitations. To
be able to derive a second-order accurate objective function, one often has to make
compromises regarding the richness of the environment, as we have seen in Chapter
2. There is therefore a great potential to enhance the methodology of optimal policy
analysis so that it is consistent with more complex modelling setups, while presenting
the policy problem and its optimal results in a tractable and policy-relevant manner.
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